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ABSTRACf 
Title: Feyerabend and Incommensurability 
Author: Graham Ryan 
I consider only the semantic claims of Paul Feyerabend's incommensurability 
thesis. These semantic claims are that incommensurable scientific theories, 
taken paradigmatically as successive theories: (1) are inconsistent; (2) the terms 
of one theory differ in meaning to those of another incommensurable theory; 
and (3) the claims of one theory are largely logically independent of the other. 
Since the inconsistency claim (1) is essential to Feyerabend's argument (against 
the Received View on theory reduction and explanation), I claim that (2) and (3) 
must be understood in the light of (1), and that (3) must be revised to avoid 
contradiction with (1). Feyerabend's semantic theory supporting (3) is presented 
and found wanting. Two other main arguments against (3) are also considered. 
The first is the causal theory of reference (of Putnam and Devitt), including 
causal descriptive theories advocated by Kitcher and Psillos; none of these 
theories is found to offer compelling reasons to reject (3). The second main 
argument against (3) is Donald Davidson's essay 'On the Very Idea of a 
Conceptual Scheme', and a close reading of Davidson's paper is offered. I fmd 
that Davidson does offer convincing reasons for rejecting any implication by (3) 
that the languages of incommensurable theories are not intertranslatable, or that 
such theories are closed cognitive frameworks. However, I agree with Larry 
Laudan that Davidson does not deliver a fatal blow to the semantic 
incommensurability thesis because: (a) incommensurability need not entail 
nontranslatability; and (b) Davidson's semantic arguments do not succeed in 
demonstrating that the very notion of a conceptual scheme is incoherent. I 
present briefly two versions of the semantic incommensurability thesis which 
are consistent in an interesting way with (1), (2) and a revised (3), namely 
taxonomic incommensurability and a model of misinterpretation in intractable 
conflicts. 
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Preface 
I would like to thank Dr. Robin Hendry for his well-informed supervision and 
for having the perseverance to read not just this version but an untold number of 
drafts. 
My biggest debt of gratitude is to my wife Irene. Without her support and 
interest this thesis would either never have been started or, if started, probably 
never have been completed. 
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Introduction 
" .. .incommensurability ... although my ideas on the matter are pitiful, the 
objections are even more pitiful."t 
It is now forty years since Paul Feyerabend published 'Explanation, Reduction 
and Empiricism', his first paper proposing the incommensurability thesis. In the 
same year, 1962, Thomas Kuhn proposed his own version of the 
incommensurability thesis, but Kuhn's The Structure of Scientific Revolutions 
has received the lion's share of academic attention.2 The relative lack of attention 
given to Feyerabend's incommensurability thesis provides a reason for 
reconsidering his proposals and revisiting the debates around them. 
Here, I consider the early semantic claims of Feyerabend's incommensurability 
thesis. These semantic claims are that incommensurable scientific theories, 
taken paradigmatically as successive theories: (1) are inconsistent; (2) the terms 
of one theory differ in meaning to those of another incommensurable theory; 
and (3) the claims of one theory are largely logically independent of the other. 
Since the inconsistency claim (1) is essential to Feyerabend's argument against 
the Received View on theory reduction and explanation, and the 
incommensurability thesis is a part of that argument, I claim that (2) and (3) 
must be understood in the light of (1), and that (3) must be revised to avoid 
contradiction with (1). Another reason for revising (3) is that Feyerabend's 
semantic theory supporting (3) is found wanting. 
Opposition to (3) has come from many quarters. Two of the main arguments 
against (3) are considered. The first is the causal theory of reference (of Hilary 
Putnam and Michael Devitt), including causal descriptive theories advocated by 
Philip Kitcher and Stathis Psillos; none of these theories is found to offer 
compelling reasons to reject (3). The second main argument against (3) is 
Donald Davidson's essay 'On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme', and a close 
1 Feyerabend, in a letter written to lmre Lakatos in 1971 , Feyerabend (1999b), p. 237 
2 In 1977, Frederick Suppe believed he spoke for many when he said: "Feyerabend' s philosophy of science has little to 
recommend itself and is losing whatever importance and influence it once had within philosophy of science." Suppe 
( 1977), p. 643 . 
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reading of Davidson's paper is offered. I find that Davidson does offer 
convincing reasons for rejecting any implication by (3) that the languages of 
incommensurable theories are not intertranslatable, or that such theories are 
closed cognitive frameworks. However, I agree with Larry Laudan that Davidson 
does not deliver a fatal blow to a slightly revised semantic incommensurability 
thesis because: (a) incommensurability need not entail nontranslatability; and 
(b) Davidson's semantic arguments do not succeed in demonstrating that the 
very notion of a conceptual scheme is incoherent. I present briefly two directions 
that a revised semantic incommensurability thesis, or theses, might take. These 
directions, namely taxonomic incommensurability and a model of 
misinterpretation in intractable conflicts, are consistent in an interesting way 
with (1), (2) and a revised (3). 
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Chapter 1 
Problems With The Relations 
[I]t is usually possible for the primitive concepts of an axiomatic system such as 
geometry to be correlated with, or interpreted by, the concepts of another 
system, e.g. physics. This possibility is particularly important when, in the 
course of the evolution of science, one system of statements is being explained 
by means of a new - a more general - system of hypotheses which permits the 
deduction not only of statements belonging to the first system, but also of 
statements belonging to other systems. In such cases it may be possible to 
define the fundamental concepts of the new system with the help of concepts 
which were originally used in some of the old systems. 
Karl Popper (1959), The Logic of Scientific Discovery, p. 75. 
I think that incommensurability turns up when we sharpen our concepts in the 
manner demanded by the logical positivists and their offspring and that it 
undermines their ideas on explanation, reduction and progress [ ... ] but Kuhn 
used a different approach to apply the same term to a similar (not identical) 
situation. His approach was historical, while mine was abstract. 
Paul Feyerabend (1993). Against Method, pp. 211-2. 
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Introduction 
In 'Explanation, Reduction and Empiricism' (1962) Paul Feyerabend presents the 
incommensurability thesis (IT) as a denial and some additional proposals. That is, 
Feyerabend's presentation of the IT in 'Explanation, Reduction and Empiricism' is 
founded on the argument that the highly influentiaP Received View of scientific 
theories and theoretical change is false. The 'Received View' is a standard 
appellation given to logical positivist and logical empiricist views which regard 
scientific theories as languages with a clearly specified vocabulary and structure. 
The Received View's formal description of the language of a scientific theory makes 
two general claims pertinent to Feyerabend's paper. First, "it embraces a 
'hypothetico-deductive' view of theories"2 such that a theory is a set of theoretical 
principles from which logically follow observation statements (and the observable 
consequences they state). Second, it assumes that observation statements "are 
scientifically and theoretically neutral, and nonproblematic with respect to truth"3 
and "that observational data are the bedrock on which theories ultimately rest"4• The 
two claims combine to assert that "a scientific theory is a deductively connected 
bundle of laws which are applicable to observable phenomena in ways specified by 
the correspondence rules."5 Put this way, the Received View appears almost 
innocuous. However, Feyerabend argues that the Received View extends the two 
synchronic claims made above to diachronic assertions. For example, Ernest Nagel's 
view of theory reduction and Carl Hempel's (and Paul Oppenheim's) deductive-
nomological model of scientific explanation augment the first claim by positing 
deductive relations between successive theories. The second claim implies that 
"highly confirmed theories are relatively immune from subsequent 
disconfirmation."6 It is these further claims and the assumptions which underlie 
them that Feyerabend challenges. 
1 
"It is little exaggeration to say that virtually every significant result obtained in philosophy of science between the 1920s and 
1950 either employed or tacitly assumed the Received View." Suppe ( 1977), p. 4. 
2 Lambert, K. & Brittan, Gordon G. (1992), p. 92. 
3 Suppe ( 1977), p. 48. 
4 Lambert, K. & Brittan, Gordon G. ( 1992), p. 97. 
5 Suppe ( 1977), p. 36. 
6 Suppe ( 1977), p. 56. 
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Before Feyerabend argues against the Received View, he first describes it by 
attributing to it "the thesis of development by reduction"7, the claims, mentioned in 
the previous paragraph, that "old theories are not rejected or abandoned once they 
have been accepted; they are just superseded by more comprehensive theories to 
which they are reduced."8 Feyerabend maintains that this thesis of theory 
development by reduction, as well as deductive-nomological explanation, place three 
constraints (to be described in the coming Parts) on the relations between successive 
theories, namely: 
the derivability condition 
the consistency condition 
the meaning invariance condition 
Feyerabend then criticises these three alleged conditions. Having shown that the 
three conditions are untenable for general theories in a common domain, 
Feyerabend then argues that pairs of successive theories which do not meet the 
above conditions, and which also meet some further conditions which he stipulates, 
are incommensurable. 
Part 1 of this chapter considers whether Feyerabend is right to attribute the 
derivability and consistency conditions to the Received View of theory reduction; 
and Part 2 considers the same question with respect to the Received View of 
explanation. Part 3 deals with the attribution of the meaning invariance condition to 
the Received View. From the first three Parts, I conclude, with certain reservations, 
that Feyerabend rightly attributes the derivability, consistency and meaning 
invariance conditions to the Received View. 
In Part 4, Feyerabend's objections to the Received View are stated and his 
arguments are judged valid, though doubts are raised about their soundness: some 
of the premises expressing proposals of the meaning variance thesis (MVT) are 
problematic, particularly the claim that successive theories may be logically 
independent in a common domain. Part 5 has three main tasks. The fust is to state 
the four main claims of the MVT and to highlight problems. The second task of Part 
5 is to claim that the MVT expresses the semantic claims of IT. It is the semantic 
problems of the IT, that is, the MVT, which will be addressed in the subsequent 
7 Suppe ( 1977), p. 56. 
8 Suppe ( 1977), p. 56. 
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chapters. PartS's third task is to argue that, as a result of Feyerabend's arguments 
against the Received View, what he calls two 'incommensurable' theories are first 
and foremost mutually inconsistent; so the claim of logical independence will need 
to be revised. 
Part 1 ~ Reduction. 
Feyerabend attributes the derivability and consistency conditions to Nagelian 
reduction as a representative of the Received View. The burden of Part 1 is whether 
these two conditions are legitimately attributed to Nagel and the Received View of 
theory reduction. Throughout this and subsequent chapters, let 'T1' and 'T2' signifY 
two general theories which have a common domain9 and are such that T2 succeeds, 
and is wider10 than, T1. 
The derivability condition is the claim that the sentences of T1 are a logical 
consequence of the sentences ojT2. Attributing this condition to Nagelian reduction 
is not entirely straight-forward. Nagel himself maintains that "[t]he objective of 
reduction is to show that the laws, or the general principles of the secondary science 
are simply logical consequences of the primary science."11 Here, it looks as if Nagel 
posits derivability between sciences, not theories. A (branch of) science may be 
defined by the problems which that science is concerned with, along with 
characteristic methods and techniques. A theory, according to the Received View, is 
an explanatory and predictive system composed of: 
an abstract calculus whose postulates [ ... ] 'implicitly define the basic notions of 
the system' [ ... and] correspondence rules, relating theoretical notions to 
'observational procedures'[ ... ] or 'experimental concepts'.l2 
Reduction of one science, such as Biology or Psychology, to another, such as 
Chemistry or Physics, is therefore not simply the same as reduction of one theory to 
another. A further apparent deviation from the derivability condition is that Nagel's 
words make no mention of the succession of one science by another (T 2, it will be 
recalled, is Tt's successor). 
9 Let us say that a domain is a hody of information of a problematic nature, but with a suspected underlying unity. See Suppe (1977), p. 239. 
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'Wider' in the sense of applying to more phenomena and therefore able to make a greater variety of predictions. 
11 Nagcl, quoted by Feycrabend (1962), p. 33. 
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The gist of the two concerns just raised is that Nagelian reduction is a thesis about 
the logical unity of the sciences, and not about the historical development of 
theories. Nagel illustrates such a unity in his layer cake model where scientific 
knowledge is structured as sentences of different kinds, the different kinds pictured 
in different layers. The bottom layer contains sentences expressing facts; the next 
layer contains sentences expressing empirical generalisations; then there are 
sentences expressing theoretical laws; and on the top there are increasingly more 
abstract or general theories. The sentences in one layer are linked deductively to 
those in the next layer so that sentences of the lower layers can be derived from the 
upper layers, but not vice-versa. The layer cake model of science illustrates the 
claims that "science tends towards a more unified structure"13 (the ne plus ultra of 
which is "a theory which holds all natural phenomena in its deductive embrace"14) 
and that science is based on empirically knowable facts. 
I will now reply to the two concerns expressed about the applicability of the 
derivability condition to Nagel and, in so doing, will make reference to the layer cake 
model. The first concern was that reduction in Nagel's view concerns the derivability 
of one science from another, not of one theory from another. Nagel does not seem to 
regard the distinction between sciences and theories as important in this context. 
For example, the layer cake model of the logical unity of the sciences does not 
contain the notion of a science! Hence the criticism that the Received View "suggests 
that to reduce one branch of science [ ... ] to another [ ... ] is simply to reduce one 
theory to another."15 The second concern was that Nagel's notion of theory reduction 
has no historical import. But the layer cake model implies that science does develop 
more and more general theories which stand in a particular relation to their less 
general predecessors; so from our current well-confirmed theories we can in 
principle (the 'layer cake principle') derive our previous well-confirmed theories. In 
practice, such derivability may occur only after suitable connecting statements have 
been ascertained, but the establishment of such connecting laws merely offers 
empirical confirmation of the 'layer cake principle'; for Nagel expresses no doubt 
about the historical nature of theory reduction: 
12 Feyerabend (1964b), in PP2, p. 53, using quotations from Nagel. 
13 Lambert, K. & Rrittan, Gordon G. (1992), p. 93. 
14 Lambert, K. & Brittan, Gordon G. (1992), p. 159. 
15 Lambert, K. & Rrittan, Gordon G. (1992), p. 159. 
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the phenomenon of a relatively autonomous theory becoming absorbed by, or 
reduced to, some other more inclusive theory is an undeniable and recurrent 
feature of the history of modern science.J6 
I conclude that Feyerabend is justified in attributing the derivability condition to 
Nagel. The view just stated in Nagel's own words will now be considered further, a 
view described in the introduction as 'the thesis of development by reduction'. 
Frederick Suppe helpfully lists four conditions for Nagelian theory reduction: 
(a) The theoretical terms ofTt and T2 must have "meanings unambiguously fixed by 
codified rules of usage or by established procedures appropriate to each discipline."17 
(b) For each theoretical term, a, of Tt not found in T2, "assumptions must be 
introduced which postulate relations between whatever is signified by a and traits 
represented by theoretical terms"18 in T2's vocabulary. 
(c) Using, if need be, the assumptions in (b), all the laws of Tt "must be logically 
derivable from the theoretical premises and their associated correspondence rules"19 
in T2. 
(d) "these additional assumptions must have evidential support."20 
Condition (c) expresses the derivability condition. When condition (b) is required, 
the reduction is termed 'inhomogeneous'; otherwise 'homogeneous'. Condition (b) is 
employed to ensure that (c); hence Thomas Nickles' remarks that "Nagel's strategy, 
in effect, is to turn heterogeneous [i.e. inhomogeneous] reduction into homogeneous 
reduction"2t, and that "Nagel's treatment of all reduction [is] derivational; in the 
final analysis he too casts all reduction in essentially the same mould."22 While such 
comments serve to support Feyerabend's application of the derivability condition to 
Nagel, these comments merely support a conclusion that we have already reached. 
Of more interest is Nickles' further remark that "Nagel's analysis of reduction is best 
regarded as a treatment of domain-combining reduction only."23 By 'domain-
combining' Nickles means that T1 is not shown as defective within a certain domain 
by T2, and that, instead, "ontological reduction and consolidation of theoretical 
postulates"24 occur. So Nagelian theory reduction proposes that T2, in reducing Tt, 
16 Nagel, quoted in l'reston (1997), p. 81. 
17 Suppe (1977), p. 55, quoting Nagel. 
18 Suppe (1977), p. 55. 
19 Suppe (1977), p. 55. 
20 Suppe(1977), p. 55. 
21 Nickles(l973), p. 186. 
22 Nickles (1973), p. 187. 
23 Nickles (1973), p. 1!!7. 
24 Nickles, in Suppe (1977), p. 5!!6. 
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absorbs rather than fundamentally replaces T1. A little more detail about this view of 
theory development or scientific progress will now be given. 
The Received View understands scientific progress in three ways25: 
(e) Tt was once highly confirmed, but subsequent developments, such as better 
measuring instruments, revealed Tt to be predictively inadequate. T2 is the well-
confirmed alternative. 
(f) Tt remains predictively adequate within its original domain, but T2, also well-
confirmed, encompasses the original domain and more. So T2 is an expansion of Tt 
by using correspondence rules which increase the scope ofTt. 
(g) "various disparate theories, each enjoying high degrees of confirmation, are 
included in, or reduced to, some more inclusive theory"26, T2. Here the theoretical 
principles of the previous theories are altered, and possibly their correspondence 
rules. 
However, the Received View regards way (e) as improbable because it holds that, 
once Tt is confirmed, "it is highly unlikely that the theory can ever be 
disconfirmed."27 Correspondence rules are, according to the Received View, partly 
constitutive of a given theory; new measuring instruments, and such like, would 
entail additional correspondence rules for Tt, thereby constituting (according to the 
Received View), a new theory Tt*. The disconfirmed theory will therefore be Tt*, not 
Tt. In this way, the Received View holds: "once it enjoys a high degree of 
confirmation, a theory [Tt] is unlikely to be disconfirmed; rather, any 
disconfirmation will be of extensions of [Tt] to scopes wider than that of [Tt]."28 This 
formal flourish discounts (e), leaving (f) and (g) as the Received View's preferred 
descriptions of scientific progress. In Nagelian terms, (f) describes homogeneous 
reduction, and (g) inhomogeneous. 29 So the thesis of development by reduction 
proposes a cumulative view of scientific theory development in which old successful 
theories are extended, or absorbed, by new successful theories which make a greater 
range of successful predictions. Crucially (for Feyerabend's argument), there is more 
to the thesis of development by reduction than cumulativity - there is also the 
relation of reduction. In (f) and (g), where Nagel and the Received View meet is in 
25 See Suppe (1977), p. 53. 
26 Suppe ( 1977), p. 53. 
27 Suppe (I 977), p. 54. 
28 Suppe (I 977), p. 54. 
29 See Suppe (1977), p. 54. 
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the claim that old theories are "superceded by more comprehensive theories to 
which they are reduced."3° 
The foregoing comments serve two main purposes. The first purpose is to clarify that 
the Received View and Nagel, in holding the thesis of development by reduction, 
hold not merely the claim Tt and T 2 make the same predictions within a common 
domain, but that the Received View and Nagel also hold the reductionist claim that 
theory Tt is derivable from T2 within the common domain. When Dt is the domain of 
Tt, and d "expresses, in terms of [T2] the conditions valid inside Dt,31 the thesis of 
development by reduction then implies the derivability condition:32 
T2&d 1-Tt 
The second purpose of the previous comments is to support Feyerabend's 
attribution of the second condition, the consistency condition, to the Received View 
of theory reduction. 
The consistency condition states that T1 and T2 are mutually consistent within the 
common domain. Since consistency is a semantic relation, it may be useful to state 
the derivability condition semantically: 
T2&di=T1 
The difference, then, between the derivability condition and the consistency 
condition is as follows. If the sequent expressing the derivability condition is 
semantically valid, then there is no interpretation under which (T2 & d) is true and Tt 
is false. The consistency condition claims: Tt and T2 are mutually consistent only if 
there is an interpretation under which Tt is true and T2 is true. We have seen 
previously that the thesis of development by reduction proposes just this 
interpretation: Tt and T2 are both true inside the common domain. Or we might put 
matters thus: since the Received View maintains that, in the common domain, Tt is 
itself consistent; and that T2 is a consistent theory; and that Tt is a logical 
consequence ofT 2; then T 1 and T 2 are mutually consistent. So because of the thesis of 
development by reduction, Feyerabend is right to attribute the derivability and 
consistency conditions to the Received View. 
30 Suppe (1977), p. 56. 
31 Feyerabend ( 1962), p. 46. 
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Part 2: Explanation 
The second designated representative of the Received View is the Hempelian 
deductive-nomological (D-N) model of scientific explanation. This model requires 
that a scientific explanation take the form of a deductively valid argument. The 
premises of the argument, the explanans statements, must express at least one 
general law of nature, and may include statements of antecedent conditions. The 
conclusion of the argument, the explanandum statement, describes the 
explanandum phenomenon. 
In order to ascribe the derivability condition to Hempel, it must be shown that his 
D-N model of scientific explanation is also a model of the historical development of 
scientific theories; in which case: 
(h) T2 is the explanans 
(i) T1 the explanandum. 
Requirement (h) presents no major problem: explanans statements will be 
statements of laws from T2 (and possibly condition(s) allowed by T2). Part of 
requirement (i) is that Hempel must allow the explanandum phenomenon to be a 
predecessor theory.33 Suppe thinks that this view is attributable to the Received 
View, for, "[o]n the D-N model, the explanandum, E, may be either a (description of 
an) event or a law or theory."34 I have not found any place where Hempel explicitly 
allows the explanandum to be a theory. However, comments by J. Alberta Coffa link 
the explanation of a theory with the explanation of its laws: T2 explains T1 if and only 
ifT2implies the laws ofT1.3s Coffa maintains that this claim "is obvious"36 and is part 
of "Hempel's deductive model"37. Hempel does explicitly claim that "Newton's 
theory accounts for Galileo's law of free fall"38, and speaks of"the explanation, by the 
kinetic theory, of Boyle's law"39; and these examples show at least that Hempel 
allows that the laws of T1 may be the explanandum of T2. So it seems fair to allow 
that Hempel permits that one theory explains another, if by that we mean one theory 
may explain the laws of another. 
32 Stated formally in Feyerabend (1962), p. 46. 
33 
"Explanation f ... ofT 1] consists in the derivation of[T1] from [T2] and initial conditions, which specify the domain [0 1] in 
which [T.] is applicable." Feyerabend (1965a), p. 164. 
34 Suppe ( 1977), p. 620. There is more discussion of this later. 
35 Cofta (1967), p. 503. 
36 Coftil ( 1967), p. 503. 
37 Coffa (1967), p. 503. Coffa's claims are problematic. 
38 Hempel ( 1966), p. 76. 
39 Hempel (1966), p. 73. 
15 
Feyerabend maintains that the Received View's D-N explanation is a model of the 
past historical development of theories; after all, the Received View explicitly 
equates D-N explanation with theory reduction.4° For example, Nagel makes the 
direct assertion that reduction is "the explanation of a theory or a set of 
experimental laws established in one area of inquiry by a theory usually, though not 
invariably, formulated for some other domain."41 Thomas Nickles concurs that 
Nagelian theory reduction "amounts to a deductive explanation of the reduced 
theory."42 Since it has been shown that the derivability condition can be ascribed to 
the Received View of theory reduction; and that the Received View equates theory 
reduction and D-N explanation; the conclusion follows that the derivability 
condition can also be ascribed to the Received View of D-N explanation. While it 
seems to be the case that, for the Nagelian aspect of the Received View, the Received 
View implies that D-N explanation is a model of the historical development of 
theories, it is not as easy to pin this view on Hempel. This is because Hempel does 
not regard it as a foregone conclusion (as Nagel seems to in his 'layer cake' model) 
that Tt is reducible to T2: 
Generally, then, the extent to which biological laws are explainable by means of 
psycho-chemical laws depends on the extent to which suitable connecting laws 
can be established. And that, again, cannot be decided by a priori arguments; 
the answer can be found only by biological and biophysical research.43 
Insofar as Tt is reducible to T2, the latter explains the former; but Hempel does not 
seem to buy into the claim that all past theories are, even in principle, reducible to or 
explained by their current successors44• Where does this leave the derivability 
condition vis-a-vis Hempelian D-N explanation? What Feyerabend does show 
(rather obviously) is that cases which Hempel claims are cases of intertheoretic D-N 
explanation45 are also cases which lay claim to the derivability condition. 
In order to show that the consistency condition applies to those cases where the D-N 
model of explanation does obtain, it must be shown that Hempel proposes an 
40 See Suppe ( 1977), p. 623. 
41 Nagel, quoted in Feyerabend (1962), p. 34, n. 14. My italics. 
42 Nickles ( 1973), p. 184. Kenneth Schaffuer also remarks: "lntertheoretic explanation in which one theory is explained by 
another theory, usually formulated for a different domain, is generally termed 'theory reduction'." Schalfner (1967), p. 137. 
43 Hempel (1966), p. I 05. 
44 In his discussion of emergence in his 1948 paper 'Studies in the Logic of Explanation', reprinted in Hempel ( 1965), J-lempel 
is also careful to avoid the claim that emergent phenomena in biology or psychology will ever be explained by psycho-physical 
theories. 
45 For example, Newtonian mechanics explaining the laws ofGalilean free-fall or the kinetic theory explaining Royle's law. 
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interpretation whereby both explanans and explanandum statements are true at the 
same time. Suppe points out that "Hempel and Oppenheim [1948] required that 
they [the explanans statements] be true"46; and if the premises in a deductively valid 
argument are true under a given interpretation, then the conclusion must also be 
true under that same interpretation47. Feyerabend makes the same point, but puts it 
more carefully: "the consequences of a satisfactory explanans [T2] inside [d] must 
be compatible with the explanandum [TI]"48. Since Hempel's model of scientific 
explanation implies that explanans and explanandum statements are both true, it 
interprets T2 and (the laws of) T1 in such a way as to meet the consistency condition 
(though Hempel does not hold that D-N explanation- or therefore, the consistency 
condition- hold in principle between any current theory and its predecessor). 
Attributing the derivability and consistency conditions to Hempel has met with more 
limited success than their attribution to Nagel. Matters become even more strained 
when Feyerabend attributes to the Received View the following claim: 
G) "only theories are admissible (for explanation and prediction) in a given domain 
which either contain the theories already used in the domain, or are at least 
consistent with them."49 
I will argue that, because of the Nagelian thesis of development by reduction, 
Feyerabend is justified in attributing (j) to the Received View. However, Hempel 
does not subscribe to the thesis of development by reduction, and that means that 
pinning (j) on him will be more problematic. I will also say why I think the 
attribution of (j) to the Received View has proved such a hot potato. A little later, I 
will consider a couple of objections to (j). 
It seems to me that Feyerabend's remarkable move of attributing a forward-looking 
methodology to the derivability and consistency conditions can be justified on the 
grounds of the thesis of development by reduction. In holding that scientific 
progress is characterised by either the expansion of the scope of T1 (i.e. (f)) or by the 
absorption of T1 into T2 (i.e. (g)), the Received View is expressing views consistent 
with (j). 
46 Suppe ( 1977), p. 620, .n 6. And Hempel [1948] in his ( 1965), p. 248: "The sentences constituting the explanans must be 
tn1e." 
47 
"[A] true explanation, of course, has a true explanandum as well." Hempel (1965), p. 338. 
48 Feycrabend ( 1965a), p. 164. 
49 Feyerabend ( 1962), p. 44. 
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The derivability and consistency conditions ((i) mentions containment and 
consistency conditions) were generally held, by members of the Received View, to 
be retrospective descriptions of the historical development of theories. Now 
Feyerabend wants to pin on the Received View the belief that the derivability and 
consistency conditions are adequacy conditions on future theory development. To 
claim that they are such has proved to be a contentious and even startling move on 
Feyerabend's part. Commenting on (j), John Preston agrees with comments by Cliff 
Hooker: 
Cliff Hooker, in an excellent discussion of this issue, correctly suggests that 
superficial criticisms of Feyerabend are made [ ... ]because most philosophers of 
science, deploying the distinction between the 'context of discovery' and the 
'context of justification', assume that the rules for a prospective methodology of 
science need not be related to those for a retrospective assessment of science.so 
Hooker's argument - as given by Preston - in support of attributing (j) to the 
Received View, eschews mention of contexts of discovery and justification, and 
argues that it is only rational to expect that rules which apply retrospectively to our 
best theories will have prospective implications for our best theories. I find Hooker's 
argument convincing, and it shows in part why attribution (j) was so contentious: 
Hooker suggests that supporters of the Received View were being less than 
completely rational in denying the forward-looking methodology (attributed to them 
by Feyerabend) while at the same time holding the derivability and consistency 
conditions. 
I wonder if Cliff Hooker's comments do not make clear why supporters of the 
Received View are so vehemently opposed to (i). For the Received View, whether in 
formalising theories, or in stipulating how they are to be tested, claims to deal with 
theories as finished products, and therefore the Received View holds derivability and 
consistency as relations between past, or current and past, accepted theories. The 
Received View does not view derivability and consistency as conditions for a theory 
to reach acceptance: the two conditions describing scientific progress are not, for 
supporters of the Received View, conditions used to fashion new theories, but rather 
to describe successive finished products. Hooker's argument, compelling though it 
is, does not (as Preston presents it) quite explain why the attribution of (j) as a 
forward-looking methodology was anathema to supporters of the Received View. 
50 Preston ( 1997), p. 85. 
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Feyerabend's attribution of (j) to the Received View is contentious because it implies 
that, if it is to avoid self-contradiction, then the Received View must acknowledge 
that its views on reduction and explanation (and the conditions of derivability and 
consistency) do not apply only to theories which are, or have been, accepted already; 
rather, such views on reduction and explanation also imply a forward-looking 
methodology. (j) is discomfiting for the Received View because the rejection of (j) 
would appear to be inconsistent with the Received View of theory reduction and 
explanation. 
Coffa rebutts (j) by claiming that "Hempel believes that scientific progress consists 
in the explanation of more inclusive sets of facts [ ... not in] the explanation of 
preexistent theories"s1• I think that Coffa's rebuttal is more than half right: Hempel 
does think that when progress occurs, T2 explains more facts than Tt, and that the 
explanation of predecessor theories is not a hard and fast adequacy condition on 
progress. (It is not a hard and fast condition because Hempel did not think it a 
logical truth that Tt is deducible from and consistent with T2 in the common 
domain.) But I am inclined to think that, for Hempel, (j) is a soft and optional 
condition on progress. By this I mean that Hempel allows that there are occasions 
when a progressive successor theory does explain the laws of its predecessor, and on 
those occasions the derivability and consistency conditions must hold because: 
[I]n a sound explanation, the content of the explanandum is contained in that of 
the explanans. That is correct since the explanandum is a logical consequence of 
the explanans; but this peculiarity does not make scientific explanation trivially 
circular since the general laws occurring in the explanans go far beyond the 
content of the specific explanandum.s2 
If the derivability and consistency conditions sometimes apply retrospectively, then 
it seems reasonable (a la Hooker) to expect that the laws of our current theories will 
sometimes be derivable from and consistent with future theories. But, in a later 
paper, Hempel rejects even this soft view of (j): 
[Feyerabend] is completely mistaken in his allegation [ ... ] that the conception of 
explanation by deductive subsumption under general laws or theoretical 
principles entails the incriminated methodological maxim [j]. Indeed, the D-N 
model of explanation concerns simply the relation between explanans and 
explanandum and implies nothing whatever about the compatibility of 
different explanatory principles that might be accepted successively in a given 
field of empirical science. In particular, it does not imply that a new explanatory 
theory may be accepted only on condition that it be logically compatible with 
those previously accepted.s3 
51 Cotfa ( 1967), p. 506. 
52 Hempel [1948] (1965), p. 276, n. 36. 
53 Hempel (1965), p. 347, n. 17. My italics. 
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The claim in italics and the claim which follows it are certainly not the same claim. 
The latter claim seems to me consistent with Hempel's other views, but the italicised 
claim strikes me as too strong. For on those occasions where T2 will be found to 
explain the laws ofTt, the D-N model of explanation will imply something about the 
different explanatory principles of the successor theory, namely, that T2 logically 
implies and is consistent with the laws of T1. 
While Coffa is surely right to deny the attribution of (j) to Hempel, is there not a 
toned-down version of (j), (i'), which does fit with Hempel's views, to wit: 
G') It is reasonable to expect that sometimes a theory which is under consideration 
explains (and so logically implies and is consistent with) our currently held theory 
(in a common domain). When this explanatory relationship is discovered, the theory 
under consideration is in a stronger position to be accepted than before the 
explanatory relationship was discovered. 
Feyerabend is not therefore justified in attributing (j) to the Hempelian view of D-N 
explanation. But if one takes the received view to include the thesis of development 
by reduction (which Hempel did not hold), and since reduction and D-N explanation 
are logically the same, then it seems to me that (j) is generally attributable to the 
Received View. 
William Newton-Smith concludes that Feyerabend's attribution of (j) to the 
Received View fails: 
(k) (j) is not one of "the rules that philosophers and/ or scientists have tended to 
assume are used in theory choice."54 
Yet Newton-Smith's two claims in support of this conclusion (k) make little or no 
attempt to address the Received View, or any particular view. For example, Newton-
Smith's first claim in support of (k) is: 
not even the most conservative of rationalists will deny that an unacceptable 
theory may have gained ascendancy.55 
Newton-Smith's stated conclusion from this first premise is: 
Hence it cannot be a constraint on one who wishes to evaluate a new theory 
critically that it must agree with any de facto accepted theories.s6 
54 Newton-Smith (198 I), p. 129. 
55 Newton-smith (I 98 I), p. I 29. 
56 Newton-Smith (I 98 I), pp. I 29-30. 
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It seems to me that Newton-Smith fails to maintain a clear distinction between on 
the one hand what can or cannot (read 'ought' or 'ought not') be a constraint on 
theory choice (for even strict rationalists), and on the other hand what constraint 
those rationalists actually do hold. I made such a distinction already in the 
presentation of (j) and pointed out that the two issues are related in the following 
way: members of the Received View may not, or do not, actually hold (j); but since 
(j) is consistent with a large body of the beliefs of members of the Received View, the 
members of the Received View could logically hold (j), and should do because (j) 
follows from57 their other views on reduction and explanation. 
Newton-Smith's second claim in support of (k) is: 
What one wants to preserve when faced with a choice between new rival 
theories is not the old theory itself but the observational successes of that 
theory.ss 
Even if 'one's view' is taken to refer to the Received View, Newton-Smith's claim 
here is open to the distinction I have drawn between the Nagelian Received View 
and the Hempelian view. What William Newton-Smith objects to about (j) is this: it 
requires that "new hypotheses agree with accepted theories"59 is or was "a rule 
which he [Feyerabend] takes to have been standardly held by philosophers of 
science"60• But I do not think that Feyerabend makes this claim; rather, I think 
Feyerabend argues that (j) is a consequence of the Received View of reduction and 
explanation. (Besides, Newton-Smith's remarks do not sit well with Hempel's 
comment "that conflict with a broadly supported theory militates against a 
hypothesis".61) 
I conclude that the attribution of (j) to the Received View is problematic for two 
main reasons. First, (j) is not implied by Hempel's views on explanation, though a 
soft version of (j) is. Second, (j) is on the one hand generally consistent with the 
Nagelian Received View's claims about theory reduction and explanation; on the 
other hand, (j) is particularly inconsistent with the Received View that reduction 
and explanation are adequacy conditions only on past theory development. With 
these reservations, then, it seems to me that Feyerabend is justified in ascribing the 
57 If their views include or imply the thesis of development by reduction. 
58 Newton-Smith (1981 ), p. 130. 
59 Newton-Smith (1981), p. 129. He is quoting Feyerahend whose italics 1 have removed. 
60 Newton-Smith (1981), p. 129. 
61 Hempel (1966), p. 40. Though, of course, a hypothesis is not a theory. 
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derivability and consistency conditions to the Received View's (but not Hempel's) 
model of D-N explanation. That the derivability and consistency conditions do 
ascribe prospective conditions on the Received View of theory development is a 
problem which is surely is to be laid at the door of the Received View, not at the door 
of Feyerabend. 
Part 3 ~ The Meaning Invariance Condition 
The meaning invariance condition states that "the meanings of (observational) 
terms are invariant with respect to both reduction [ofT1 to T2J and explanation [of 
T1 by T2]. "62 In presenting this condition I will first give an account of the Received 
View of observation language and its role in scientific theories. This brief description 
of the double-language model of scientific theories seeks to explain why, in stating 
the meaning invariance condition, Feyerabend encloses 'observational' in 
parentheses in the above quotation. Having considered the meaning invariance of 
observational and (in a slightly different way) theoretical terms, and concluded that 
such meaning invariance follows from the derivability condition, I then try to 
establish the relation between the meaning invariance condition and the consistency 
condition. 
Examples of actual scientific theories would make the points made here in Part 3 
clearer; but such examples will not be introduced until Part 4, for two reasons. First, 
I wish to try and avoid needless repetition of the same examples in Parts 3 and 4. 
Second, I think it is important to formulate carefully (as opposed to illustrate) what 
the meaning invariance condition is, so that it is clear what proposal Feyerabend 
will later oppose. Since the IT denies the meaning invariance condition, it is hoped 
that a clear idea of the meaning invariance condition will aid a clear notion of the 
meaning variance thesis embodied in the incommensurability thesis [IT]. 
According to the Received View, scientific theories can be expressed in a first-order 
language (L). The nonlogical primitive terms of L are divided into two classes: 
observation terms (Vo) and theoretical terms (VT). Vo has a domain of interpretation 
consisting of "concrete observable events, things, or things-moments; the relations 
62 Feyerahend (1962), p. 43_ 
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and properties of the interpretation must be directly observable."63 So sentences of 
L which contain Vo, but not VT, are completely interpreted. VT is partially interpreted 
by two kinds of postulates: first, theoretical postulates (TP) are the theoretical laws 
which interpret a theoretical term in terms of other theoretical terms; second, 
correspondence rules (C) are mixed sentences in the sense that each rule contains 
"at least one Vo term and at least one VT term essentially or nonvacuously"64. An 
important point (which will be returned to) concerning the relation of C to TP is: 
(I) C must be logically compatible with TP. 
C must also be finite in number, and have a domain which "may be construed as the 
sum total of admissible experimental procedures for applying the theory to 
observable phenomena."65 All the descriptive terms of L are expressed in TP & C, 
and "a theory is the set of all logical consequences of the conjunction of [TP-] and C-
postulates."66 
The interpretation of VT terms by C is only partial, and is so in two ways. First, C 
does not define any VT term: C sets constraints on the meaning of any VT term. 
Second, not every VT term is in C; the rest of the VT terms will be interpreted in TP so 
that "as used in [TP & C], the theoretical terms must admit of such and such 
observational manifestations of the systems described by [TP & C]."67 This limited 
interpretative role of C is described by Carnap: 
All they [i.e. C-rules] do is, in effect, to permit the derivation of certain 
sentences of [the observation language] from certain sentences of [the 
theoretical language] or vice versa. They serve indirectly for the derivations of 
conclusions in [the observation language], e.g., predictions of observable events, 
from premises in [the observation language].6B 
Without C, no VT term would have an observational interpretation; and so without C 
"a theory would have no explanatory power [ ... ] it would also be incapable of test"69 
as far as the Received View is concerned. Since Vo terms are fully interpreted by 
direct observation, their meanings are theory neutral: "any two observers who 
possess the words from Vo used in [observation statements], regardless of their 
scientific or theoretical background, will be able to agree upon the truth of such Vo 
assertions."70 This theory-neutrality allows the performance of crucial tests of a 
63 Suppe ( 1977), p. 51. My italics. 
64 Suppe (1977), p. 25. 
65 Suppe (1977), p. 25. 
66 Psillos ( 1999), p. 41. 
67 Suppe(l977), p. 103, n. 213. 
68 Camap, quoted in Suppe ( 1977), p. 87. 
69 Hempel (1966), p. 74. 
70 Suppe ( 1977), p. 411. 
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theory by the comparison of statements of observational predictions with statements 
about what is observed. 
It is now clear that in the Received View, Vo in Tt will have the same interpretation 
as Vo in (Tz & d). Since its domain is the directly observable, the interpretation ofVo 
also tends to be incorrigible; and so Vo has not just a common interpretation (in Tt 
and Tz) it has an historically invariant interpretation. This would explain why 
Feyerabend ascribes the meaning invariance of observational terms to the Received 
View. 
Yet Feyerabend's presentation of the Received View does not stop at the meaning 
invariance ofVo. The invariant observation language ensures that, for each theory (T1 
and Tz) in a common domain, Vr terms partially interpreted by C receive common 
partial interpretations; these common, partial, observational interpretations of VT 
are fed into the other VT terms via TP. All interpreted VT terms, as far as the 
Received View is concerned, have observational import either directly via C, or 
indirectly in TP via VT terms from C.71 Carnap notes that TP alone does not, strictly 
speaking, interpret any VT term: 
All the interpretation (in the strict sense of this term, i.e. observational 
interpretation) that can be given for [VT] is given in the C-rules, and their 
function is essentially the interpretation of certain sentences containing 
descriptive terms, and thereby [VT]."n 
Nagel also remarks that without C, the descriptive terms of L are nothing more than 
bound variables: 
Without correspondence rules a theory is not even a statement ... as its 
descriptive terms (or rather those for which no rules of correspondence are 
given) have the status ofvariables"73. 
So C is necessary for the interpretation of all VT terms. All interpreted theoretical 
terms correspond, in C, or in TP & C, with observational terms; and since the 
observational terms are meaning invariant, the interpretation (in the strict sense 
above) of theoretical terms will also be meaning invariant. Since C only partially 
interprets VT terms, it is sometimes said that theoretical terms are meaning 
invariant insofar as their partial interpretation includes an observational core. It is 
71 
"The terms of[VT] obtain only an indirect and incomplete interpretation by the fact that some ofthem are connected by 
correspondence rules with observational terms, and the remaining terms of[V·r] are connected with the first ones hy the 
~stulates ofT." Camap, quoted by Feyerabend ( 1962), p. 41. 
2 Camap, quoted in Suppe ( 1977), p. 86. 
73 Nagel, quoted hy Feyerahend (1964) in PP2, p. 53. 
24 
probably for this reason that Feyerabend places 'observation' in parentheses when 
he states the meaning invariance condition: observation terms have fully interpreted 
invariant meanings; and all interpreted theoretical terms are partially interpreted by 
observation terms; so all theoretical terms are partially74 meaning invariant in 
theory transition. 
Nagel points out that theoretical terms do partially change meanings, and partially 
do not. Concerning the reduction of classical thermodynamics to the kinetic theory, 
he writes: 
It is certainly possible to redefine the word 'temperature' so that it becomes 
synonymous with 'mean kinetic energy' of molecules. But it is certain that on 
this redefined usage the word has a different meaning from the one associated 
with it in the classical science of heat, and therefore a meaning different from 
the one associated with the word in the statement of the Boyle-Charles law. 
However if thermodynamics is to be reduced to mechanics, it is temperature in 
the sense of the term in classical science of heat which must be asserted to be 
proportional to the mean kinetic energy of gas molecules. Accordingly ... the 
state of bodies described as 'temperature' (in the classical thermodynamical 
sense) is also characterized by 'temperature' in the redefined sense of the term.75 
Nagel allows that a theoretical term's theoretical meaning postulates (TP) may 
change in the move from T1 to T2; hence the need for bridge principles (in the 
reduction of T1 to T2) to relate the sense of 'temperature' in T1 to the sense of 
'temperature' in T2. But the main point of interest in Nagel's comments, as far as the 
meaning invariance condition is concerned, is not what changes, but what remains 
invariant with respect to the theoretical terms of T1 and T2. If inhomogeneous 
reduction is to occur, if bridge principles relate 'temperature' in T1 with 
'temperature' in T 2, then ("accordingly" as Nagel puts it) 'temperature' in each 
theory is eo-referential. (The eo-reference of theoretical terms is taken as given in 
homogeneous reduction). Nagel's requirement that theoretical terms eo-refer in 
successive general theories expresses the meaning invariance condition for Vr terms. 
This requirement, even with regard to the particular example of 'temperature', will 
be discussed further by Feyerabend and by Putnam in Chapter 3. 
Hempel also can construe meaning invariance as referential continuity when he 
writes about attempting the inhomogeneous reduction of Biology to Physics and 
Chemistry: 
74 Lambert et al., maintain that "the condition of 'meaning invariance' requires that the meaning of theoretical terms does not 
shift as new phenomena are described and explained." Lambert, Karel & Brittan, Gordon G. { 1992), p. 98. In the text I claim 
that this claim is true if 'meaning' can he substituted by 'reference'; otherwise, the statement is only partially true. 
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It would be very difficult to name even one biological term for which a physico-
chemical synonym can be specified [ ... ] But descriptive definition may also be 
understood in a less stringent sense, which does not require that the definiens 
have the same meaning, or intension, as the definiendum, but only that it have 
the same extension or application.76 
Bridge principles are simply ways of capturing such eo-references. Hempel's bridge 
principles posit not a relation of sense between identical sentences of Tt and T2 
employing theoretical terms, but a preservation of the sentences' truth values. Such 
a preservation of truth values would be sufficient to secure the derivability 
condition. It will be recalled that the Received View holds not only that Tt and T2 
(within a common domain) have the same observational consequences, but also that 
Tt is derivable from T2 within the common domain. In holding the derivability 
condition, the Received View must also hold the meaning invariance condition if it is 
to avoid an equivocation fallacy.77 
While the Received View holds that the theoretical postulates (TP) are not subject to 
the meaning invariance condition in the same way as C (which links a theoretical 
term with a core observational meaning), any changes to TP in the transition from Tt 
to T2 are constrained by C. As already stated in 0), the Received View held that TP 
and C must be consistent. For example: 
[If] I incorporate an experimental procedure into [TP & C] as a correspondence 
rule involving the VT term corresponding to electrons and assert [TP & C] so 
interpreted, I am committing myself to using 'electron' in such a way that its 
observational content includes that specified by the correspondence rule. 78 
What consistency between TP and C states is that any meaning postulate of a 
theoretical term must be consistent with (statements of) the observational 
consequences attributed to that term. But the Received View holds that the 
observational consequences of Tt and T 2 are the same within the common domain. 
Consequently, the meaning postulates of all VT terms of Tt are consistent with the 
meaning postulates of all VT terms ofT2. In Parts 1 and 2, the consistency condition 
has been described as consistency between successive theories; now it is clearer that 
this means consistency not merely between the observational consequences of Tt 
and T2, but between the theoretical axioms or laws ofTt and T2: 
the demand for meaning invariance implies that the laws of later theories be 
compatible with the principles of the context of which the earlier theories are 
part.79 
75 Nagel, quoted by Coffa (1967), p. 507. 
76 Hempel (1966), p. 103. 
77 As Suppe ( 1977), p. 172 observes. 
78 Suppe (1977), p. 92. 
79 Feyerabend ( 1962 ), p. 81. 
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So Feyerabend regards the meaning invariance condition as "a special case of'80 the 
consistency condition. 
I conclude that Feyerabend is right to ascribe the following views to the Received 
View. The observational and theoretical terms of Tt and T2 are "unambiguously 
fixed"81 in each theory. This fixing is a complete and theory-independent 
interpretation in the case of observational terms, and is a partially theory-
independent interpretation in the case of theoretical terms. For any theoretical term, 
theoretical meaning postulates must be consistent with C-rules (the observational 
core). In the transition form T1 to T2, then, observational terms will not undergo any 
change of meaning; and theoretical terms will not endure any change of meaning 
which would conflict with their (ineradicable) correspondence rules. In ascribing the 
meaning invariance condition to the Received View, Feyerabend attributes to that 
View the claim that the meanings of the primitive descriptive terms of T1 "will not be 
affected by the processes of reduction"82• What is absolutely not affected by the 
process of reduction are the meaning postulates of Vo terms; but I have tried to show 
that, according to the Received View, the meaning postulates of VT terms may be 
affected, but only to a limited extent (i.e. TP may change but must always be 
consistent with the meaning postulates ofVo terms). I venture that this difference in 
meaning invariance between the terms of Vo and Vr is marked by Feyerabend 
placing 'observational' in parentheses when stating the meaning invariance 
condition (given at the beginning of Part 3). 
Part 4: Arguments Rejecting The Received View 
Feyerabend has established (I have argued) that the Received View espouses the 
derivability condition, the consistency condition and the meaning invariance 
condition as conditions on the development of successive, well-confirmed theories. 
In opposing the Received View, however, Feyerabend does not argue against each of 
these conditions in turn. Instead, he chooses to argue against the consistency 
condition, implying that, in arguing against the consistency condition, he is also 
8
° Feyerabend (1962), p. 81. 
81 Nagel, quoted by Suppe {1977), p. 55. 
82 Feyerabend {1962), p. 33. 
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arguing against the derivability condition. 83 Then he asserts that the arguments 
against the consistency condition can also be used against the meaning invariance 
condition. This final move is problematic, however, because having asserted that T1 
and T2 are inconsistent, he cannot then logically claim (as the meaning variance 
thesis does go on to do) that T1 and T2 are logically independent. 
Feyerabend asserts: 
{m) the derivability condition "leads to the demand [ ... ] that all successful theories 
in a given domain must be mutually consistent."B4 
If (m) is true (if the derivability condition implies the consistency condition) then 
Feyerabend can kill two conditions by aiming at one target - simply arguing against 
the consistency condition. The Received View requires that the theories T1 and T 2 are 
each consistent. Placing each on either side of the turnstile in the derivability 
condition does then 'lead to the demand' that T1 and T2 are mutually consistent. So 
(m) is true with respect to the Received View of reduction and explanation. 
Consequently, Feyerabend can argue against the derivability condition by aiming at 
the consistency condition. 
The second element in Feyerabend's attack on the Received View is the claim: 
(n) "Using our [ ... ] arguments against [the consistency condition] we may now infer 
the untenability, on methodological grounds, of meaning invariance as well."85 
In Part 3 I tried to show that, according to the Received View, the meanings of all 
theoretical terms "are a function of observational consequences"86 such that the 
theoretical axioms (TP) of a theory must be consistent with C postulates; and that 
since the meanings of observation terms in C are common to T, and T2 (in the 
common domain), TP in T1 will be consistent with TP in T2 (in the common domain). 
Part 3 therefore supports Feyerabend's assertion that the meaning invariance 
condition, in proposing consistency between the theoretical postulates of T1 and T2 
(and equivalence of observational postulates), is a special case of the consistency 
condition, so that claim (n) is true - provided that Feyerabend's arguments against 
the consistency condition are sound. 
83 
"lt is in this fnrm [the form of the consistency condition as stated in U)] that [the derivahility condition] will he discussed". 
Feyerabend (1962), p. 44. 
84 Feyerabend (1962), p. 30. 
85 Feyerabend ( 1962), p. 81. 
86 Suppe ( 1977), p. 92. 
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The two most general supporting elements of Feyerabend's attack (in 'Explanation, 
Reduction and Empiricism') against the Received View are therefore the short-cut 
strategy just explained and the arguments produced against the consistency 
condition. I will now present the three kinds of argument against the consistency 
(and derivability) conditions. The meaning invariance condition will be addressed 
after. 
The first type of argument against the derivability and consistency conditions is the 
argument from example. It states: 
most of the cases which have been used as shining examples of scientific 
explanation do not satisfy [the consistency condition] and [ ... ] it is not possible 
to adapt them to the deductive schema.B7 
Feyerabend selects two examples; the first is where Tt is Galilean physics and T2 is 
Newtonian celestial mechanics. It will be recalled that Dt is then the domain of Tt, 
and d "expresses, in terms of [T2] the conditions valid inside Dt."88 The laws of free-
fall in T1 maintain that the acceleration of a falling body as constant, whereas the 
laws of T 2 hold that acceleration increases the closer to Earth the body falls. 
According to Nagel, the derivability condition holds in this example, so that: 
T2&di-T1 
However, Feyerabend points out that Tt and T2 giVe quantitatively different 
predictions,89 for Tt posits constant acceleration and T2 posits variable acceleration. 
Feyerabend concludes: 
It is therefore impossible, for quantitative reasons, to establish a deductive 
relationship between [T 1J and [T 2], or even to make [T 1J and [T 2J compatible [i.e. 
consistent].9o 
The question is: has Feyerabend demonstrated what he claims to have? 
Feyerabend has certainly pointed out that Tt and T2 are not mutually consistent, in 
which case: 
(o)T2&d 1-~Tt 
Taking up this matter of inconsistency, Hempel writes: 
87 Feyerabend ( 1962), p. 46. 
88 Feyerabend ( 1962), p. 46. 
89 Unless "the earth's radius is infinitely large, which it is not." Schaflher (1967, p. 138. 
90 Feyerabend (1962), p. 47. 
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It might therefore be tempting to say that theories often do not explain 
previously established laws, but refute them. But this would give a distorted 
picture of the insight afforded by a theory. After all a theory does not simply 
refute the earlier empirical generalizations in its field; rather it shows that 
within a certain limited range defined by qualifying conditions, the 
generalizations hold true in fairly close approximation.91 
Though "everybody would admit that explanation may be by approximation only"92, 
Feyerabend maintains that everybody who holds the Received View is wrong to do 
so. Either one can derive T1 from Tz or one can not, for the turnstile does not allow 
for approximate derivation. Therefore the Received View's use of approximation in 
its formal account of reduction and explanation is, as it stands, in need of 
emendation. Lawrence Sklar, for example, feels that "somewhat more needs to be 
done to clarify the matter of approximate derivational reduction"93; and Schaffner94 
and Nickles9s agree in their own ways. In the argument from example, Feyerabend 
claims that Tz & d 1- T1, does not express a valid sequent when T1 and Tz are 
interpreted as in the free-fall example. So as a result of disproving the consistency 
condition, Feyerabend has shown that the sequent expressing the derivability 
condition is invalid. 96 
The second example (in the argument from example) takes T1 is the medieval 
impetus theory and Tz is Newtonian theory of motion. In considering whether T1 and 
Tz are consistent, Feyerabend considers the terms 'impetus' in T1, and 'momentum' 
in Tz. "It has been suggested", writes Feyerabend, "that the momentum of the 
moving object is the perfect analogue of the impetus."97 Three reasons in support of 
this Received View suggestion are, first, that it is possible to substitute 'momentum' 
for 'impetus' in such statements as: "The impetus of a body in empty space which is 
not under the influence of any outer force remains constant."98 The first reason, 
then, for claiming meaning invariance of the terms 'impetus' and 'momentum', is 
that they are intersubstitutable salve veritate. Underlying the substitution claim is 
the assumption that Newton's first law and the impetus theory are consistent (within 
a common domain). Consistency between statements containing 'impetus' in T1, and 
all but identical statements containing instead 'momentum' in Tz, is claimed by the 
91 Hempel (1966), p. 76. 
92 Feyerabend (1962), p. 48. 
93 Sklar ( 1967), p. Ill. 
94 Scbaffuer ( 1967), p. 142. 
95 Nickles (1973), p. 188. 
96 One worry about this argument is the exact nature of the relation between the domain expressions 0 1 and d. This point pre-
empts discussion about a problem associated with the claim that theories are incommensurable, namely, in what sense can it be 
said that incommensurable theories have a common domain~ 
97 Feyerabend (1962), p. 56. 
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Received View because the measurement of impetus, according to Tt, in all cases 
equals that of momentum in T2. That impetus and momentum take the same 
numerical value is the second reason for claiming meaning invariance. Thirdly, even 
operationally considered, the procedures for measuring impetus and momentum are 
the same (in the common domain). 
Feyerabend then points out that 'impetus' is not substitutable salve veritate between 
statements ofT1 and T2 in the common domain. According to T1: 
[I]mpetus is the force responsible for the movement of the object that has 
ceased to be in direct contact, by push or pull, with the material mover. If this 
force did not act, i.e., if the impetus were destroyed, then the object would cease 
to move and fall to the ground.99 
In short, impetus is the force sustaining all motion, but momentum is not. This 
certainly appears to show inconsisteney100 between T1 and T2, even within the 
common domain. Feyerabend explains: 
what is being asserted is not the inconsistency of, say, Newton's theory and 
Galileo's law, but rather the inconsistency of some consequences of Newton's 
theory in the domain of validity of Galileo's law, and Galileo's law.l01 
This comment is useful because it says something about the nature of the common 
domain. The common domain of Tt and T2 is the domain were both theories are 
empirically adequate. Furthermore, as Chapter 2 will show, the common domain is 
the domain of common causes of the utterance of observation sentences of T1 and T 2. 
More explication of the causal nature of the common domain is given in 
Feyerabend's pragmatic theory of observation, presented in Chapter 2. 
Turning to the second reason given for equating 'impetus' and 'momentum', 
Feyerabend points out that they would not have the same numerical values in T1 and 
T2. Since impetus is the force sustaining motion, it is determined as the product of 
force and acceleration in T2, not, as in Tt, as the product of mass and velocity (the 
value of momentum). So in a state of uniform motion in empty space, 'impetus' 
would have value 0, according to T2, and such a value would not be equivalent to 
that given by the impetus theory, T1. 
98 Feyerabend (I 962), p. 54. 
99 Feyerabend (1962), p. 55. 
100 
"Note that what is being asserted here is logical inconsistency", Feyerabend { 1963b), p. 13. 
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Thirdly, an operational notion of impetus and momentum may claim that the way to 
measure each magnitude is to bring a body "to a stop in an appropriate medium 
(such as soft wax) and then noting the effect of such a maneuver"102. The degree to 
which the object is embedded in the wax will be an indicator or measure of the 
object's momentum just before impact; the degree of impact will also be a measure 
of the object's impetus. To try to use this operational definition of impetus and 
momentum as a bridge principle for the purpose of reducing medieval impetus 
theory to Newtonian mechanics, however, is problematic. The operational definition 
presupposes the further bridge hypothesis "that wherever momentum is present, 
impetus will also be present, and[ ... ] the measure will be the same in both cases."103 
Feyerabend objects to this bridge hypothesis on the grounds that that T2 forbids it. 
The theoretical postulates of 'impetus' (in T1) conflict with axioms in T2: T2 claims 
that a body moving at constant velocity is not acted on by any force; but 'impetus' 
(according to T1) is the force which sustains any motion. Bridge laws between the T1 
term 'impetus' and the T2 term 'momentum' cannot be adopted because the axioms 
ofT2 imply that the magnitude impetus does not exist104. As was pointed out in Part 
3, bridge principles attempt to capture eo-references. If it can be plausibly argued 
that 'momentum' and 'impetus' do refer to the same magnitude, then the truth of 
statements about impetus will be preserved across theories in statements about 
momentum (and the substitution and numerical claims will be shown to be true). 
Such an argument, the causal theory of reference, will be considered in Chapter 3. 
Feyerabend's second kind of argument against the derivability and consistency 
conditions is a conceptual argument about 'empiricism'. If the derivability and 
consistency conditions are adequacy conditions on scientific progress, as 
Feyerabend has alleged they are in the Received View, then only a theory which is 
consistent with the current theory, and from which the current theory can be 
derived, will reach acceptance. Empiricism requires that observations confirm laws 
and theories; and the Received View claims to be empiricist; yet the derivability and 
consistency conditions (for example, G)) are such that a theory is rejected "not 
because it is inconsistent with the facts, but because it is inconsistent with another, 
and as yet unrefuted, theory whose confirming instances it shares."10s As pointed out 
101 Feyembend (1963b), p. 13. 
102 Feyerabend (1962), p. 54. 
103 Feyembend (1962), p. 58. 
104 Or that, if impetus does exist, it has a constant value of zero. 
105 Feyembend (1962), p. 64. 
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earlier, members of the Received View would probably deny that they follow any 
such test condition; and I argued (in Part 2) that, be that as it may, such a test 
condition is largely implied by the derivability and consistency conditions: they are 
anti-empiricist conditions. 
The third argument against the derivability and consistency conditions is a 
methodological one and follows from the conceptual argument. The methodological 
claim is that "a strict empiricism will [admit] theories which are factually adequate 
and yet mutually inconsistent"106 (such theories are called 'strong alternatives' by 
Feyerabend). The warrant for this claim is that "the basic principle of empiricism is 
to increase the empirical content of whatever knowledge we claim to possess."107 The 
'data' or ground for the warrant for the methodological claim is Feyerabend's 
semantic views about observation statements. Feyerabend denies that "the facts 
which belong to the content of some theory are available whether or not one 
considers alternatives to this theory"108; rather, he believes: 
(p) "[e]xperimental evidence does not consist of facts pure and simple, but of facts 
analyzed, modeled [sic], and manufactured according to some theory."109 
Premise (p) claims that "the description of every single fact [is] dependent on some 
theory"110 ; and the methodological argument which (p) supports argues for the use 
of strong alternatives on the grounds that "[t]here exist also facts which cannot be 
unearthed except with the help of alternatives to the theory to be considered"m. For 
empiricists, factual statements must be derivable from observational statements, 
and in the Received View the latter are statements whose meanings are 
foundational. For Feyerabend, the meanings of observational sentences are not basic 
or foundational, and he argues such when presenting his pragmatic theory of 
observation (PTO). For Feyerabend, a consequence of the PTO is that "[m]eaning 
comes from ideas. Meaning, therefore 'trickles down' from the theoretical level 
toward the level of observation."112 So for empiricists such as Feyerabend, the PTO 
will have (p) as a consequence because the PTO supports what Feyerabend labels 
thesis I: 
106 Feyerabend (1962), p. 67. 
107 Feyerabend (1962), p. 66. 
108 Feyerabend ( 1963b), p. 22. 
109 Feyerabend (1962), pp. 50-1. 
11
° Feyerabend (1963b), p. 22. 
111 Feyerabend (1963b), p. 22. 
112 Feyerabend (1995), p. 118. 
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the interpretation of an observation language is determined by the theories 
which we use to explain what we observe, and it changes as soon as those 
theories change.J13 
So the methodological argument against the derivability and consistency conditions, 
particularly premise (p), depends on thesis I. Thesis I (and the PTO) will be 
considered in Chapter 2. 
Given (p) (for the sake of Feyerabend's argument), it follows that if only those 
theories consistent with the test theory are considered, then the range of facts or 
empirical evidence which can be considered is limited - without empirical reason. It 
is therefore only good empirical procedure to consider strong alternatives - those 
theories which are "partly overlapping, factually adequate, but mutually 
inconsistent"114 with the test theory. The use of strong alternatives as a test 
procedure could yield successor theories which are inconsistent with their 
predecessors; so allowing the use of strong alternatives undermines the claim that 
the consistency and derivability conditions are necessary conditions on theory 
development. 
Reviewing the three arguments against the consistency (and derivability) 
condition(s), it seems that all three kinds of argument are valid; and I have claimed 
that the arguments from example and the conceptual argument are sound. The 
methodological argument is more uncertain because thesis I, (p)'s support, has yet 
to be judged (in Chapter 2). But is clear that thesis I stands in contradiction of the 
meaning invariance condition, and in this way the methodological argument attacks 
the meaning invariance condition, as Feyerabend claims: 
It is also clear that the methodological arguments against meaning invariance 
will be the same as the arguments against the derivability condition and the 
consistency condition.JIS 
It will be recalled that Feyerabend regarded the meaning invariance condition as a 
special case of the consistency condition. It comes as no surprise, then, that 
arguments against the consistency (and derivability) condition(s) are also used 
against the meaning invariance condition. 
113 Feyerabend (1958), p. 31. This claim will be considered further in Chapter 2. 
114 Feyerahend ( 1963b), pp. 22-3. 
115 Feyerabend ( 1962), p. 81. 
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Turning now to the arguments against the meaning invariance condition, that 
condition (described in Part 3) simply stated that the meanings of observation terms 
do not change in the transition from T1 to T2, and that the theoretical meaning 
postulates of terms of T2 do not contradict those of T1. From the argument from 
example it is clear that the theoretical meaning postulates (TP) of terms of T2 do 
contradict (or imply a contradiction of) those of T1; and the methodological 
argument claimed that the TP of T2 generally ought to do so. This is where 
Feyerabend's argument against the meaning invariance condition begins: 
Our argument against meaning invariance is simple and clear. It proceeds from 
the fact that usually some of the principles involved in the determination of the 
meanings of older theories or points of view are inconsistent with the new, and 
better, theories.116 
For example, impetus is the force which sustains motion, but momentum is not. This 
contradiction at the level of TP will, because there are correspondence rules, have an 
affect on the observational meaning postulates, otherwise each theory would not be 
internally consistent and each theory's predictions would not logically follow from 
that theory's laws. "Thus descriptions of the theories' observable predictions depend 
upon some theory (or theories)."117 About this argument, Frederick Suppe tells us: 
It is worth noting that Feyerabend's view here comes as close as possible to a 
complete reversal of the Received View's picture of a one-way flow of meanings 
from the observation language to the theoreticallanguage.ns 
This reversal of the 'flow of meanings' is essential to Feyerabend's main argument 
against the meaning invariance condition, and thesis I is the warrant Feyerabend 
uses to yield such a reversal. 119 
The argument from example and the methodological argument against the meaning 
invariance condition each work by pointing out that the theoretical postulates of T2 
contradict those of T1; and that, because of thesis I, the observational postulates do 
also. Consequently, the meaning invariance condition is false. 
The methodological argument's use of strong alternatives clearly assumes that "one 
and the same set of observational data is compatible with very different and 
116 Feyerabend ( 1962), p. 82. My italics. 
117 Suppe ( 1977), p. 176. 
118 Suppe ( 1977), p. 176, n. 430. 
119 But to challenge the meaning invariance condition, it is not necessary to postulate thesis I or a reversal of any flow of 
meanings. Having shown that the theoretical postulates ofT1 and T2 are inconsistent, it would be sufficient for Feyerabend to 
argue that observational meaning postulates are not fixed or 'given' extra-theoretically to validly argue that the meaning 
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mutually inconsistent theories."12° Carl Hempel also admits that "[a]ny type of 
empirical findings, however rich and diverse, can in principle be subsumed under 
many different laws or theories."121 He cites as an example the particle and wave 
theories of light which were empirically adequate up until the crucial experiments of 
the nineteenth century. Where Feyerabend and Hempel differ (with respect to 
strong alternatives) is that, for Hempel, the situation where there are two 
empirically adequate and inconsistent theories is an anomaly which will eventually 
be rectified by an observationally based crucial experiment.122 Feyerabend believes 
that, for global theories, "the alternatives do not share a single statement with the 
theories they criticize. Clearly a crucial experiment is now impossible."123 What 
Feyerabend means by the theories' not sharing a single statement is: 
(q) Tt and T2 "may not possess any comparable consequences, observational or 
otherwise" .124 
Claim (q) asserts that statements of Tt and T2 are semantically incomparable, and 
this is sufficient to warrant the denial of the ability to perform an observationally 
based crucial experiment for two global theories. However, claim (q) is problematic 
because, in addition to ruling out a crucial experiment between Tt and T2, it also 
implies that T2 is not a strong alternative to Tt; for a consequence of (q) is that 
statements ofTt and T2 cannot be mutually inconsistent. This problem of combining 
Feyerabend's assertions that statements of Tt are logically inconsistent with and 
logically independent of statements of T2 crops up time and time again. This 
problem suggests that one of the two assertions has to go. Feyerabend tries to revise 
the claim of logical inconsistency (and so alter the notion of a strong alternative), as 
Chapters 2 and 3 will show. But it seems to me that Feyerabend cannot drop his 
inconsistency claim because his opposition to the consistency condition is the hinge 
on which turns his arguments for the IT. 
The semantic incomparability of the terms ofTt and T2 expressed in statement (q) is 
made possible by thesis I permitting a complete meaning change in each and every 
term of successive general theories. Feyerabend muses: 
invariance condition is false. And as Chapter 2 will show, Feyerabend does in filet argue lhat his contemporaries' two main 
accounts of extra-theoretically fixed meanings are false. 
12
° Feyerabend ( 1962), p. 48. 
121 Hempel (1966), p. 80. 
122 See Hempel ( 1966), p. 80. This is another reason for suggesting that 1-lempel does sign up to some soft version of U). 
123 Feyerabend ( 1963b), p. 8. 
124 Feyerabend (1962), p. 94. See also Feyerabend ( 1963b), p. 8: "there is no statement [of T2) capable of expressing what 
emerges from the observation[s] [made by one who holds T 1). 
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I interpreted observation languages by the theories that explain what we 
observe. Such interpretations change as soon as the theories change. I realized 
that interpretations of this kind might make it impossible to establish deductive 
relations between rival theories" )25 
The meaning change proposal concerns both the number of meanings changed and 
the nature of their change. Numerically, "there is a change in the meanings of all 
descriptive terms of [T1] (provided these terms are still employed)"126• The nature of 
the meaning changes is such that it is: 
completely impossible either to reduce [the theories] to each other, or to relate 
them to each other with the help of an empirical hypothesis, or to find entities 
which belong to the extension of both kinds of terms.m 
The proposal that all the terms of a theory are affected in this way has been called 
the radical MVT.128 I will distinguish this from the MVT, where not all terms of T1 
and T 2 are affected in the way proposed. This distinction will come in useful in 
Chapter 3, where it will be shown that Feyerabend drops the radical MVf for the 
MVT. 
Part 5: The :rr and the MVT 
As regards Feyerabend's first presentation of the IT, given m 'Explanation, 
Reduction and Empiricism', Frederick Suppe is of the opinion that "a legitimate 
objection lurks buried in this discussion"129: 
[T]he reduced theory often is false whereas the reducing theory is true, which 
precludes the required sort of sound deduction of the former from the latter 
augmented by further definitions and hypotheses.l30 
The Received View does tend to overlook or downplay inconsistency between 
successive theories. For example, the predictions of Newtonian physics concerning a 
body in uniform motion in empty space contradict those of the medieval theory. But 
for the Received View, claims Feyerabend: 
[I]t is natural to resolve this contradiction by eliminating the troublesome and 
unsatisfactory older principles and to replace them by principles, or theorems, 
of the new and better theory.l31 
The Received View ignores certain theoretical postulates of T1 and the observational 
consequences of the laws which contain them, so that the observational 
125 Feyerabend (1978), p. 67. 
126 Feyerabend ( 1962), p. 59. My italics. 
127 Feyerabend (1962), p. 90. 
128 SeeNewton-Smith(I98I),p.l55. 
129 Suppe (1977), p. 624. 130 Suppe ( 1977), p. 624. 
131 Feyerabend (I 962), p. 82. 
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consequences of T2 will be regarded as including those of Tt. In uncovering the 
inconsistency to which the Received View had turned a blind eye, Feyerabend shows 
that the three conditions on theocy development do not always hold. In this respect, 
Feyerabend's 1962 paper may be judged a success. 
What Feyerabend's 1962 paper has argued is that Tt and T2 may be 
incommensurable by showing that they may be mutually inconsistent. Feyerabend 
himself describes the relations between two incommensurable theories (Tt and T2) 
thus: 
"[T]he use of [T 2] will necessitate the elimination both of the conceptual 
apparatus of [T 1] and the laws of [T 1]. The conceptual apparatus will have to be 
eliminated because it involves principles [ ... ] which are inconsistent with the 
principles of [T2]; and the laws will have to be eliminated because they are 
inconsistent with what follows from [T 2] for events inside D1• "I32 
It seems to me that the IT must retain the successful inconsistency claim and revise 
the logical independence claim which conflicts with it. So I would like to say that it is 
the interplay between the notions of inconsistency and something like logical 
independence (as notions which relate the statements of Tt and T2) which compose 
the IT. Such an interplay might be that T1 appears illogical or irrational to a holder 
ofT 2. This conception of the IT will come up again in Chapters 3 and 4. 
It is surely not an uncommon opinion that the Received View's meaning invariance 
condition is Oike the derivability and consistency conditions) too strict, and that the 
meanings of some terms of Tt are altered in T2. For example, Michael Devitt can 
write: 
I am sympathetic to the view that theory change often leads to meaning change 
and find the discussions of Kuhn and Feyerabend illuminating on that issue.l33 
The big issue, then, is not that meaning change occurs, but "the nature and degree 
of the semantic changes"134 which Feyerabend proposes. The degree of meaning 
change is a question of numbers: are all terms changed or only some? The nature of 
meaning change proposed is the more problematic issue of the MVT, for two 
reasons. First, the mechanism of meaning change, Feyerabend maintains, is theory 
change; the MVT therefore includes the vecy contentious thesis I. Second, the 
proposed meaning change is such that statements in Tt and T2 are logically 
132 Feyerabend (1962), p. 59. My italics. 
133 Devitt (1979), p. 33. 
134 Ramberg(l989), p. 118. 
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independent (even in the common domain). Feyerabend seems convinced that 
incommensurability occurs when "none of the usual logical relations (inclusion, 
exclusion, overlap) can be said to hold between [two successive theories]"135• 
There are a number of reasons for regarding the logical independence claim as 
highly problematic. For example, it implies that a successor theory neither supports 
nor rivals its predecessor. It also implies that Tt and T2 are not about the same 
things, raising the question of how they could have a common domain. Such 
problems have been used as reasons for rejecting the logical independence claim. 
But I argue that the logical independence claim ought to be rejected on the grounds 
that Feyerabend opposes the consistency condition, and because the MVf is, 
according to Feyerabend, a special case of inconsistency between theories. The IT 
claims that the derivability, consistency and meaning invariance conditions are 
false; any additional claims made by the IT must not conflict with those foundational 
assertions. 
That there can be meaning change in theory transition is a logical consequence of 
opposing the Received View's meaning invariance condition; but this consequence 
alone is not the MVf. A fuller statement of the MVT would include the following: 
(1) thesis I: "the interpretation of an observation language is determined by the 
theories which we use to explain what we observe, and it changes as soon as those 
theories change."t36 
(2) meaning change affects all or some of terms of the predecessor theory 
(3) meaning postulates of T1 cannot be true of the same things of which meaning 
postulates in T2 would be true (and to assume they are true of the same thing gives 
rise to inconsistency) 
(4) in the common domain, statements ofTt can be logically independent of those of 
T2 (so the truth ofTt has no logical consequences for the truth value ofT2.) 
Taken together, these claims amount to the main semantic claims of the IT. The IT 
itself, as Against Method shows, is an even more general claim concerning the 
history of science, scientific method, rationality, anthropology, and a wealth of other 
issues. These topics each present their own sets of problems for the IT; but the MVT 
is the set of claims which compose the semantic IT and which together undermine 
135 Feyerabend (1975), p. 223. 
136 Feyerabend ( 1958), p. 31. I have removed the italics. 
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the semantic IT. It is this problem - that of the MVT, or the semantic IT if you like -
which the remaining chapters will address. Chapter 2 will look at what motivates the 
general notion of the fluidity of meaning and the particular claims made in (1) and 
(2). Chapter 3 will address arguments from causal theories of reference that attempt 
to show that (1), the strong form of (2), and (4) are false. Chapter 4looks at a further 
argument against (4). 
40 
Chapter 2 
The Meaning Variance of 
(Observation) Terms 
If you are distressed by anything external, the pain is not due to the thing itself but to your 
own estimate of it; and this you have the power to revoke at any moment. 
Marcus Aurelius, Meditations, p. 131. 
A new theory of pains will not change the pains; nor will it change the causal connection 
between the occurrence of pains and the production of 'I am in pain', except perhaps very 
slightly. It will change the meaning of'I am in pain'. 
Paul Feyerabend, 'Materialism and the Mind-Body Problem' (1963a), in PP1, p. 169. 
~------------------------------------------------------- ---
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Introduction 
In the first chapter, it was shown that two successive general theories need not meet 
the derivability condition, the consistency condition, or the meaning invariance 
condition. These arguments showed: 
(a) If it is assumed that T1 and T2 have a substantial common ontology, then 
statements ofT1 and T2 may be inconsistent in the common domain. 
According to Feyerabend's presentation, failing to meet the three conditions is 
necessary, but not sufficient, for T1 and T2 to be incommensurable. The semantic 
incommensurability thesis (IT) includes a further proposal about the holistic nature 
of the meaning change which takes place, namely: 
(b) thesis I: "the interpretation of an observation language is determined by the 
theories which we use to explain what we observe, and it changes as soon as the 
theories change.''~ 
The IT also proposes that the terms ofT1 and T2 have not merely different meanings, 
but different such that: 
(c) statements ofT1 may be logically independent- even in the common domain- to 
statements of T2, so that the truth of T1 may have no logical consequences for the 
truth ofT2. 
I will take the meaning variance thesis (MVr) to be the semantic claims of the IT 
and to consist of claims (a), (b) and (c). The radical MVT, which is proposed and 
eventually withdrawn, replaces (c) with (c'): 
(c') All descriptive statements of T1 and T2 may be logically independent in the 
common domain. 
Chapter 1 has already established (a). The case for (b) is mostly presented in 
Feyerabend's pragmatic theory of observation (PTO), and is considered in this 
chapter. Feyerabend regards claim (c) as a possible result of (b), so the PTO lies 
behind both (b) and (c). Claim (c') is returned to at the beginning of Chapter 3. 
The PTO is not generally regarded as a credible theory of meaning, so the point of 
this chapter is not to show that it is. To draw such a conclusion at this stage is not 
intended to 'take the wind out of our sails', but to bring into focus what are the aims 
of this chapter. First, there is the descriptive aim of recording Feyerabend's 
arguments for the PTO and against opposing views. Second, there is the critical aim 
of stating shortcomings of the PTO and the arguments against competitor theories of 
1 Feyerabend(l958), in PPI , p. 31. 
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meaning. Thirdly, and perhaps most interestingly, there is the evaluative aim. The 
intention here is to ask whether, and to what extent, the PTO is a Quinean theory of 
meaning, as Feyerabend claimed it was, and to judge how much support (b) and (c) 
have. 
Feyerabend first presents the PTO in English in his 1958 paper 'An Attempt At A 
Realistic Interpretation Of Experience'. In that paper he does not use the phrase 
'meaning invariance'; instead, he speaks of the 'stability thesis'. The stability thesis is 
the view: 
(d) "interpretations ... do not depend upon the status of our theoretical 
knowledge."2 
Feyerabend uses the word 'interpretations' in a very particular way, meaning the 
assertoric content of (observation) sentences (or that which makes an observation 
sentence a statement). Since the stability thesis rejects the idea that the meaning of 
an observation term is determined holistically by its embedding theory, and yet the 
stability thesis maintains that such terms are meaningful, Feyerabend will need to 
justify (d) by stipulating what the interpretation of observation terms does depend 
on. Feyerabend thinks that proposers of the stability thesis will tend to maintain that 
the meanings of observation terms are relatively stable because either the meanings 
of such terms are determined by sense-data, or because the meanings of such terms 
are explained by the way the terms are used. Interpretation as a function of 
experience is labelled the 'principle of phenomenological meaning' and 
interpretation as a function of linguistic convention is called the 'principle of 
pragmatic meaning'. 
In this chapter, Part 1 addresses Feyerabend's arguments against the stability thesis' 
principle of phenomenological meaning; and Part 2 considers his arguments against 
the principle of pragmatic meaning. Part 3 presents the PTO and evaluates to what 
extent it provides a Quinean view of language. Part 4 considers criticisms of the PTO 
and the degree of support it gives to the semantic claims of the IT, claims (b) and (c). 
2 Feyerabend(l958), in PP!, p. 20. 
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The principle of phenomenological meaning states that the meaning of an 
observation statement is determined by sense-data: "the acceptance (or the 
rejection) of any description of those things is uniquely determined by the 
observational situation."3 So: 
in order to explain to a person what 'red' means, one need only create 
circumstances in which red is experienced. The things experienced, or 
'immediately perceived', in these circumstances completely settle the question 
concerning the meaning of the word 'red' .4 
Feyerabend offers three sets of argument against this principle. Set 1 considers the 
claim that knowledge by acquaintance underlies the ability to denote. Set 2 
considers whether the meanings of introspective statements are given solely by 
sense-data. Set 3 contains three arguments against the principle of 
phenomenological meaning: an infinite regress, which in turn is part of a reductio 
ad absurdum, and a third argument about phenomena not imparting meaning but 
being grounds for selecting a meaningful statement from a group. 
With regard to set 1, one of the objects of knowledge by acquaintance is sense-data. 
In contrast to knowing by acquaintance, we know an individual by description 
"when we know that it is the object having some property or properties with which 
we are acquainted"S. The relation, then, between the two types of knowledge (i.e. by 
acquaintance and by description) is such that "in the case of particulars, knowledge 
concerning what is known by description is ultimately reducible to knowledge 
concerning what is known by acquaintance."6 It was Bertrand Russell's view that the 
sense-data statement 'there is a canoid patch of colour' was more certain (or less 
prone to error) than 'there is a dog'. Russell thought that, with his canoid patches, it 
was possible to 'break down' the denotation of a statement about a dog into 
constituent sensations7 with which we could be unproblematically acquainted. About 
this view, Feyerabend remarks:8 
Russell seems to assume that the statement 'there is a canoid patch of colour', 
while being true whenever 'there is a dog' is true, satisfies the condition of being 
logically simpler than 'there is a dog' because it is about a simpler phenomenon 
3 Feyerabend (1958), in PPI, p. 25. 
4 Feyerabend (1965a), pp. 203-4. 
5 Russell (1917), p. 166. 
6 Russell (1917), p. 158. 
7 
"[l]n order to understand such propositions, we need acquaintance with the constants of the description, but do not need 
acquaintance with its denotation." Russell ( 1917), p. 166. 
8 How accurately Feyerabend's remark represents Russell's views will not be of much concern here. It is the position, rather 
than the accuracy of its attribution to Russell which is the main interest. 
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(a patch of colour is two-dimensional, does not bark, a dog is three-dimensional, 
barks etc).9 
Feyerabend objects to the appeal to sense data on three grounds. First, to state 'there 
is a canoid patch of colour' in the presence of a dog is to give a phenomenologically 
inadequate observation statement, for a canoid patch of colour is not a dog. Second, 
if there actually is a dog, then the statement 'there is a canoid patch of colour' is 
false, "for a picture of a dog is not a dog."10 Third, the allegedly simpler statement 
contains the category 'canoid' which involves the category 'dog': 'dog-like' is hardly 
more simple than 'dog'. Feyerabend concludes that the attempt, on the basis of 
knowledge by acquaintance, to build up an observation language whose 
interpretation is immediately given by sense-data is unsuccessful. 
Here, Feyerabend's criticisms of the sense-data view do not seem to me to succeed in 
their goal of having the stability thesis dismissed. Feyerabend's criticisms are in 
danger of being criticisms only of statements about individuals known by 
description, whereas Russell's comments distinguish between the physical objects 
known by description and sense-data known by acquaintance.11 Of course, collapsing 
Russell's distinction is Feyerabend's intention. But Feyerabend's simply not 
following this distinction does not produce convincing arguments against Russell's 
making it. Feyerabend's failure to engage with Russell's distinction seems most 
marked in the third criticism. I can sense a canoid patch of colour without there 
being a dog present (such as when a wolf or a jackal is present); but when I look at a 
dog, I will always sense a canoid patch of colour. So the sense-data statement 'There 
is a canoid patch of colour' is logically weaker than the descriptive statement 'There 
is a dog'. Inasmuch as Feyerabend's criticisms are interesting, they are so because 
there is some disparity between my experiencing a dog and my experiencing a 
canoid patch of colour. But Feyerabend does not enlighten us as to the nature of that 
disparity. The next set of arguments involves an area where, it is claimed, there is no 
such disparity. 
9 Feyerabend(1958), in PPI, p. 28. 
10 Feyerabend ( 1958), in PP I, p. 28. Does Feyerabend here assume that a patch of eanoid colour is a picture of a dog? 
11 Whether physical objects are a function of sense-data or vice-versa is an issue of which Russell is keenly aware: "In Physics 
as commonly set forth, sense-data appear as functions of physical objects: when such-and-such waves impinge upon the eye. we 
see such-and-such colours, and so on. But the waves are in filet inferred from the colours, not vice-versa[ ... ] Thus if Physics is 
to be verifiable we are filced with the following problem: Physics exhibits sense-data as functions of physical objects, but 
verification is only possible if physical objects can be exhibited as functions ofsense-data.""Russell (1917), p. 109. 
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Set 2 arguments against the principle of phenomenological meaning concern 
psychological phenomena. Proponents of the principle can claim that, when I feel 
pain, then the statement 'I am in pain' is true and must be so: the truth of the 
statement (and hence the meaning of 'pain') is determined by the sensation. The 
meaning of such statements are therefore fixed by the sensation accompanying the 
urge for me to say that I am in pain. 
Feyerabend has three objections in this set concerning psychological phenomena. 
The first is that the above comments about psychological phenomena claim: 
the existence of either an urge to produce a sentence of a certain kind or the 
existence of psychological phenomenon, can without further ado transfer 
meaning upon a sentence.l2 
Feyerabend objects to this claim on the grounds that it is "unacceptable to any 
philosopher who takes seriously the distinction between facts and conventions."l3 
Feyerabend wants to insist that facts are in some sense independent of opinions, 
while descriptions of states of affairs employ linguistic conventions. He points out 
that "what we are discussing is not what is and is not going on in the world, but how 
what is going on is to be described."14 The problem with the principle of 
phenomenological meaning, claims Feyerabend, is that this distinction ultimately 
collapses. Feyerabend points out that when I utter 'I am in pain' I must have in mind 
a conventional notion or description (i.e. a 'theory') of what pain is; for example: 
pain is not something inanimate objects have, it is not contagious, and it can 
disappear through the use of morphine. Other people share this description of what 
pain is. However, the principle of phenomenological meaning would have it that 
only the immediately given sensation of pain determines the meaning of the 
sentence 'I am in pain'; the above descriptions associated with pain would then have 
no role in determining the meaning of the pain statement. The result of meaning 
determined solely by sense-data is that, in the case of my saying 'I am in pain', 
I may utter it on the occasion of pain (in the normal sense) [i.e. as defined in the 
description of pain]; I may also utter it in a dream with no pain present ... or I 
may have been taught ... to utter it when I have pleasant feelings and therefore 
utter it on these occasions. Clearly, all these usages are legitimate, and all of 
them describe the 'immediately given pain' ,15 
12 Feyerabend ( 1962), pp. 38-9. 
13 Feyerabend (1962), p. 39. This may seem an odd tactic to employ, given Feyerabend's adherence to the claim that theories 
determine the meanings of statements of filets). But this claim mentions theories and statements of filet, not theories and filets. 
This distinction comes out in the presentation of Feyerabend's argument. 
14 Feyerabend (1965a), p. 196. 
15 Feyerabend (1965a), pp. 195-6. 
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Without inferring a description of pain (from other people's behaviour) I would use 
the word 'pain' irregularly. The claim that only the facts or sense-data of 
psychological phenomena impart interpretations to observation sentences 
disregards the conventional nature oflinguistic meaning. 
In response to Feyerabend's first argument in set 2, it may be retorted that the 
distinction between fact and convention need not come under threat of collapse 
because of the principle of phenomenological meaning. The causal theory of 
reference (CTR), for example, adheres to something like the principle of 
phenomenological meaning without collapsing the distinction between fact and 
convention. The CTR will be considered in Chapter 3. 
Feyerabend's second objection in set 2 is that "it is not true that every assertion 
about sensations excludes doubt."16 He cites Berkeley's example of a hot sensation 
becoming a pain sensation, with a 'grey area' as to when the heat becomes pain (or 
'heat' becomes 'pain'). He also describes a medical nerve-test on a patient who has 
had temporary paralysis: the patient may be unsure whether he has had the 
sensation of a blunt or a sharp instrument pressed against his skin. It is therefore 
doubtful that a stimulation of nerve-endings renders the interpretation of the 
statement 'I am in pain' fixed. 
In later writing on this topic of psychological states or sensations, Feyerabend shifts 
the emphasis of the above criticism from being uncertain about the sensation to 
misinterpreting the sensation. Feyerabend debated this issue with Herbert Feigl and 
gives an example from his own personal experience of how a sensation such as pain 
may be misinterpreted: 
Feigl believed in incorrigible statements. He said ... that being in pain he knew 
directly and with certainty that he was in pain. I didn't believe him but only had 
general objections to offer. One night, however, I dreamed that I had a rather 
pleasant sensation in my right leg. The sensation increased in intensity, and I 
began to wake up. It grew even more intense. I woke up more fully and 
discovered that it had been a severe pain all the time. The sensation itself told 
me that it had been a sensation of immense pain, which I had mistaken for a 
sensation of pleasure.17 
16 Feyerabend (1960c), in PP3, p. 24. 
17 Feyerabend (1995), pp. 116-7. 
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Here, Feyerabend seems to take the phenomenon of pain as a 'given', a phenomenon 
the existence of which is certain, but the meaning or significance of which may be 
variously construed and misconstrued. As we will see, this shift in emphasis from 
uncertainty to misinterpretation will answer some problems raised by Feyerabend's 
second area of objection to the principle of phenomenological meaning. 
In response to this second argument of set 2, Elie Zahar retorts that the issue here is 
not one of uncertainty, but one of inadequate description: we simply do not have the 
vocabulary to describe the miriad sensations on the pleasure-pain kline: 
Our sensations form a potentially infinite set and have infinitely many nuances; 
it is no wonder that they cannot all be captured by a finite number of 
adjectives .Is 
Even though Zahar's point is a fair challenge to Feyerabend's argument from 
uncertainty, it does not offer any resistance to Feyerabend's argument that 
observational terms' meanings are variant because we can misinterpret (or re-
interpret) sense-data statements. What might be considered unsatisfactory, 
however, are Feyerabend's examples of such misinterpretation; for they all concern 
states (of mind or body) which are either not fully conscious (sleep) or pathological 
(a patient with poorly functioning nerve endings). While his argument would be 
strengthened if it did not depend on such exotic examples, we cannot dismiss his 
argument simply on the grounds of their rum character. 
Feyerabend's third argument in set 2 comes from the conclusions of the other two 
arguments in the set. That is, if the meaning of the term 'pain' were determined by 
the private sensation of pain, and 'pain' were used to make an assertion without 
regard to any conventional use or description of pain, then the term 'pain' would 
mean different things at different times to different people. Consequently, I would 
not know for sure what you mean when you claim to be in pain. This consequence of 
supporting a sense-datum theory of meaning with respect to introspective 
statements is what Elie Zahar calls the 'in transmissibility thesis'. The 
intransmissibility thesis is "the ... view that meaning cannot be infallibly 
communicated from one person to another"19. Lack of a common description of a 
sensation (such as pain) would be sufficient for what the intransmissibility thesis 
proposes. When lack of any common description is combined with the claim of 
18 Zahar (1982), p. 399. 
19 Zahar(1982), p. 401. 
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Feyerabend's second argument, that the same stimulation may cause me to assert at 
one time that I am in pain, and at another time that I experience pleasure, then the 
result is not merely intransmissibility between persons: an individual observer 
would be unable to reidentify the same stimulation with the appropriate 
interpretation. Sense-data are not generally regarded as interpreted; but 
Feyerabend's point is that sense-data statements are interpreted, and that 
statements of facts and sense-data have no fixed interpretation provided by facts or 
sense-data. 
Zahar is in agreement with the substance of the third argument: "Feyerabend 
successfully shows that the intransmissibility thesis applies to all phenomenological 
concepts."20 Zahar also admits that, in raising the problems of intransmissibility and 
reidentification, Feyerabend has laid bare 'the conjectural assumption of meaning 
invariance' by showing that 
a proposition S about sense-data is incorrigible for at most one person, namely 
the observation reporter Q, and only at the instant t at which Q utters S. 
Another person Q*, who might want to rely on the absolute truth of S, can never 
be sure that he and Q attach identical meanings to the descriptive symbols 
occurring in s.21 
Feyerabend's argument showing intransmissibility is sound, according to Zahar. But 
Zahar accepts the intransmissibility thesis, and does not regard it as a reason for 
rejecting sense data-ism. Zahar's holding the intransmissibility thesis (including his 
claim, to be quoted shortly, that intuition adequately explains the relation between a 
statement and a phenomenon) surely suggests that the meaning of an observation 
statement is or may be unstable in case that the meaning is determined by 
phenomena. And this is what Feyerabend is proposing in opposing the stability 
thesis. 
Moving on to set 3, the final set of arguments against the principle of 
phenomenological meaning, Feyerabend's begins with an infmite regress claim. Let: 
-
S =an observation statement 
P = a phenomenon which is said to determine the meaning of S 
M = the relation between P and S 
20 Zahar ( 1982 ), p. 40 I. 
Jt 
- Zahar (1982), p. 400. 
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The view that "phenomena must speak for themselves"22 would have it that the 
acceptance or rejection of S is determined by P. Yet the reason why S is accepted is 
not simply because of P, it is because of M: we accept S because there is a mapping, 
M, of P to S and we reject S when there is no such mapping. For example, ifS is the 
statement 'I am in pain', then the following series of steps would (under the 
principle of phenomenological meaning) be involved in our determining the 
meaning of S: 
(1) I form or utter S because I know that the phenomenon P is mapped to the 
statement S. 
(2) To know that Pis mapped to S, I must know the mapping, M. 
(3) To know the mapping M, I must have a thought in the form of a statementS'. 
(4) To formS', I must know that M is mapped to S'. 
(5) To know that M is mapped to S', I must know the mapping M'. 
(6) To know the mapping M', I must have a thought in the form of a statementS" 
(7) To formS", I must know that M' is mapped to S" 
(8) To know that M' is mapped to S", I must know the mapping M". 
etc. (Repeat ad infinitum from (3) to (5) or (6) to (8) With appropriate substitutions.) 
The corollary of Feyerabend's infinite regress argument against the principle of 
phenomenological meaning is that an "observer must perform infinitely many acts 
of observation before he can determine the meaning of a single observation 
statement."23 In short, phenomena (in this example, psychological phenomena) 
cannot determine the meanings of observation statements. 
Feyerabend's infinite regress argument is criticised by Zahar on the grounds that it 
clearly contains a gratuitous assumption, namely that [M], in order to exist at 
all, must be adequately described by some S'. It is as if intuition were impossible 
without some accompanying linguistic, or quasi-linguistic, entity.24 
But Feyerabend's argument is surely not about whether M exists, but what it is to 
know that M; for to know that M would be to know that the meaning of S is 
determined by P (according to the principle of phenomenological meaning). As John 
Preston points out, "[t]he question is whether we can know that S 'fits' P without 
having any means to express this knowledge."25 Zahar's suggestion that M is intuited 
runs into a series of objections: 
22 Feyerabend ( 1965a), p. 204. 
23 Feyerabend ( 1965a), pp. 204- 5. See also Feyerabend ( 1958), p. 26. 
24 Zahar (1982), p. 398. 
25 Preston (1997), p. 35. 
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It is hard to see how a meaningful sentence expressing a relationship could have 
its meaning completely determined by a relationship which cannot be 
adequately described, and is inexpressible'. Such a sentence would be one whose 
meaning was humanly unstable: its meaning could therefore be conveyed only 
in an appropriate situation in which the audience was confronted with the 
relationship. But how, in such a situation, would the communicator direct the 
audience's attention to, or know whether the audience had focused on, the 
correct relationship?26 
Feyerabend uses this infinite regress in a reductio ad absurdum27, thereby 
constituting the main argument of set 3. Since the principle of phenomenological 
meaning has it that phenomena are capable of determining statements, then M, if it 
is a phenomenon itself, must be capable of determining a statementS'. Since M is 
never expressed by a statementS' (because of the regression) then M "cannot be 
immediately given in the sense in which P is immediately given, i.e. it cannot be a 
phenomenon."28 In the case where M is not a phenomenon, the principle of 
phenomenological meaning would regard M as of no significance in the formation of 
observation statements; since no significance is attached to the relation between P 
and S, the principle falsifies itself! If M were a phenomenon, then the principle of 
the principle of phenomenological meaning is that M should determine the meaning 
of a statementS'; yet M never meets this requirement, so the principle is false. 
Rather than dealing directly with the relation between a statement and a 
phenomenon, Richard T. Hull suggests that Feyerabend's traps be avoided by 
considering the relation between a state of affairs and a thought about the state of 
affairs. Hull points out that statements obtain their connexion to facts by way of 
conventional laws (in the language community): 
I utter something to my doctor and he slaps me on the back and tells me it's 
great I'm feeling so well. This is good evidence that I have not expressed the 
thought that-I-am-in-pain.29 
So facts do not directly determine statements, rather facts determine thoughts and 
they can do so in a way that does not lead to an infinite regress. Let: 
H = the fact that I am in pain (it so happens that I am in pain) 
T =the thought that-l-am-in-pain 
M* = the relation between H and T 
26 Preston (I 997), p. 35. Preston adds that Zahar's assertion ofineffubility conceming the statement/phenomenon relation 
"injects mysticism into the foundations of empirical science." This would be an unacceptable consequence tor many holders of 
the principle ofphenomenological meaning. 
27 Feyerabend regards the red11ctio as 'the argument' and the infinite regress merely as a part oft he red11ctio. See Feyerabend 
(1958), in PP I, p. 25. 
28 Feyerabend (1958), in PP I, p. 25. 
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Hull argues that M* is an analytic relation: 
for I already know that the thought that-l-am-in-pain means that I am in pain 
before a particular situation of my being in pain arises. That the thought that-l-
am-in-pain could fail to intend the fact that I am in pain is either false or 
unintelligible.3o 
This analytic relation between Hand T is due to intentionality: if I am thinking that-
l-am-in-pain then that in itself is sufficient for my being in pain, without any further 
appeal to facts: "the fact need not obtain in order for the intentional nexus to 
connect the thought with the fact"31 Ifl think that-I am-in-pain, then that can mean 
only one thing - my thought is necessarily about the fact that I am in pain. No 
infinite regress is called upon to express the relation between the thought and the 
fact; so the meaning of the statement 'I am in pain' is fixed by the state of affairs 
indirectly. Hull makes an interesting case where facts and thoughts match nicely. 
However, Hull's explanation is not in accord with the principle of phenomenological 
meaning. One of his premises is that the meaning of 'I am in pain' is sufficiently 
constrained by the behaviour of the members of the language community, and this is 
inconsistent with the principle of phenomenological meaning. Furthermore, the 
analytic relation which Hull proposes has synthetic import. Synthetic a priori 
statements would not be acceptable to Positivists, and Feyerabend is primarily 
concerned with attacking Positivist supporters of the stability thesis. Such 
supporters ought not to go along with Hull's reply to Feyerabend's criticism. And 
Feyerabend would point out that no empiricist should accept synthetic statements 
which are in principle unfalsifiable. 
Feyerabend's final argument in set 3 considers the weaker claim of the principle of 
phenomenological meaning that, "given a class of interpreted sentences, the relation 
of phenomenological adequacy might allow us to select those sentences that 
correctly describe P."32 The view under consideration is that, from a class of 
statements, we would be able to know, simply by acquaintance with a phenomenon, 
which statement to use as our observation statement of that phenomenon. Many 
statements can be "obtained from"33 the single statement 'there is a table', such as 
'there seems to be a table', 'a table is located in the place I am indicating', 'a table 
exists before us', and so on. A spectral statement is each member of the class of 
29 Hull (1972), p. 383. 
30 Hull (1972), p. 381. 
31 Hull (1972), p. 381. 
32 Feyerabend (1965a), p. 205. 
33 Feyerabend (1965a), p. 206. 
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'statements which are [said to be] phenomenologically adequate' to the selected and 
interpreted sentence 'there is a table'; and the class they make up is called, 
appropriately, "the spectrum associated with the phenomenon in question."34 From 
this spectrum we cannot, merely by acquaintance with a phenomenon, select our 
observation statement. So Feyerabend concludes "that phenomena alone cannot 
even select interpretations, but that additional considerations are needed."35 
I confess that I find this argument of Feyerabend's the most opaque of all those so 
far considered. My first difficulty with it is that I do not see the need to have a 
preference for one of the statements if all of the statements are phenomenologically 
adequate. If, as Feyerabend seems to have allowed for the purposes of his argument, 
the phenomenon has determined the meaning of all of the spectral statements, then 
surely any one of them will do as a satisfactory observation statement. Feyerabend 
would probably reply that, since there are many different acceptable statements, 
then the phenomenon does not provide invariant meaning (so the principle of 
phenomenological meaning is untenable, QED). But my problem with this reply is 
that many different statements need not entail many different meanings. This brings 
out what I see as the second difficulty with Feyerabend's argument, the spectrum of 
statements. 
Feyerabend proposes the spectrum of statements because, "given a phenomenon, 
there are always many different statements (expressed by the same sentence) that 
will be found to fit the phenomenon."36 As the foundational sentence, Feyerabend 
takes the example "there is a table". This sentence is said, then, to express the 
statements "there is a table", "there seems to be a table" and many other statements. 
An unhappy feature of Feyerabend's argument is that the spectrum which 
Feyerabend proposes could imply that spectral statements do have a common 
element of meaning and that this common element is the denotation of the 
spectrum. As the chapter on reference will show, just such arguments are used to 
support the stability thesis. However, Feyerabend would probably not be fazed, for 
he would maintain that any given spectrum has infinitely many possible statements, 
none of which is selected as 'the meaning' or privileged interpretation or best 
description by the phenomenon in question. To make his argument convincing, 
34 Feyerabend (1965a), p. 206. 
35 Feyerabend (1965a), p. 206. 
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though, I think Feyerabend would need to improve upon and better explain the 
notion of the spectrum which is so central to his argument. 
With the three sets of arguments considered here, Feyerabend concludes that "the 
meaning of an observation term and the phenomenon leading to its application are 
two entirely different things."37 The first set of arguments (about knowledge by 
acquaintance) against sense-datum theories of meaning was judged not convincing. 
The arguments in set 2 have shown that sense-data are not sufficient to determine 
the meaning of observation sentences, (or that, if sense-data are, observational 
meanings will be variant); so set 2, while generally successful in dismissing the 
principle of phenomenological meaning, does not adequately support Feyerabend's 
conclusion (stated at the beginning of this paragraph) that the principle of 
phenomenological meaning does not in part determine the meanings of observation 
statements. The reductio argument in set 3 is surely Feyerabend's most effective 
support for ruling out sense-data as the source of invariant meaning for observation 
statements. But that sense-data do offer some constraint on the meaning of 
observation statements is an option against which Feyerabend has not offered 
compelling evidence in these arguments. 
Part 2: Use Theories 
The second source of support for the stability thesis is the principle of pragmatic 
meaning, the principle that "the interpretation of an expression is determined by its 
'use' "38. Feyerabend gives a formal description of the use of an observation sentence 
and he calls this formal description the 'characteristic' of an observation language: 
"The characteristic of an observation language completely determines the 'use' of 
each of its atomic sentences."39 He defines the characteristic as follows:4° 
-
C = a class of observers using a language 
A= class of atomic sentences (each a physical event) of the language considered 
S = class of observed situations 
F = the function correlating members of A with C (the associating function) 
R = the function correlating S with acceptance or rejection of any member of A 
(the causal relevance function) 
36 Feyerabend (1965a), p. 206. 
37 Feyerabend (1965a), p. 206. 
38 Feyerabend (1958), in PP I, p. 21. 
39 Feyerabend (1958), in PP I, p. 18. 
4
° Feyerabend(l958), in PPI, p. 18. 
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The set {C, A, S, F, R} fully characterises "[t]he pragmatic properties of a given 
observation language"41• Feyerabend uses the characteristic to substantiate his claim 
that the act, and even conditions, of sentence utterance do not make "any stipulation 
as to what those sentences are supposed to assert"42 • To understand the sentences as 
statements, further conditions must be added, namely an interpretation. Feyerabend 
illustrates this claim with the following example. 
A language, L, describes the colours of self-luminescent objects using predicates Pi (i 
= 1, 2, 3 ... ). The 'characteristic' of L is defined and determined for everyday 
situations (moderate velocities and masses) and the predicates of L are regarded as 
designating properties of objects, irrespective of whether the objects are being 
observed. A new theory is formulated which states that the wavelength of light is 
dependent upon the relative velocities of the observer and the light source. Using 
this theory and L to describe the colour of a self-luminescent object a, the expression 
'Pi( a)' has now become "no longer complete and unambiguous"43, for in addition its 
former meaning, we may also interpret 'Pi(a)' as 'Pi(a,p)', where p represents "the 
relative velocity of a and the co-ordinate system of the observer - which may or may 
not be observable"44• The 'characteristic' of L restricts the use of 'Pi(a)' to the 
everyday level, and we can continue to use it without any formal alteration on the 
everyday level. While the characteristic of L may remain unchanged with regard to 
the use of'Pi(a)', 'Pi(a)' has a different meaning to what it had before the positing of 
the Doppler effect, for now it designates the relation 'Pi(a,p)'. In this formal way, 
Feyerabend is saying that no change has occurred in the observation sentence's place 
in L, but there is a different observation statement. The use of the language has not 
altered, nor have the relevant phenomena, but the interpretation has. 
From this example, Feyerabend hopes to have shown that the principle of pragmatic 
meaning is untenable. Commenting on the colour predicate example, John Preston 
argues that no serious challenge has been mounted against the principle of 
pragmatic meaning, for: 
41 Feyerabend ( 1958), in PP I, p. 18. 
42 Feyerabend(l958), in PPI, p.l8. 
43 Feyerabend (1958), in PP I, p. 32. 
44 Feyerabend (1958), in PP I, p. 30. 
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-(0 the example fails to provide "support for the idea that a change in meaning can 
occur in the absence of any change in application."45 
If there has been no change in the characteristic, no change in the use of the 
sentences of L, then "what ... could make us think that the meaning ('interpretation') 
of that sentence has changed?"46 Indeed, without any change in the use of the 
observation sentence 'Pi(a)', argues Preston, a speaker of L would explain 'Pi(a)' in 
the same old non-Doppler effect terms. In which case, if there were a change in 
meaning "it must be one which transcends the speaker's knowledge ofmeaning".47 If 
a change of theory is to effect a change of meaning in an observation statement, then 
there will need to be some change in the use of that or related observation 
statements. 
Since it would be possible to narrow a domain to the extent where the displayed 
linguistic behaviour of two speakers (one a Doppler fan, the other with no such 
specialist knowledge) was identical, Preston's objection needs to include as 
regularities of use, the case where sentences are privately accepted (i.e. "uttered 
assertively to oneself'4B). Indeed, Preston allows for such a notion of use when he 
speaks of "changes in the (possible, if not actual) correct use"49 of A; for the very 
sentences of the new theory would, though they were never publicly uttered, 
constitute private changes to the application of A. Then, it is claimed, Feyerabend's 
example does not show that use (given in the characteristic) is held constant while 
meaning has changed; consequently (f) is vindicated. 
Such a response, however, seems to suggest that a sentence will have as many 
different meanings are there are ideolects, for then a (private or possible) change of 
use would always entail a change of meaning. The principle of pragmatic meaning 
would then be required to defend itself by differentiating "between those properties 
which comprise[ ... ] 'the use' and those which do not"so, and this is not a task which 
Preston undertakes. Paul Harwich, a supporter of a use theory of meaning, makes 
such a distinction on the following basis: 
45 Preston (1997), p. 37. 
46 Preston (1997), p. 3 7. 
47 Preston (1997), p. 37. 
48 Horwich (1998), p. 94. 
49 Preston ( 1997), p. 38. My italics. 
50 Horwich (1998), p. 60. 
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the way to pick out the particular use property of a word that comprises what we 
call 'the use' is to find the use property which provides the best explanation of 
all the others.s1 
For example, the discovery of a tenth planet would lead to new uses of'planets', such 
as 'There are ten planets', yet this is not considered sufficient to change the meaning 
of 'planets'. If the meaning of 'planets' is altered, it will be done so in such uses as 
'Planets do not orbit stars', for such uses alter a more explanatorily basic meaning of 
'planets'. Of such a procedure for ascertaining meaning-determining use, Harwich 
admits: 
The outcome [ ... ] may no doubt be indeterminate. There will sometimes be 
equally good ways of finding a simple regularity in the use of a word [ ... ] But a 
distinction with unclear boundaries is a distinction none the less - one that puts 
us in a position to say of certain novel deployments of a word that they definitely 
do not amount to changes in its use.s2 
Harwich also admits that the procedure may rely on distinguishing analytic from 
synthetic statements. So it would seem that vindicating (f) is a project which is 
beyond the scope of this chapter. As regards Feyerabend's criticism of the principle 
of pragmatic meaning, it can at least be said that the issues it raises are legitimate. 
In the Doppler effect example, Feyerabend had attempted to show that meaning can 
differ when use is identical. He also tried to illustrate the converse: two observation 
languages with different characteristics can be "jointly interpreted by one and the 
same theory"53• For example, "Maxwell's electrodynamics plays this role with respect 
to the phenomena of light and electricity."54 Sentences which had been used in the 
description of light, and sentences used in the description of electricity, endured no 
alteration of use in their respective domains by the introduction of Maxwell's theory; 
yet before Maxwell, no light-sentence had the same interpretation as an electricity-
sentence. 
Finally, Feyerabend objects to the principle of pragmatic meaning on the grounds 
that that there are phonological regularities which are meaningless: "the fact that in 
certain situations [ ... one] (consistently) produces a certain noise, does not allow us 
to infer what this noise means."55 Snoring would be an example of such behaviour. 
51 Horwich(l998), p. 60. 
52 Horwich (1998), p. 60. 
53 Feyerabend (1958), in PP I, p. 32. 
54 Feyerabend (1958), in PPI, p. 32. 
55 Feyerabend (1958), in PP I, p. 22. 
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To such a criticism, Harwich gives two replies. First, "the use of a [ ... ] term must 
cohere with the regularities that constitute the meanings of the other words."56 
Snoring expressions clearly do not meet this condition. Second, it is important to 
distinguish the making of a sounds? from accepting a sentence. The propositional 
attitude of a snorer, or of one who listens to snoring, is not that of holding as true or 
false the sound made. The mere regular production of sounds is not sufficient for 
those sounds to be used to mean something. 
What Feyerabend's arguments against the principle of pragmatic meaning have 
shown is that, while the meanings of observation terms may be irifluenced by their 
use, "the logic of the observational terms is not exhausted by the procedures which 
are connected with their application 'on the basis of observation."'58 
Regarding Feyerabend's arguments against the sense-data and use theories of 
meaning, John Preston concludes: 
Observation terms do have (relatively) stable meanings, not because their 
meaning is fixed by invariant phenomenological features, but because it is fixed 
by their use, which is relatively impermeable to theoretical considerations. 59 
While there may be a use theory of meaning which adequately supports this 
conclusion, Feyerabend has shown that naive sense-data or use theories of meaning 
will not do. 
Feyerabend describes as 'semantic theories of observation' the views expressed in 
the principle of phenomenological meaning, and principle of pragmatic meaning. 
These views account for observation statements in terms of their meaning, claiming 
that observation statements derive their meaning from either their use or from sense 
data. The PTO, by contrast, attempts to show that "[o]bservational statements are 
distinguished from other statements not by their meaning, but by the circumstances 
of their production."6o 
56 Horwich ( 1998), p. 94. 
57 These responses to Feyerabend's criticism are good for marks as well as sounds. 
58 Feyerabend (1963b), p. 16. My italics. 
59 Preston ( 1997), p. I 0 I. 
60 Feyerabend ( 1965a), p. 212. 
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Feyerabend described himself as "a Quinean"61 because he thought that the PTO 
implied the indeterminacy of translation thesis: 
I have now discovered that I said everything Quine is famous for, such as radical 
translation, much more briefly and with much better arguments in 1958, in my 
Aristotelian Society paper.62 
John Preston dismisses such claims, maintaining that Feyerabend "failed to 
understand Quine."63 The task of Part 3 is to present the PTO and weigh 
Feyerabend's claim against Preston's dismissal. 
According to the PTO, observation sentences are uttered by a conditioned observer. 
Such an observer, 0, has the ability to observe a situation, s, if 0 "is able to 
distinguish between sand other situations."64 0 is able to demonstrate this ability 
when "[0] can be conditioned such that [0 ... ] produces a specific reaction r 
whenever s is present, and does not produce r when s is absent."65 When the 
conditioned observer is an average human being, r can be an utterance. 
Feyerabend's notion of an observation sentence, then, is that speakers of the same 
language are trained to respond (or be disposed to respond) consistently to a 
physical stimulus by uttering a particular observation sentence. This appears to be 
what Quine thinks too: "an occasion sentence is observational to the extent that all 
speakers assent to it in response to the same stimulations."66 
The process of conditioning the human observer presupposes that he has some 
minimal level of knowledge (or theory).67 Feyerabend acknowledges as much when 
he states that ''behavior that is not connected with any theoretical element [ ... ] is 
impossible."68 Indeed the human observer is born with some minimal theory, for 
"[k]nowledge can enter our brain without touching our senses. And some knowledge 
resides in the individual brain without ever having entered it."69 Such theory is so 
61 Feyerabend (1999), p. 237, referring to the (1958) paper in which he presented the PTO. 
62 Feyerabend (1999), p. 362. 
63 Preston (1997), p. 220, n. 20. 
64 Feyerabend (1958), in PP!, p. 19. 
65 Feyerabend (1958), in PPl, p. 19. 
66 Hookway(l988), p. 132. 
67 Townsend (1971), p. 207 thinks that this presents a problem for the PTO. But Feyerabend does not deny that some minimal 
theory is involved if an observer is to be conditioned; he denies that such minimal theory adequately constrains the meanings of 
the observation sentences. 
68 Feyerabend (1962), p. 95. 
69 Feyerabend ( 1969a), in PP I, p. 134. I take it that this is not one of Feyerabend's Quinean views. 
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minimal as to be a negligible constraint on the meaning of any conditioned response, 
r. 
Since an observation sentence is a conditioned response, tokens of its production are 
a matter of conformity with convention and of physically stimulated causal 
regularity; but since the beliefs of the observer are bound to determine what he 
means when he utters the observation sentence, the taught convention and the 
stimulation (or circumstances of utterance) do not sufficiently constrain the 
meaning of the observation sentence. That is the point of Feyerabend's contentious 
analogy between a human observer and an instrument: 
[H]owever well behaved and useful a physical instrument may be, the fact that 
in certain situations it consistently reacts in a well-defined way does not allow 
us to infer Oogically) what those reactions mean.7° 
Having made the point and the analogy, Feyerabend admits that the analogy with 
the instrument is limited (and presumably the point is too); for what makes an 
instrument different to the human observer is that he "also interpret[s] the 
indications of these instruments [ ... ] or the observational sentence uttered"71• 
Interpretation is an "additional act"72, but, for a normal human being, is inseparable 
from the action of uttering a sentence. Feyerabend makes this point in a number of 
ways. One way is in his description of a language as a characteristic plus an 
interpretation (given in Part 2). Observation sentences, when spoken by normal 
human beings, are spoken as sentences of a language, and ex hypothesi they have an 
interpretation (i.e. they are statements, in Feyerabend's terminology). Feyerabend 
also points out that the average human being has a level of theory well beyond the 
minimum required to become a conditioned observer: 
[E]liminate part of the theoretical knowledge of a sensing subject and you have 
a person who is completely disoriented, incapable of carrying out the simplest 
action. Eliminate further knowledge and his sensory world (his 'observation 
language') will start disintegrating ; even colours and other simple sensations 
will disappear until he is in a stage even more primitive than a small child.73 
So the PTO is not proposing that a human (i.e. language-speaking) observer is 
merely a maker of noises. Such an observer, if he is a well-functioning human being, 
has an extensive knowledge (not necessarily current, scientific, theoretical 
7° Feyerabend(l958), in PPI, p. 22. 
71 Feyerabend(l958), in PPI, p. 19. 
72 Feyerabend(l958), in PPI, p. 19. 
73 Feyerabend ( 1969a), in PPI, p. 133. 
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knowledge), so that his observation utterances will be meaningful statements -
expressions of that knowledge. Quine shares this view. 74 
The distinction which Feyerabend makes between observation sentences and 
statements is not odd, but his choice of terminology is. (It is also odd that speakers 
of the same language are assumed to have the same beliefs.) Observers who speak 
the same language are conditioned to give a particular response to a particular 
stimulus. The wider theoretical knowledge (or beliefs) of the observer are not 
necessary for the making of such responses (the conditioned observer need not be a 
natural language speaker), and in this respect the responses are (rather 
misleadingly) termed observation sentences. Very little meaning content or 
informative output is necessary for r to be such a sentence; all r necessarily conveys 
is that the conditioned observer has had a particular stimulation. The observer's 
understanding of the stimulation is (again misleadingly) what constitutes his 
'experience', according to Feyerabend. Stimulation is to sentence what experience is 
to statement. An experience is what an observer describes (i.e. interprets) the 
stimulation as, and this can vary from observer to observer; that a stimulation has 
occurred is indicated by the production of an observation sentence, and this 
response cannot vary from observer to observer when they have undergone the same 
conditioning. While Feyerabend's tenninology aids confusion, the distinction 
between experience and stimulation is Quinean. Quine held that stimulation is "the 
uninterpreted impact of external things upon our cognitive apparatus."?s For Quine 
the experience (in Feyerabend's sense) would be something like the observer's 
beliefs about the stimulation. A Quinean distinction akin to that of Feyerabend's 
sentence and statement is not so easy to discern, partly because Quine's observers 
are all healthy, human, language speakers. They do not, therefore, merely utter 
sentences (in Feyerabend's sense). But Quine and Feyerabend would both agree that 
all healthy human language speakers are more than conditioned noise-makers: 
-
(g) For all such observers, their observation sentences (in Feyerabend's sense) 
express observation statements. 
The motivation for Feyerabend's distinction between sentence and statement is to 
point out that observation sentences can be stimulus synonymous, but have different 
74 As his final sentence in 'Two Dogmas of Empiricism' makes clear: "Each man is given a scientific heritage plus a continuing 
barrage of sensory stimulation". 'Two Dogmas of Empiricism' at 
http://my .dreamwiz.cornlreality/data/philosophy ~information2 _ qu in e. htm 
75 Hookway ( 1988), p. 191. 
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interpretations. And Quine would agree with that point, for it is essential to the 
indeterminacy of translation thesis. 
Feyerabend summarises Quine's views on radical translation thus: 
The argument seems to consist of two parts: (1) given some body of evidence 
you can always have many different theories which fit the evidence, and (2) 
solipsism in its linguistic form i.e. I can never know that when you say 'J ensen is 
progressive', you do not really mean: 'Popper is a donkey.'76 
While (1) and (2) are consistent with Quine's views, they are weaker claims than 
those of the indeterminacy of translation thesis. (1) and (2) look like epistemological 
claims, when in fact: 
Quine's point is not primarily epistemological: his claim is not that correct 
translation is underdetermined by available evidence, but rather that it is not 
detennined by the facts.n 
So in (1), 'some body of should read 'all' and both tokens of 'evidence' should be 
replaced with 'facts'. A similar point applies to (2). It is not just that I can never 
know the meaning of what you say, but that "there is no objective fact of the matter 
what we are talking about"78 (beyond what is expressed by behaviour). The 
remaining discussion questions whether Feyerabend agrees with the metaphysical 
claims of the indeterminacy of translation thesis. 
In distinguishing between observation sentence and statement, the PTO 
differentiates 
between the causes of the production of a certain observational sentence, or the 
features of the process of production, on the one side, and the meaning of the 
sentence produced in this manner on the other.79 
Feyerabend gives two reasons for making this distinction: 
(h) "First, because the existence of a certain observational ability [ ... ] is compatible 
with the most diverse interpretations of the things observed;"80 
and 
(D.) "secondly, because no set of observations IS ever sufficient for us to infer 
Oogically) any one of those interpretations. "81 
76 Feyerabend ( 1999), p. 339. 
77 Hook way (1988), p. 137. My italics. 
78 Hookway (1988), pp. 142-3. 
79 Feyerabend ( 1962), p. 94. 
8
° Feyerabend (1958), in PP I, p. 22. 
81 Feyerabend(l958), in PPI, p. 22. 
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These two reasons seem to be related in the following way. The second reason (i), 
Feyerabend tells us, is the problem of induction. The claim that it is never rational to 
accept a general hypothesis which has been inductively inferred implies that it is 
never rational to accept a scientific theory which has been similarly inferred. 
According to Feyerabend (thesis I), a theory determines the interpretations of the 
theory's observation sentences. It follows, then, that it is not rational to accept that 
an observation sentence has one, and only one, interpretation (i.e. that there is a 
one-to-one correspondence between observation sentences and observation 
statements). Some explanation of (h) has already been given in the preceding 
paragraphs where the view that that observation sentences can be stimulus 
synonymous but have different interpretations was presented. What remains to be 
explained of (h) and (i) is how, from the diverse interpretations, one is chosen. 
In thesis I, Feyerabend proposes that the meanings of observation sentences are 
determined by the theory held by the speaker. The theory is chosen according to the 
criterion of predictive success. A theory is judged according to: 
[T]he way in which the prediction sentences are ordered by it and by the 
agreement of this physical order with the natural order of observation 
sentences as uttered by human observers.s2 
The physical order (i.e. the syntax) of the sentences which a theory predicts should 
match as closely as possible the syntax83 of the conditioned observer's observation 
sentences. Then the theory will indirectly predict "the natural order of sensations."B4 
Why this is so is clear: a conditioned observer's linguistic response is correlated with 
a particular stimulation; if a theory can predict the response, it indirectly predicts (a 
better word might be 'indicates') the stimulation. 
The criterion of predictive success strikes me as making Quinean claims, namely: 
Our knowledge of the external world is mediated through 'stimulations' at the 
surfaces of our perceptual organs, and our framework of sentences is tied down 
to reality only insofar as it enables us to anticipate these stimulations.ss 
The framework or relation of sentences (not just observation sentences) is given by a 
theory or conceptual scheme. According to Feyerabend, the right relation of such 
sentences is provided by a theory which would enable one observer to predict, for 
82 Feyerabend (1965a), p. 215. More details have been given in Part 3. 
83 Confusingly referred to as the 'natural order of observation sentences'- 'natural' for all of the observers so conditioned. 
84 Feyerabend (1965a), p. 215. 
85 Hookway(l988), p. 216. 
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any given circumstances, the observation sentences of a differently conditioned 
observer: 
such a theory would then enable one observer to speak another observer's 
observation language. For Quine, the right relation of observation sentences is 
provided not by a theory but by a translation manual. On the grounds of this 
difference, I will go about arguing that Feyerabend's PTO does not propose Quine's 
indeterminacy of translation thesis. Next, I describe briefly Quine's two arguments 
for the indeterminacy of translation thesis. 
In the Quinean scheme of things, physical evidence underdetermines the theory of 
nature. Quine's underdetermination claim has a Feyerabendian resonance: 
Physical theories can be at odds with each other and yet compatible with all 
possible data even in the broadest sense. In a word they can be logically 
incompatible and empirically equivalent.B6 
Quine's epistemological holism holds that the truth or falsity of an individual 
sentence cannot be tested against the physical evidence, but that only a whole theory 
can. Such holism has semantic consequences when the meaning of a sentence is 
considered to be "the difference its truth would make to possible experience"87• Since 
such a test for truth can only be applied to theories as whales, and experience makes 
no difference between a number of incompatible theories, the meaning of a sentence 
will be indeterminate, not simply underdetermined. The hop from epistemological 
underdetermination to semantic indeterminacy comes from linking empirical 
adequacy with truth. Dagfinn F0llesdal remarks that this argument for 
indeterminacy of translation "proceeds via holism and a verificationist theory of 
meaning."88 In this respect, Quine's argument is similar to Feyerabend's reason (i) 
(the problem of induction) - the reason for his distinction between observation 
sentences and statements. Feyerabend's scepticism about induction would suggest 
that he does not make the jump from empirical adequacy to truth, and the 
corresponding jump from empirically underdetermined theories to ontologically 
indeterminate observation statements. However, I think that it is at least arguable 
that Feyerabend does make a leap from epistemological claims about theories to 
ontological claims. I should add that this leap is not apparent in his PTO, so I am not 
claiming that the PTO presents the indeterminacy of translation thesis. In other 
86 Quine, quoted in Follesdal (1973 ), pp. 292-3. 
87 Quine, quoted by Follesdal ( 1973), p. 290. 
88 Follesdal (1973), p. 290. 
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parts of his writings, Feyerabend seems to combine epistemological holism with 
ontological claims as follows. 
For Feyerabend, observation statements of empirical facts have a peculiar feature: 
they can be mutually inconsistent, yet empirically adequate in a common domain. 
For example, we can state that motion is uniform and that motion is nonuniform, 
and both observation statements are empirically adequate within a common 
domain; as such, they are both statements of facts in Feyerabend's view. Feyerabend 
claims that the facts can be "made inaccessible"89 or even "eliminated"90 by different 
theories. Facts, unlike energy, can be created and destroyed by empirically adequate 
theories.91 So different general theories express different ontological commitments: 
A comprehensive theory, after all, is supposed to contain also an ontology that 
determines what exists and thus delimits the domain of possible facts and 
possible questions.92 
The semantic consequence is that the observation term 'motion', for example, will 
mean different things in different theories. If the motion of a body is described as 
uniform by one theory and nonuniform by another, then the observation term 
'motion' has changed its meaning. The meaning of 'motion' is not simply 
underdetermined, for statements containing it have factual, and so ontological, 
import. The indeterminacy of the meaning of observation terms comes from 
Feyerabend's views about theories, not from his PTO. 
Quine's second argument for the indeterminacy of translation thesis concerns the 
use of translation manuals. Such manuals are constructed as follows: 
[A]n observation sentence in one language/theory should be correlated with an 
observation sentence in the other if and only if any stimulation that prompts 
asset [sic] to the one, prompts assent to the other.93 
It has previously been made clear that, for both Feyerabend and Quine, observation 
sentences uttered by human observers are more than noises - they are meaningful 
and therefore already part of a language. Since Quine holds that "language and 
theory are inseparable"94, observation sentences are, upon utterance, part of a 
89 Feyerabend (1975), p. 42. 
9
° Feyerabend (1975), p. 42. 
91 Feyerabend toys with the options: either "different languages [or theories] will posit different filets under the same physical 
circumstances in the same physical world, or[ ... ] they will arrange similar filets in different ways." Feyerabend ( 1975), p. 286. 
92 Feyerabend (1975), pp. 176-7. 
93 Fellesdal (1973), p. 294. 
94 Fellesdal ( 1973 ), p. 291. 
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language and a theory. So in forming a translation manual "we are just correlating 
two comprehensive language/theories concerning all there is."95 The distinction 
between a translation manual and an empirical theory is what motivates Quine's 
second argument for the indeterminacy of translation thesis. 
"A translation manual," points out Christopher Hookway, "is simply a mapping from 
expressions to expressions [ ... it] simply tells us which pairs of expressions have the 
same meaning; it does not tell us what they mean."96 From the stimulus synonymy of 
sentences it is possible to infer which words (or sentence parts) are synonymous too, 
and this allows the construction of a manual. In positing such translation manuals, 
the question is: 'How far will it take the radical translator?' - "how much of language 
can be made sense of in terms of its stimulus conditions"97? 
The radical translator's dependence on stimulus conditions encounters two 
problems. The first problem is that many different English observation sentences 
have the same stimulus meaning as one alien observation sentence. So 'Gavagai' 
could be translated as 'Behold, a rabbit', 'Behold, an undetached rabbit part', or even 
'Behold, an instantiation of universal rabbithood'. Even when the translator has 
decided on which theory of nature to attribute to the alien, the "choice of translation 
manual is still open."98 
The second problem is that the stimulated assents and dissents "do not reflect 
semantic properties of individual sentences."99 For example, from the alien 
dissenting to 'Gavagai', it does not follow that 'Gavagai' does not mean 'Behold a 
rabbit'. The translator may not distinguish between rabbits and hares and so may 
himself utter 'Behold a rabbit' in the presence of a hare when the more 
discriminating alien, knowing that a hare is not a rabbit, will refrain from uttering 
'Gavagai'. Yet 'Gavagai' could still be translated as 'Behold a rabbit', even in the case 
when the alien dissents to 'Gavagai' and the translator assents to 'Behold a rabbit'. 
This case hinges on a difference in the knowledge or beliefs of the two parties. It 
95 Fellesdal (1973), p. 295. 
96 Hookway(I988),pp.l51-2. 
97 Hook way ( 1988), p. 129. 
98 Hookway(l988), p. 137. 
99 Hookway (1988), p. 134. 
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shows that a translator can retain the translation manual pairing 'Gavagai' with 
'Behold a rabbit' if he makes adjustments in other parts of the manual, namely, in 
the translations of standing sentences (for example, the alien believes that rabbits 
are under a certain size, or can run under a certain speed.) And this can be done for 
all the possible manuals which arose in the first problem. 
Since appeal to stimulus synonymy cannot determine a unique translation manual; 
and since, because of Quine's physicalism and his view that linguistic facts are 
necessarily public, there are no other facts to appeal to, Quine decides that choice of 
translation manual is indeterminate with respect to the facts. 
Underdetermination is a notion which applies to theories of nature and 
indeterminacy applies to translation manuals. To distinguish underdetermination 
from indeterminacy, it will therefore be helpful to distinguish a theory of nature 
from a translation manual. This is not so easy to do, for as Dagfinn F0llesdal 
observes, "the view that translation manuals are just a species of empirical theories 
is deeply rooted"100• 
When I construct a translation manual, "the only entities I am justified in assuming 
are those that are appealed to in the simplest theory that accounts for all the 
evidence."101 Since theory is underdetermined by the physical evidence, the final 
theory choice is made on pragmatic grounds such as simplicity. Now, since Quine 
maintains "that such theories make claims about the world"102, and since our theory 
preference is determined by pragmatic features, it follows that we use such 
pragmatic features as "guides to truth."103 Epistemologically underdetermined as the 
theories are, only one of them can be the true theory (and in fact neither may be). 
Pragmatic features such as simplicity and personal quirks such as my own laziness 
also play a role in determining my choice of manual, yet here they play no role as 
guides to truth: there is no true translation manual because "[i]n translation we are 
not describing a further realm of reality"104• Hence Quine's remark: 
10
° Fellesdal (1973), p. 296. 
101 Fellesdal (1973), p. 295. 
102 Fellesdal ( 1973), p. 293. 
103 Fellesdal (1973), p. 293. 
104 Fellesdal (1973), p. 295. 
67 
[W]hen I say there is no fact of the matter as regards, say, the two rival manuals 
of translation, what I mean is that both manuals are compatible with all the 
same distributions of states and relations over elementary particles.1°5 
The different ontological commitments of different translation manuals are 
consistent with the one chosen theory of nature, and for this reason "[s]tatements 
about the ontological commitments of theories will be relative to translation 
manuals."106 From this claim comes Quine's notion of inscrutability of reference, the 
idea that even as I hold a theory of nature, different sets of ontological commitments 
are open to me: "I can systematically reinterpret my own utterances and conclude 
that 'rabbit' in my mouth is true of rabbit parts or stages."107 
In Quine's second argument, indeterminacy of translation comes about because, 
given a theory of nature, many different translation manuals, and so many different 
ontological commitments, are possible. In the PTO, by contrast, Feyerabend makes 
no use of translation manuals, and this rules out any significant similarity between 
the PTO and Quine's second argument. Since Feyerabend's wider view is that 
ontological commitments are given by theories, Quine's second argument, locating 
indeterminacy in translation manuals, would suggest that Feyerabend's wider view 
can only assert that ontological commitments (and meanings) will be 
underdetermined, not indeterminate. So Quine's second argument for the 
indeterminacy of translation thesis cannot be marshalled to support Feyerabend's 
claim that he is a Quinean. If Feyerabend's claim that the meanings of observation 
terms are indeterminate is tenable, it will be because of similarity between his 
general views on theories and Quine's first argument. 
Feyerabend is of the opinion that two people who are disposed to utter the same 
sentences under the same sensory stimulations may express completely different 
beliefs or meanings. But this is not what Quine means by translational 
indeterminacy. In his letters in the early 'seventies, Feyerabend claimed that his PTO 
anticipated the main ideas behind Quinean radical interpretation.108 In the early 
'nineties, in the third edition of Against Method, Feyerabend offers a much weaker 
and more measured comparison: "Quine [ ... ] also used a criterion of observability 
105 Quine, quoted in Hookway (1988), p. 137. 
106 Hookway (1988), p. 141. 
107 Hookway(l988), p. 142. 
108 Feyerabend also maintains that Camap had been a proponent of the PTO (see, for example, Feyerabend ( 1965a), p. 212). 
This claim is challenged by Thomas Oberdan ( 1990). 
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that is rather similar to mine."109 I have argued that there are similarities between 
the PTO and Quine, but that the PTO does not imply that the meanings of 
observation terms are indeterminate. 
Part 4: The PTO: Criticism And Conclusion 
The general consensus110 is that the PTO is untenable. While I think this is true, not 
all the criticisms levelled at the PTO are justified in my view. Here in Part 4 I will 
consider six. 
First, John Preston criticises the PTO for assuming that the utterance of an 
observation sentence "will occur independently of the interpretation [ ... the observer] 
may connect with the statement"111• Preston believes that this assumption "implies, 
falsely, that scientific observers are not concerned with the meaning of the 
observation-statements they produce."112 Dudley Shapere puts the matter vividly 
when he remarks: 
G) "Feyerabend's observation-sentences, being mere uninterpreted noises, are no 
more 'linguistic' than a burp."113 
Preston is surely right to claim that I utter an observation sentence partly because of 
what I believe and partly because of what it means. But it also seems to me that 
Preston and Shapere are being a little unfair when they attribute the likes of (j) to 
the PTO. In Part 3 I argued that when the observer is a healthy human being, 
Feyerabend's view of an observation sentence is the same as Quine's inasmuch as 
both Feyerabend and Quine hold that when people say something they also mean 
something (claim (g)). Claim (j) attributes to the PTO the view that people speak 
first and think afterwards. But I have argued that the PTO claims that the meanings 
of observation utterances can change because observation sentences can be stimulus 
synonymous and yet have different interpretations. From such a view it does not 
follow, and nor does Feyerabend assert, that observation utterances are 'verbal knee-
jerk reactions' and meaningless when made. Such an interpretation of the PTO 
overplays Feyerabend's analogy of observers with measuring instruments. 
109 Feyerabend (1993), p. 212. 
11
° For example: Shapere ( 1966); Butts (1966); Townsend (1971 ); Hull (1972); Hacking ( 1975 ), p. 128 observes the consensus; 
Suppe ( 1977), p. 638; Suppe ( 1991 ); Preston ( 1997), pp. 45-54. 
111 Feyerabend (1965a), p. 198. 
112 Preston (I 997), p. 48. 
113 Shapere (1966), p. 60. 
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The second criticism, related to the first, is that Feyerabend's notion of a conditioned 
observer is unsatisfactory. John Preston maintains that the PTO "conflate[s] the 
nomic regularity of causation with the normative regularity of rule-governedness."114 
At first glance, this criticism may seem unfair. After all, the PTO does distinguish 
causally determined behaviour dispositions from behaviour dispositions determined 
by social conventions and linguistic rules. Considering first the nomic relation, the 
PTO maintains, rightly or wrongly, that the disposition to make a verbal response to 
a given stimulation is uniform among the members of a language group. Here, the 
physical causal relation is that between stimulation and disposition to respond. The 
verbal character of the response one is disposed to give, however, is conventional 
insofar as it is taught. The symbols and syntax are chosen by convention and their 
manipulation will conform to conventional rules. A defender of the PTO might then 
assert that the above causal and conventional qualities of observation sentences 
allocate distinct nomic and normative roles to speech dispositions. 
The problem with this defence of the PTO is that it (perhaps unwittingly) leaves 
open the possibility that the normative rules governing syntax and symbol 
manipulation could conflict with the nomic or causal rules governing utterance 
disposition. This conflict would then be evidence of conflation. The conflation which 
criticism two alleges is found in the PTO's claims that one is disposed, for purely 
nomic reasons, to make a particular utterance, but that the form of that utterance is 
purely conventionally determined. Since a disposition to make an utterance is a 
disposition to make an utterance of a certain form, the nomically determined 
disposition gets mixed up with the normatively determined form. 
The third criticism is that, in the PTO, the disposition to assent to an observation 
sentence is not formed on the basis of what the sentence means. Indeed, observation 
sentences can mean just about anything, depending on the theory held. Consistent 
with this view, the criterion of predictive success has the consequence that "one is 
caused to accept observation sentences which, as the observer interprets them, may 
be true or false." 115 Feyerabend admits that the acceptance of an observation 
114 Preston ( 1997), p. 54. 
115 Suppe (I 977), p. 638. 
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sentence "has nothing to do with the truth of the theory [or beliefs which the 
sentence expresses]."116 The third criticism is that it does not make sense to separate 
like this the truth and meaning of an observation sentence from acceptance or 
rejection of that sentence. I agree. It seems to me that the PTO does not clearly 
explain the relation between, on the one hand, syntax production/simulation and, 
on the other, the empirical theory which constrains the meaning of the observation 
syntax. 
The fourth criticism, made by Dudley Shapere in 1966, criticises the criterion of 
predictive success because, while the criterion aims to reproduce syntax which 
indicates the order of stimulations, scientific theories often edit information about 
stimulations: 
[S]cientific theories often, as a matter of fact, alter that order rather than imitate 
it; and in many cases some of the elements of experience are declared irrelevant. 
So 'interpretation', rather than 'imitation', takes place even with regard to the 
alleged 'order' of experience or sensations.m 
Feyerabend anticipates this problem (though Shapere does not seem to notice), for 
in 1965 he writes: 
Not every interpretation of the sentences uttered will be such that the theory 
furnishing the interpretation predicts it in the form in which it has emerged 
from the observational situation.ns 
But this seems to undermine the criterion of syntax prediction which the PTO 
proposes; at the very least, Feyerabend's remark only serves to make even less clear 
the relation between syntax prediction and the theory of nature used to interpret the 
syntax. 
The fifth criticism also addresses the lack of clarity in the relation between syntax 
prediction and a theory of nature. It sounds like the criterion of predictive success 
allows for an optimum theory - the one which can simulate all the observation 
sentences. Since "observational statements are not meaningful unless they have 
been connected with theories"H9; and since one theory is chosen by the criterion of 
predictive success; then Feyerabend's reason (h), claiming that any observation 
sentence has many different interpretations, is contradicted. The alternative is that 
many different but empirically adequate theories of nature will be able to meet the 
116 Feyerabend (1965a), p. 216. 
117 Shapere (1966), p. 61. 
118 Feyerabend (1965a), p. 214. 
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syntactic criterion of predictive success; but then the criterion cannot interestingly 
be used as Feyerabend proposed - as a means of testing theories, 120 for many 
theories will pass the test. 
The sixth criticism points out that, in the PTO, the theory which best predicts 
observational syntax will be the preferred theory of nature: 
an acceptable theory ... has an inbuilt syntactical machinery that imitates (but 
does not describe) certain features of our experience. This is the only way in 
which experience judges a general cosmological point of view.J21 
But there are an infinite number of observation sentences in a natural language, and 
an infinite number of observations. Translation manuals got round this problem 
because they were formed for words, not sentences. Since there is no hint of 
recursivity in the criterion of predictive success, it is difficult to see how it would 
work for all observation sentences. 
In my opinion, the previous five of the six criticisms considered point out grave 
problems and inconsistencies in the PTO. The untenability of the PTO has 
consequences for the semantic proposals of the IT. According to Feyerabend: 
The most important consequence of the transition to the pragmatic theory of 
observation is the reversal that takes place in the relation between theory and 
observation.J22 
So the PTO was supposed to justify thesis I (statement (b)); and thesis I motivated 
the logical independence claim (c). With the dismissal of the PTO, the semantic IT 
looks bereft of support; but Feyerabend made a number of moves to argue that there 
was yet life in the IT in general and even in the semantic IT. For one, he mustered 
other arguments from anthropology, psychology and sociology to support his 
scepticism about the meanings of observation terms.123 He also made stronger 
appeals to the history of science rather than to abstract arguments in the philosophy 
of language. Such moves suggested that the IT concerns a much wider range of 
phenomena than merely the semantic relations between the statements of scientific 
theories. This suggestion is borne out by recent publications124 about the IT, for they 
119 Feyerabend(l965a),p.213. 
120 
"[W]e accept the theory whose observation sentences most successfully mimick our own behavior." Feyerabend ( 1965a), p. 
217. 
121 Feyerabend(l965a),p.214-5. 
122 Feyerabend ( 1965a), p. 213. 
123 For example, the linguistic relativity principle ofB.L. Whorff(see Feyerabend (1975), pp. 286-7); and Piaget's writings on 
ITrception (see Feyerabend (1975), p. 227). 
24 For example, Chang (1999), Hoyningen-Huene & Sankey (eds.) (2001). 
72 
deal not only with semantic issues, but also ontology, value theory, rationality and 
multiculturalism. 
What Chapter 2 has tried to show is that Feyerabend's early presentation of the IT 
as a semantic thesis, that is, the MVT, is not convincingly supported by Feyerabend's 
semantic theory of observation terms. What remains unclear about the PTO is the 
relation between phenomenally caused stimulations and observation sentences, on 
the one hand, and experiences, theories, and knowledge, on the other hand. Without 
an explanation of this relation, the PTO, and the manner in which thesis I 'rides 
shotgun' with it, are very obscure proposals. 
If thesis I and the logical independence claim (c) are going to survive it will be 
without the help (or hindrance) ofthe PTO. The next chapter examines an argument 
(actually a group of semantic arguments) which, if sound, would show that thesis I 
and (c) are not going to survive because they are false. 
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[E]ither the theory of reference is called upon to underwrite the success of contemporary 
science, or else it is simply a decision about how to write the history of science (rather than 
the provision of a 'philosophical foundation' for such historiography). The one task seems too 
much to ask, and the other too slight to merit the title of 'theory'. 
Richard Rorty (1980), Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, pp. 287-8. 
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Introduction 
The quixotic PTO was intended to motivate1 thesis I: 
----- ------- ---- - ---- --
(a) thesis I: "the interpretation of an observation language is determined by the 
theories which we use to explain what we observe, and it changes as soon as the 
theories change."2 
I have argued that the PTO does not adequately support or explain thesis I. This 
presents a problem for the semantic claims of the IT, for Feyerabend remains 
committed to semantic holism. Furthermore, thesis I is Feyerabend's main 
justification for the claim that: 
- --
(b) in the common domain, the truth of T 1 may be largely independent of the truth 
ofT2 
With thesis I largely unsupported, it. would seem that (b) is too; and so IS 
Feyerabend's early view that: 
--
(c) all statements ofTt and T2 may be logically independent in the common domain 
With claims (a)~-(b), and (c) already on shaky ground due to the inadequ-acy -of the 
PTO, the aim of this chapter is to decide if they are completely without foundation. 
The extent of meaning change initially proposed by thesis I is that an alteration in a 
general theory would change the meanings of all the terms in the theory: 
the change of rules accompanyio.g the transition [ ... T1 to T 21 is a fimdamental 
change, and the meanings of all the descriptive terms of the two theories, 
primitive as well as defined terms, will be different: [ ... T1 to T2] are 
incommensurable theories.3 
Perhaps never before in the field of Semantics was so much meaning change owed to 
so many theories with so few adjustments. Such extreme semantic holism takes a 
very narrow view of what constitutes sameness of meaning and a very wide view of 
what constitutes difference in meaning. Such extremity makes the notion of 
'meaning' oflittle interest or utility, as early critics4 pointed out. 
In response to the early criticism, Feyerabend modifies his views. First, he claims 
that a change of theory will not always incur a change in meaning: 
1 In that it led Feyerabend to "tentatively put forward" thesis I. (See PP I, p. 31). 
2 Feyerabend (1958), in PP!, p. 31. Italics removed. 
3 Feyerabend(l965c), p. 231. My italics. 
4 For example, Shapere (1966), pp. 54-7; Achinstein (1964), p. 504. 
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the transition from T to [T*] may not involve a change of meaning because there 
is no change in the kinds of entities being posited, only in the quantitative 
values.s 
The importance of Feyerabend's comment at this point is that he foregoes the 
extreme holistic claim that "the slightest alteration of theoretical context alters the 
meaning of every term in the context."6 The second revision which Feyerabend 
proposes is that when meaning change does occur as a consequence of the transition 
between two incommensurable theories, not all terms are (or need be) affected: 
[I]f we consider two contexts with basic principles that either contradict each 
other or lead to inconsistent consequences in certain domains, it is to be 
expected that some terms of the first context will not occur in the second with 
exactly the same meaning.7 
Claim (c), the proposal of radical meaning variance, can therefore be disregarded.8 
The rest of this chapter will examine arguments against claims (a) and (b). 
Chapter 3 asks if some causal theories of reference convincingly show that there is 
continuity of reference between the terms ofT 1 and T 2. If ea usal theories of reference 
succeed in showing such continuity, then the IT's claim (b), that the truth of 
statements of Tt may be independent of the truth of statements of T2, will be judged 
unconvincing. Causal theories of reference require that there are external 
components to reference (which causal theorists call 'meaning'); consequently claim 
(a) is insufficient as an account of the meanings of scientific terms. There are two 
general reasons why I do not find these arguments compelling. First, it seems to me 
that the causal theories of reference here considered do not adequately describe how 
reference is fixed. Second, the notion of reference advanced by causal theories does 
not adequately address the concerns raised by the IT. 
Part 1 shows how the issue of reference arose in the early responses to the IT and 
advances the hypothesis that the IT relies on some description theory of reference. 
Part 2 presents six problems generally ascribed to description theories of reference 
(from now on, generically referred to as the 'Description Theory'). Part 3 presents 
Hilary Putnam's causal theory of reference (CTR). Part 4 addresses criticisms of 
' " Feyerabend ( 1965b), p. 267. 
6 Shapere (1966), p. 54. 
7 Feyerabend (1965a), p. 180. My italics. 
8 Shapere (1966), pp. 54-5 notes that Feyerabend "introduces at various points, qualifications which appear to contradict" the 
claim that theory change entails meaning change and claim (c). Yet Newton-Smith ( 1981 ), pp. 155-6 ascribes both these claims 
to Feyerabend; and Suppe (1991 ), p 303 maintains that "Feyerabend is committed to the view that any change in a (global) 
theory changes all the meanings of its terms". 
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Putnam's CTR and concludes that Putnam's description of how reference is fixed is 
unsatisfactory. Part 5 considers Michael Devitt's modifications to the Putnam view. 
Part 6 looks at the notion of partial reference, a notion which Devitt, among many 
others, employs in his CTR. Part 7 considers causal descriptive theories of reference 
and concludes that none of the theories considered in Chapter 3 has given an 
adequate account of how the reference of scientific terms is determined. This 
conclusion implies that causal theories of reference do not convincingly undermine 
claims (a) and (b) which comprise the meaning variance thesis. Part 8 advances a 
further argument for why claim (b) is not under threat from causal theories of 
reference. Part 8 also draws some general conclusions about theories of reference 
and the IT. Part 9 suggests along what lines a kind of semantic IT might be 
developed. 
Part 1: The Relevance of Reference 
Peter Achinstein points out that, for Feyerabend, the meaning of a term is 
constrained by many elements: 
Feyerabend, e.g., in a discussion of the term 'absolute temperature' in 
thermodynamics, alludes to the definition, derivation and range of application 
of this expression, as well as to various characteristics [i.e. properties] of 
temperature determined by the laws of this theory, and suggests that all are 
involved in understanding its meaning.9 
Once a change occurs in any of the above aspects of meaning, the meaning changes. 
Achinstein admits that some of these aspects of meaning "might be deemed relevant 
for understanding a scientific term and hence for knowing its meaning"10; but he is 
not sure what, if any, aspect is necessary or sufficient for giving the meaning of a 
scientific term. Arthur Fine criticises Achinstein on the grounds that "Achinstein's 
analysis does not provide adequate tools for deciding about whether the meaning of 
a term has changed."11 If a semantic theory which successfully proposes necessary 
and sufficient conditions for meaning change can be found, then Feyerabend's claim 
that at least some terms change meaning in the transition from Tt to T2 can be 
adequately addressed. 
9 Achinstein (1964), p. 502, n. 9. 
10 Achinstein (1964), p. 502. 
11 Fine ( 1967), p. 236. 
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Fine gives two criteria for meaning change which introduce "what is in effect a 
notion of 'same extension' as a guarantee of substitutivity."12 In the same year that 
Fine proposes his two criteria, Israel Scheffler points out: 
[D]eduction within scientific systems [ ... ] requires stability of meaning only in 
the sense of stability of reference. That is to say, alterations of meaning in a 
valid deduction that leave the referential values of constants intact are irrelevant 
to its truth-preserving character.l3 
For the purposes of theory comparison, as long as the terms of Tt are eo-referential 
with those of T2, statements of Tt are not logically independent of those of T2. A 
theory of reference which shows that the terms of Tt and T2 are eo-referential would 
defeat Feyerabend's claim (b) for logical independence. However, neither Fine nor 
Scheffler offer (in the works quoted above) such a theory of reference. 
Hilary Putnam does propose a theory of reference which purports to show a massive 
degree of eo-reference between the terms ofT1 and T2. Using as an example the term 
'temperature', Feyerabend asserts: 
Galileo's thermoscope was initially supposed to measure an intrinsic property of 
a heated body; however, with the discovery of the influence of atmospheric 
pressure, of the expansion of the substance of the thermoscope (which, of 
course, was known beforehand), and of other effects (nonideal character of the 
thermoscopic fluid), it was recognized that the property measured by the 
instrument was a very complicated function of such an intrinsic property, of the 
atmospheric pressure, of the properties of the particular enclosure used, of its 
shape, and so on.14 
Because Galileo had a general theory of what he was measuring which was different 
to our theory, "we do not mean by the word 'temperature' what Galileo meant (i.e. 
what Galileo meant by the synonymous Italian word)."15 So it is false that: 
the meanings of observation statements as obtained with the help of measuring 
instruments remain invariant with respect to the change and progress of 
knowledge.t6 
Putnam rejects Feyerabend's claims about meaning change, asserting that "[i]t is 
evident that Feyerabend is misusing the term 'meaning'."17 As far as the Galileo 
example is concerned, says Putnam: 
Galileo was measuring and theorizing about the magnitude we call 'temperature' 
in English, but [ ... ] we have somewhat different beliefs concerning it than he 
did .IS 
12 Hesse (1968), p. 50. 
13 Scheftler, quoted in Sankey (1994), p. 39. 
14 Feyerabend ( 1962), p. 37. 
15 Putnam (1975), p. 121. 
16 Feyerabend (1962), p. 37. 
17 Putnam (1975), p. 122. 
18 Putnam (1975), p. 129. 
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What Putnam goes on to do is to offer a semantic theory which shows how reference 
can remain constant while beliefs about the referent vary. This chapter is concerned 
with Putnam's and others' efforts to that end. In the various causal theories of 
reference considered here in Chapter 3, the common idea is: 
as long as we continue to use the word 'temperature' to refer to the same 
physical magnitude, we will not say that the meaning of the word has changed, 
even if we revise our beliefs many times about the exact laws obeyed by that 
magnitude, and no matter how sophisticated our instruments for measuring 
temperature may become.I9 
Such a theory of reference would drastically limit the occasions of meaning change 
in theory transitions, and would deny that theory change need ever imply meaning 
change; thesis I (claim (a)) would then look irrelevant in talk about meaning (i.e. 
reference) change. The logical independence claim (claim (b)) would also be 
confounded by such a theory of reference; for if, in the common domain, a term in Tt 
does refer (and it is difficult to see how the term could have no reference in an 
empirically adequate theory), then the reference of the term will continue, one way 
or another, in T2. 
Continuity of reference between the terms of successive general theories can occur in 
a number of ways. Israel Scheffler's proposal concerned "two theories which share 
the same predicates but where these predicates have different senses."20 Michael 
Martin points out that some referential variance is compatible with the claim that 
statements of Tt are semantically comparable with statements of T2. Martin argues 
that the case where predicates ofTt and T2 have overlapping extensions is sufficient 
for those predicates to be mutually inconsistent. It is not necessary that a predicate 
of Tt have an identical extension to a predicate of T2, or that a predicate of Tt be a 
proper subset ofT2 in order that the predicates eo-refer. For eo-reference, all that is 
required is that predicates of Tt and T2 have an intersecting extension.21 Martin's 
point seems to be a fair one. More problematic is the notion of partial reference 
presented by Hartry Field. The idea behind partial reference is that a predicate ofTt 
intersects with two predicates ofT2, but that the aforementioned predicates ofT2 do 
not themselves intersect. The resulting claim is that the predicate ofTt does not fully 
refer to anything, but does partially refer to two things. Field's comments will be 
looked at later. 
19 Putnam (1975), p. 128. 
20 Martin (1971 ), p. 23. 
21 See Martin (1971), p. 26. 
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Chapter 1 showed that Feyerabend rejected (in the case of general theories) the 
Received View's use of bridge hypotheses as a means of achieving theory reduction. 
He spurned the claim that impetus and momentum are materially equivalent on the 
grounds that their descriptions are mutually inconsistent. 22 Description theories of 
reference hold that a term denotes an object (or kind of object) because the object 
satisfies the definite description associated with the term. Impetus satisfies the 
impetus theory's description of impetus, and this description is inconsistent with the 
Newtonian description of momentum. Feyerabend's conclusion that 'impetus' and 
'momentum' are not co-extensive is based on impetus and momentum satisfying 
inconsistent descriptions. It would therefore appear that Feyerabend's claims of 
meaning variance assume a Description Theory of reference. As Howard Sankey puts 
it, "Feyerabend clearly assumes that considerations between concepts are capable of 
deciding questions of co-reference."23 Whether or not the IT actually employs the 
Description Theory of reference is a matter which I will come back to at the end of 
the chapter. 
Jerzy Giedymin has criticised Feyerabend's brand of semantic holism on the 
grounds that thesis I implies: 
the denotations of the primitive terms of a theory are determined by all axioms 
of the theory [ ... and] only those assignments of denotations to primitives are 
permitted under which the axioms remain true.24 
In which case, "this would make the theory true a priori."25 The internalism of this 
view, that the meanings of statements are constrained solely by their embedding 
theory, is further incentive to regard the IT as being susceptible to criticisms to 
which the Description Theory is also susceptible. For example, it is not clear how 
non-synonymous terms eo-refer; indeed the Description Theory and Giedymin's 
above observations explain claim (b), the claim that there may be radical 
discontinuity of reference between incommensurable theories. If the IT does indeed 
rely on the Description Theory of reference, then successfully challenging the 
Description Theory will be sufficient to undermine the IT. 
22 See Chapter I, Part 4. 
23 Sankey (1991 ), p. 227. Sankey points out that attributing the Description Theory to Feyerabend is not a straightforward 
matter. I return to this at the end of Chapter 3. 
24 Giedymin (1970), p. 259. 
25 Giedymin (1970), p. 259. Suppe (1977), p. 640 makes the same point. 
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Part 2~ JP>ut~m~unm 9 § Objection§ T® The De§ciriptiioiDl 
Theory 
Putnam rejects the Description Theory's account of how we refer to objects. In 
particular, Putnam claims that the Description Theory inadequately describes how 
we refer to natural kinds (NKs). NKs are "classes whose normal distinguishing 
characteristics are 'held together' or even explained by deep-lying mechanisms."26 
Natural kinds include lemons, water, gold and cod. Putnam shows that no 
conjunction of properties is both necessary and sufficient to pick out a NK. NKs 
cannot be designated by property ascriptions because of the existence of abnormal 
members: some lemon will not be yellow, but green or brown, and some will not 
taste bitter (if grown under certain conditions). Exceptions do not prove the 
descriptive rule of what a kind is, but undermine it. In this way, Putnam shows that 
no description is sufficient to designate a NK. Where Putnam is more startling is in 
his claim that no definition of a NK term is analytic. Here, Putnam distinguishes a 
term like 'bachelor' from a NK term like 'lemon'. For the definition 'unmarried man' 
is true of 'bachelor' in such a way that bachelors could not be otherwise; but it could 
happen (however unlikely) that scientists discover that lemons are not citrus fruits. 
So the known material make-up oflemons and the classification of that make-up is a 
matter of scientific investigation and, as such, is always open to revision. Putnam 
rejects the Description Theory because descriptions of NK terms are neither 
sufficient nor (analytically) necessary to refer. It is especially his support for the 
latter which forms the bedrock for his own theory of reference and which will be 
returned to later in this essay. 
Putnam further breaks the bond between descriptions and referents by pointing out 
that I do not need to know or understand a description in order to designate a NK; 
so I can refer to a lemon without needing to know its DNA structure. This point is 
also developed by Donnellan27 in his distinction between using an expression 
referentially and attributively. Take the old Peter Sellers sketch: 
Person A: "Does your dog bite?" 
Person B: "No." 
Person A goes to stroke the dog and the dog bites Person A. 
Person A: "I thought you said your dog doesn't bite!" 
Person B: ''That is not my dog." 
26 Putnam, 'Is Semantics Possible', in Schwartz (1977), p. 102. 
27 
'Reference and Definite Descriptions', in Schwartz ( 1977). 
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Person A is using 'your dog' to refer to a particular dog he has in mind, (the dog 
standing next to person B). This is Donnellan's referential use of an expression and 
it shows that to refer to a particular individual we have no need of a true description 
of it. Donnellan's attributive use of an expression involves reference not to an 
intended individual but to some unrecognised individual. The joke is funny because 
everybody believes that Person A is using 'your dog' referentially- everybody, that 
is, except Person B who regards Person A's use of 'your dog' as attributive. All this 
serves to illustrate Putnam's point that in referring to a NK, the description is not of 
itself important. I can be ignorant of the correct description and still refer (by 
referential use of a definite description); and I can understand the correct 
description and still not grasp the referent (by attributive use of a definite 
description). 
A third area in which Putnam has objections to the Description Theory is in its 
constructivist leanings. Sankey28, for example, has claimed that the Description 
Theory gives support to the incommensurability thesis' (ITs) radical discontinuity of 
reference; but Putnam's point is one of meaning stability when he holds that lemons 
are lemons (or whatever they are) independently of what I conceive them as. The 
Description Theory has it that the essential property of a NK is determined by 
whatever theory I hold at a given time, so that "whether something is a lemon or not 
... is a matter of the best conceptual scheme, the best theory". 29 The danger of the 
Description Theory is that, rather than the referent giving rise to its description, it is 
the description which is regarded as prior to the referent. Putnam gives a little 
illustration as to why the 'stuff of the referent precedes any description of it: 
Even if cats turn out to be remotely controlled from Mars we will still call them 
'cats' ... Not only will we still call them 'cats', they are cats.3o 
If all cats turned out to be robots then, no matter whether we thought of them as 
animals or as robots, they are, and always have been, robots; what they are called (or 
described as) does not make them what they are. 
The objection just outlined was that the meaning of a term is its reference and not 
the description or list of concepts we have of the term. However, 'meaning' is a very 
28 Sankey (1994). p. 76. 
29 Putnam, 'Is Semantics Possible', in Schwartz (1977), p. 104. 
30 ibid. p. I 07 
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broad term, and clearly it does encompass linguistic, conceptual and mental 
elements; it is worth pointing out that Putnam does consider these aspects of 
'meaning', it is just that he wishes to ground the meaning of NK terms in the external 
world and not in the formulation of words or thoughts. As he himself says: 
"Linguistic competence and understanding are not just knowledge."31 Putnam's 
comment draws out the fourth criticism of the Description Theory of reference: the 
Description theory implies that there is little more to the meaning of a term than the 
mental content I associate with the term. 
The way in which the Description Theory deals with non-synonymous eo-referring 
expressions provides a fifth area of the Description Theory with which Putnam 
disagrees. Putnam employs Kripke's notion of necessary truth to solve the problem 
of contingent identity statements. Putnam and Kripke would say that if the morning 
star is the evening star in actual fact, then the statement 'the morning star is the 
evening star' is necessarily true. The Description theory, on the other hand, holds 
that 'the morning star is the evening star' is true only contingently. Whether the 
PutnamfKripke notion of necessary truth is a satisfactory alternative to that 
employed by the Description Theory is an issue that will be considered later. 
Proponents of the Description Theory must struggle to account for how non-
synonymous expressions eo-refer. What nobody considered, says Putnam, tendering 
the sixth criticism of the Description Theory, is the possibility that expressions could 
be (regarded as) synonymous and yet not eo-refer. The reason why supporters of the 
Description theory tend to overlook such a possibility is because they regarded 
property ascriptions as providing necessary and sufficient conditions of a term's 
extension; so two terms eo-refer because their descriptions were synonymous. 
Consider the statements: 
(1) I live in Paris 
(2) I live in the capital of France 
If we take all the descriptions of 'Paris' and all those of 'the capital of France' we 
would find that they are identical; since (according to the Description Theory of 
reference) the descriptions are the necessary and sufficient constraints on the 
reference of each expression, the referents are identical too (at least contingently so). 
Putnam sets the cat among the pigeons by giving an example where terms are 
31
'Explanation and Reference', in Putnam (I 975), p. 199. 
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synonymous but not eo-referential. On Putnam's famous Twin Earth (TE), 
aluminum is called 'molybdenum' and is very rare, whereas molybdenum is called 
'aluminum' and is very common. On (American English-speaking) Earth (E), of 
course, aluminum is called 'aluminum' and molybdenum is called 'molybdenum'; 
and aluminum is the common metal while molybdenum is rare. When Putnam 
compares a speaker from E and a speaker from TE, he finds that "there may be no 
difference in their psychological states when they use the word 'aluminum"'32 and, 
correspondingly, they would ascribe identical properties to 'aluminum'. However, 
the extension of 'aluminum' as used by the TE speaker is different to the extension of 
'aluminum' as used by the E speaker. Same term, same descriptions, same concepts, 
but different referents. 
Putnam's direct challenge to the Description Theory is that descriptions and 
concepts do not fix the reference of NK terms. The Causal Theory of Reference 
(CTR) which he proposes instead has therefore to deal with the question: 'How is 
reference fixed?' and, along with that, What description is appropriate to NK 
terms?' Putnam has advanced his main objection to the Description Theory from a 
number of directions and in various ways, and it is only to be expected that he will 
advance his CTR by similar manifold means. 
Part 3: How Reference Is Fixed In Putnam's Causal 
Theory Of Reference 
In the CTR, the reference of a NK term is fixed without describing any of its 
properties. We simply point to the NK and name it; from that moment on a NK term 
has, potentially, entered the language. Put baldly like this, the CTR seems highly 
implausible for it sounds like Putnam is saying that NK terms refer by a point and 
grunt mechanism. Putnam is aware that his theory must appeal not just to 
Neanderthals and those under the age of two; yet he is also aware that he must take 
the description of properties out of reference fixing. It is Putnam's attempt to square 
this circle that makes for much of the beauty of his CTR, for what he does is 
integrate ostensive definition into a broad theory of linguistic competence. In doing 
this he employs a range of notions, namely: indexicality, introducing event, causal 
32 Putnam, 'Meaning and Reference', in Schwartz (1977), p. 123-4. 
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chain, causal physical magnitude, division of linguistic labour, stereotype, semantic 
and syntactic markers. Each of these elements will now be sketched. 
The reference of a NK term is fixed by pointing at a NK and giving it a name. This is 
the (rather unpromising) gist to the CTR: 
Our theory can be summarized as saying that words like 'water' have an 
unnoticed indexical component: 'water' is the stuff that bears a certain 
similarity relation to the water round here.33 
Here, we can see that a NK term is defined locally and that the NK must be 
immediately physically present to the one who first gives it a name. So for Putnam 
the word 'defined' or 'definition' does not involve a description such as dictionaries 
provide, for no description is forthcoming. Rather, the definition of a NK term is 
given by its initial reference. Schwartz puts it this way: 
One would come closer to the position of Kripke and Putnam if one simply said 
that 'water' has no definition at all, at least in the traditional sense, and is a 
proper name of a specific substance.34 
The "certain similarity relation" of which Putnam speaks really just means 'same 
type of stuff as', and that 'stuff is described and conceived by us as chemical or 
atomic. The genius of Putnam's 'same stuff relation is that chemical and atomic 
systems of classification may come and go, for they are ways of describing; but what 
they describe will not change, for water will always be the stuff it is. 
The first attaching of a name to a NK by use of an indexically given paradigm 
example is called the 'introducing event' and from then on the name and the stuff 
are forever wed. Once the introducing event has happened, examples of the NK can 
be referred to by using the appropriate NK term, even if you are quite ignorant of 
what it is you are referring to. Putnam removes the ambiguity highlighted by 
Donnellan by insisting that in all future uses of a NK term, the reference of the term 
is given by the initial baptism (or referential use, as Donnellan would call it). This 
phenomenon of rigid designation does not only apply to NK terms. In fact, the term 
'rigid designator' originally came from Kripke who applied it to proper names. 
Kripke gives as an example a person who believes that Quine was a Roman emperor. 
In saying that Quine was in charge of things when Jesus was born, the speaker is 
actually referring to the contemporary Harvard logician. This is because Willard van 
33 Putnam, 'Meaning and Reference', in Schwartz (1977), p. 131. 
34 Schwartz ( 1977), p. 30. 
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Orman Quine was once given his name in a baptismal introducing event. That 
attachment of term to referent is thereafter passed on to other members of the 
community who use the name 'Willard van Orman Quine'. All uses of this name 
form a 'causal chain' whose links could, theoretically, be traced back to that initial 
baptism which sanctions the correct referent. Putnam and Kripke thus use the ideas 
of 'introducing event' and 'causal chain' to construct a theory of linguistic meaning 
from a non-conceptual base: ostensive definition. What was a solitary act of 
'pointing and grunting' determines linguistic currency; herein lies the importance of 
causal chains: 
what is important about Kripke's theory is not that the use of proper names is 
causal [ ... ] but that the use of proper names is collective.3s 
A given community uses 'Quine' to refer to Quine in virtue of their usage being 
causally connected to Quine's baptism; and this reference relation holds even though 
one or two individuals in the community think that Quine was a Roman emperor. 
The CTR has so far been presented as a theory of meaning for proper names and NK 
terms. In both cases, the entity, when it is first named, is pointed at and therefore is 
immediately physically present to the namer. However, to point at a single hydrogen 
atom or be immediately physically present at a black hole would be problematic; yet 
Putnam's CTR is good for theoretical NK terms as well as physical magnitude terms. 
The referents of such terms "are invariably discovered through their effects" .36 
Whatever causes those huge accelerations of matter is a black hole, and whatever 
causes a frog's leg to spasm and a lightbulb to glow is electricity. An indexical 
component is preserved in the naming of theoretical entities because, whereas we 
cannot point to the theoretical entity itself, we can point to its effect (and sometimes 
that effect will be the effect produced on a measuring instrument such as an 
ammeter or radio telescope). Putnam clearly asserts that physical magnitude terms 
are introduced by causal descriptions; once the theoretical entity has been named in 
this way, the theoretical NK term or the physical magnitude term is disseminated 
along causal chains throughout the language community. 
Putnam gives three conditions which he says must be met for a person to use a 
physical magnitude term successfully: 
35 
'Explanation and Reference', in Putnam (1975), p. 203. 
36 
'Explanation and Reference', in Putnam (1975), p. 202. 
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(d) the user knows that the term is a physical magnitude term 
(e) the user's use of the term is connected causally to the introducing event 
where a causal description of the referent was given 
(:0 the referent exists 
As regards the first condition, a physical magnitude is that which is able to be 'more 
or less' in quantity and to have a location. Putnam considers it important that the 
user of a physical magnitude term knows that the referent has these two properties. 
So if I am to use the term 'electric current' successfully, I need to understand that 
electric current can be 'more or less' (strong or weak) and that it can be found 
somewhere ('all along this wire', for example). Likewise, an electron can be one or 
many and it has a location ('in this 'cloud' or even just 'somewhere', for example). 
The second condition for successful use of a physical magnitude term is the user's 
inclusion in the causal chain and of the introducing event involving a 'causal 
description'. Here, it seems that Putnam is succumbing to the Description Theory's 
technique of property descriptions, so that 'makes a frog's leg spasm' is a causal 
property of electricity. But the causal description could also be 'makes my leg 
spasm', or 'makes my arm spasm' or 'caused by rain clouds in certain storms'. 
Putnam would say that if that which makes a frog's leg spasm is the same magnitude 
as that which is caused by rain clouds in certain storms, then the former is 
necessarily the same magnitude as the latter. No causal description of electricity is 
necessary to refer to electricity, but if the description does refer to electricity, it is 
necessary and sufficient to do so. In this way Putnam continues to eschew the 
Description Theory's approach. The third condition for successful use of a physical 
magnitude term is that the physical magnitude exists. This means that those who 
use the terms 'phlogiston' or 'ether' do not use them successfully for there are no 
such things. 
I can acquire and use NK terms and physical magnitude terms without any 
particular knowledge of their referents because the term has been passed down to 
me by causal chains with the referent already attached. Hence I can go to a jeweller 
and ask for a gold chain without needing to know how to test if it really is gold. Even 
the jeweller may only have some rule of thumb tests such as weighing it and scraping 
it. The only way to be sure, in as much that we can be sure, that it is gold is to test 
further chemical and possibly even atomic properties, and not many people know 
how to do that; yet we all manage to refer to the NK gold. Putnam makes the point 
that the devising of crucial experiments to test for a NK such as gold, or a physical 
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magnitude such as radiation, is the job of experts. He calls this the 'division of 
linguistic labour': "The division of linguistic labor rests upon and presupposes the 
division of nonlinguistic labor".37 Scientists, jewellers and Country and Western 
singers may be experts in their own fields, but clearly scientists are the experts when 
it comes to investigating NKs and physical magnitudes. It may be objected that 
whatever criterion the scientific expert has for gold, such as having atomic number 
79, amounts to a description which is necessarily and sufficiently a description of 
gold; consequently the CTR capitulates to the Description Theory of reference. But 
Putnam says no: what the test is does not make the stuff what it is; better tests, more 
accurate ones may be found to better determine if X is the same stuff that we call 
'gold'; describing and understanding elements in terms of the periodic table may 
also be abandoned one day. Clearly, though, when it comes to 'introducing events', 
and to an understanding of the physical nature of the world, scientific experts have 
an important role to play in the language community. Hence Putnam calls experts "a 
special case of ... being causally connected to an introducing event."38 
Is Putnam saying that, in the division of linguistic labour, experts define what a NK 
is? Here, the answer would have to be "No". When a NK term, like 'water' or 'gold' 
has already had its introducing event (which they both have), then the NK will 
always be the kind of stuff it was. The role of the experts is to determine if a 
particular entity, such as the ring on my hand, is a member of the NK class gold. The 
class of stuff is fixed by a paradigm example ostensively defined at an introducing 
event; the experts decide if what is on my finger is part of that class of stuff or not. 
Members of a class are called the 'extension' of that class. This explains Putnam's 
comment: 
When a term is the subject of linguistic labor, the 'average' speaker who acquires 
it does not acquire anything that fixes its extension.39 
In the case of the term 'gold', the reference is already given (the NK gold) and this 
the experts cannot change. The 'reference fixing' done by experts is often really 
'extension fixing' (telling me if my ring is gold, telling me if the tree in my garden is 
an ash); unless, that is, the expert is the introducer of a NK or physical magnitude 
term. 
37 Putnam, 'Meaning and Reference', in Schwartz (1977), p. 124. 
38 
'Explanation and Reference' in Putnam (1975), p. 205. 
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In the CTR the reference of a NK term is fixed by an act of ostension and naming at 
an introducing event. The reference of a theoretical NK term or physical magnitude 
term is fixed by a naming of and (implicit) act of ostension towards something 
causally related to the physical magnitude at an introducing event. Causal chains 
spread the word and its fixed reference throughout the community. Experts in 
various fields test for alleged tokens of the NK and physical magnitude but, in the 
division of linguistic labour, most people get on with referring to the rings on their 
fingers as 'gold' in the hope or belief that their jeweller is not unreliable. People can 
do this because they know that gold is yellow, shiny, metallic, heavy, and not brittle. 
In other words, they have a 'stereotype' of gold. In spite of all this talk of reference 
fixing, Putnam makes it clear that having linguistic competence of a NK term is 
"more than just having the right extension or reference". 40 It also involves 
"associating the right stereotype"41 with the term. 
Stereotypes are the normal, everyday descriptions we use of NKs. So the stereotype 
of 'dog' can include any or all of the following: has four legs, has a tail, is covered 
with hair, has a snout, barks. Now not all dogs have all these properties (some dogs 
which have survived car accidents have only three legs). Such differences do not 
matter because the stereotype is merely a description we associate with the NK; "it is 
not a necessary and sufficient condition for membership of the corresponding 
class."42 It is not even a necessary condition of being a dog that it be an animal, for if 
cats could turn out to be robots, dogs could likewise be 'anti-cat devices' (sent from 
Pluto ). In other words, stereotypes do not determine reference, but they are the 
quick and easy way for us to grasp whether a given object falls within the extension 
of a term. 
Putnam likens a stereotype to "an oversimplified theory"43 and, as such, its terms are 
theory laden. The NK term 'dog' is theory laden with the stereotype of being an 
animal; but were we to find that dogs were robots we could say 'dogs are robots' 
without any internal contradiction thereby avoiding any paradox: 
I can refer to a natural kind which is 'loaded' with a theory which is known not 
to be any longer true of that natural kind, just because it will be clear to 
39 Putnam, 'Meaning and Reference', in Schwartz (1977), pp. 126-7. 
40 Putnam, in Schwartz (1977),'1s Semantics Possible', pp. 177-8. 
41 ibid., p. 178. 
42 
'Explanation and Reference', in Putnam (1975), p. 205. 
43 Putnam, in Schwartz (1977), 'Is Semantics Possible?', p. 113. 
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everyone that what I intend is to refer to that kind, and not to assert the 
theory.44 
Of course it takes time for the new theory or stereotype to spread in the language 
community; but once it has spread, the semantic marker of the word 'dog' will 
include 'robotic device' and not 'animal' any longer. I can find no hard and fast 
distinction between a semantic marker and a stereotype except perhaps that the 
notion of 'semantic marker' includes the class NKs (i.e. the class of the class 'natural 
kinds'). Semantic markers are fundamental stereotypes such as 'animal' and 'liquid' 
as opposed to other stereotypes like 'hairy' and 'transparent'. There also may be an 
implication that stereotypes are more ideolectal then semantic markers, for the 
latter form community-wide componential analyses which may be altered by the 
theories (stereotypes) emanating from individuals. 
The final element needed for linguistic competence, according to Putnam, is the 
syntactic marker. This is the knowledge of 'well-formedness': is the term countable? 
does it take a singular or plural form of the verb? Knowledge of syntactic markers 
lets us be clear about, and rightly express, the difference between: 
(3)Two of my hairs were removed by the beautician. 
( 4) All of my hair was removed by the beautician. 
To use the word 'lemon' competently, then, Putnam claims that we need to know 
four things. First, that it is a NK with an essential sine qua non (for example, a 
particular DNA structure). Second, its stereotype (for example, yellow colour and 
tart taste). Third, its semantic markers (for example, organic matter, name of a 
fruit). Fourth, its syntactic markers (for example, countable noun). 
Putnam clearly tells us that reference is fixed and stuck fast by one ostensive 
naming. But in answer to the question What description is appropriate to NK 
terms?', Putnam goes beyond mere reference fixing to linguistic competence. This 
broader conception of language entails that meaning does indeed involve knowledge 
which distinguishes Putnam's position somewhat from Kripke's. Casting our minds 
back to Kripke's example about 'Quine' referring to a Roman emperor regardless of 
whether the user of the term was aware of its true referent, Putnam takes a slightly 
different position to Kripke: 
44 ibid. 
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[U]nless one has some beliefs about the bearer of the name which are true or 
approximately true, then it is at best idle to consider that the name refers to that 
bearer in one's ideolect.45 
Putnam does not shift from Kripke's view that the user's knowledge does not 
determine the reference of a term; but an act of articulation does require knowledge 
on the part of a speaker, so that: 
[I]f you had wrong linguistic ideas about the name 'Quine' - for example, if you 
thought 'Quine' was a female name (not just that Quine was a woman, but that 
the name was restricted to females) then there would be a difference in 
meaning.46 
The other linguistic features he clearly has in mind here which would change are 
stereotypes, semantic markers and syntactic markers (so that 'Quine' would be 
syntactically associated with the pronouns 'she' and 'her' instead of'he' and 'him', for 
example). 
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Before deciding if Putnam's CTR is a panacea to the six ills of the Description Theory 
of Reference (outlined at the beginning), I will consider some problems with what 
Putnam has to offer. Some of these problems relate to the historical aspects of the 
theory (introducing event, causal chains), and others to the very existence and 
nature of NKs themselves; for clearly a theory of the reference of NK terms, if it is to 
be satisfactory, must also give a satisfactory account of what a NK term is and of 
whataNKis. 
At Putnam's introducing event a term and its referent become attached. The 
question then arises: 'How can Putnams's CTR accommodate the fact that the 
meanings of words change, and that words can have more than one meaning?' In the 
history of English language terms become unattached from their referents and 
sometimes acquire new referents. A 'broadcast', for example, was the motion of 
sewing seed by throwing it, not the sending of electromagnetic waves or the 
television and radio programmes the waves carry; now it means all these things. A 
further problem with the introducing event is that we can rarely know when it 
45 
'Explanation and Reference', in Putnam ( 1975), p. 203. 
46 ibid. 
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occurred, so we can never be sure that the stuff referred to by the term bears the 
'same stuff relation to what we refer to by the term. These problems concerning 
rigid designation and the introducing event have been worked on by Michael Devitt 
who, as we shall see in a later section, modifies the CTR, proposing that a term has a 
number of referents and that the introducing event "is only one of many 
confrontations between a term and the world."47 
The introducing events of theoretical NK and physical magnitude terms involve a 
slightly different set of problems. We have already met with Putnam's claim that 
competent use of a physical magnitude term requires certain conditions to be met, 
including the user being aware that he is using a term which indicates a referent 
capable of quantity and location. With regard to electricity, Putnam has this to say: 
I cannot, however, think of anything that every user of the term 'electricity' has 
to know except that electricity is (associated with the knowledge of being) a 
physical magnitude of some sort and, possibly, that 'electricity' ... is capable of 
flow or motion.48 
William K. Goosens objects that having the knowledge of flow or motion was not 
necessary to the introduction of the term 'electricity', for perhaps the referent at the 
introducing event was static electricity. Goosens maintains that the knowledge of 
'magnitude' would also not be necessary. His reason for doing so is that knowledge 
of the referent is contingent and empirically given: "With electricity present, we 
discover it is capable of flow and is a quantity."49 However, Goosens point, like 
Putnam's, is concerned with linguistic competence and not with reference fixing - a 
distinction which Goosens does not seem to take account of. So, whereas it is not 
necessary to have location and magnitude in mind in order to fix reference, it is 
necessary to have those two features in mind when using the physical magnitude 
term competently. The introducing event of a physical magnitude term would 
therefore have a rather anomalous nature in that reference could be fixed while at 
the same time the new physical magnitude term could be used without full linguistic 
competence. Such linguistic anomaly should not be counted against the CTR because 
it may indeed be a feature of the early use of some theoretical NK and physical 
magnitude terms such as 'electrons' and 'quanta'. 
4 7 Devitt (I 979 ), quoted by San key (I 994 ), p. 57. 
48 
'Explanation and Reference', in Putnam (1975), p. 199. 
49 Goosens (1977), p. 144. 
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A more significant problem for the CTR is the conflict between reference fixing at 
the introducing event and subsequent expert-determined extensions in the division 
oflinguistic labour. This is not simply the problem of overly-rigid designation which 
Devitt claims to have solved using multiple groundings (more later); for even when a 
NK term has a 'basket of referents', there is still the relation 'same stuff as', except it 
is applied to several rather than one referent. Or, to put it another way, this is not 
the problem of a term being fixed to one referent or to several, this is the problem of 
the reidentification of any NK after the introducing event. Shapere (1982), Zemach 
(1977) and Melior (1996) are all concerned with this matter. Shapere's objection to 
reidentification of a NK is founded on his objections to essentialism and this will be 
looked at shortly; Zemach's presentation of the reidentification problem is done 
within the context ofTE and this will also be considered later. Melior's comments on 
the reidentification of a NK will be considered now. 
Melior believes that, in the division of linguistic labour, the experts' criteria for NK 
reidentification are actually "causally downwind of the usage they are supposed to 
constrain".5° As an example Melior takes chlorine. The term 'chlorine' was first 
introduced into the language by Sir Humphry Davy who also demonstrated that the 
referent of 'chlorine' was an element: a clear case of NK term and NK. Subsequent 
experts have demonstrated that chlorine has an isotope, and exists as Cl-35 and Cl-
37. It is then problematic to say that the initial referent of 'chlorine' is 'the same stuff 
as' Cl-35 and 'the same stuff as' Cl-37: surely 'the same stuff relation can apply to 
that which is only and exactly the same stuff? This then is Melior's first point: "some 
natural kinds have the wrong archetypes"51, for Davy's chlorine is not 'the same stuff 
as' today's Cl-35 and Cl-37 if we follow Putnam's CTR to the letter. The standard 
response to the problem posed by Melior is to invoke Devitt and say that when Davy 
used the term 'chlorine' he was referring to a 'basket of stuff as was shown by 
subsequent confrontations between the term 'chlorine' and its referents. Devitt's 
solution makes it clear that a NK term can have more than one referent, but it does 
not here give a full enough account of the 'samex as' relation; in particular it does not 
show how there are "sound inferences from individual essences to kind essences."52 I 
will come back to Melior's criticism shortly. 
50 Melior, in Pessin & Goldberg (eds.) (1996), p. 74. 
51 ibid. I take it that an 'archetype' is the stuff initially baptised. 
93 
One way used to demonstrate the existence of a kind essence is to reduce each 
member of the extension of a NK term to its atomic features and then to see what 
microfeature each member has in common. Shapere criticises the compositional 
approach by saying that it "is by no means an a priori or necessary truth"53 that the 
identification of a NK is a function of the content or arrangement of its atomic parts; 
for "the notion of an independent particle may go"54• And if it should be that there 
are no independent particles, what then is a NK? In spite of this problem, reduction 
is a key aspect to Putnam's theory. How Putnam manages to retain it in his view of 
the reference of NK terms will be explained in the next paragraph. Before doing so I 
would point out that the reduction of NKs to microconstituents in turn attaches 
great importance to theoretical NKs and physical magnitudes because the reference 
of all NK terms would be predicated on the reference of theoretical and physical 
magnitude terms. The CTR, then, is not in the first instance concerned with common 
or garden NK terms, but with theoretical NK and physical magnitude terms, and 
their referents' causal natures. 
This is the point where the causal element of the CTR becomes of great importance. 
The celebrated aspect to the CTR is not its historical theory of causal chains, for 
more recent adaptations of the CTR have down played its historical side. The 'pride 
and joy' of the CTR is the connexion it makes between a microstructure and the 
causal properties of that microstructure55. Causal properties of water include: under 
normal atmospheric pressure it forms a solid at 0°C and a vapour at 100°C; it attains 
its maximum density at 4°C; it requires 4200 joules to raise the temperature of 1 kg 
of water by 1°C.It is because water is H20 that it behaves the way it does. The CTR's 
notion of necessary causal properties is very different to the Description Theory's 
linguistically necessary properties. This different type of necessity is described by 
Stathis Psillos: 
This is not a matter of logical necessity, but it is a matter of nomological 
necessity. Had the laws of nature been different, water would have different 
properties. But those properties being what they are, water has the kind-
constitutive properties it does.s6 
52 ibid., p. 70. 
53 Shapere (1982), p. 11. 
54 ibid., p. 14 
55 Putnam's CTRdmws on the notion of metaphysical necessity when Putnam makes claims like: "[If water is H20, then] it 
isn't logically possible that water isn't H20." (Putnam ( 1975), p. 233, italics removed). Yet Putnam's CTR also draws on the 
notion of physical necessity. He discusses these two matters in his retrospective paper 'Is Water Necessarily H20', in Putnam 
(1990), pp. 54-79. 
56 Psillos (1999), p. 288. 
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For Putnam, the microstructure of a NK accounts for the causal properties it 
actually has. The CTR can withstand Shapere's objection (given in the previous 
paragraph) because our current scientific atomism may radically change, but the 
causal properties of NKs will never change (in the actual world). 
So continuity of reference has been expressed as a problem of reidentification. A NK 
could be reidentified by examining its microfeatures; and the microfeatures are 
inferred from, or expressed as a function of, causal relations. If water is H20 then it 
is so necessarily: water will retain its causal properties in counterfactual situations, 
and so will retain its microstructure. If water is H20 then it is so necessarily for no 
other reason than the way it behaves. 
In considering Putnam's claim that "[a] statement can be (metaphysically) necessary 
and epistemically contingent"57, consider how the statement 'X is H20' operates 
within the CTR: 
{g) If an individual X is H20 then necessarily X has causal features fl and f2. 
(h) If an individual X has causal features fl and f2 then necessarily X is H20. 
Dudley Shapere criticises the CTR on the grounds that "it seems impossible to show 
how, on the Kripke-Putnam view, scientists could ever come to the conclusion that 
they were mistaken"58• This criticism presupposes that the CTR asserts something 
like statement (g). The problem with (g) is that it is false only when X does not have 
causal features fl and f2. Whether X is H20 or not makes no difference to the truth 
of (g); so whatever entity is posited will be the entity referred to, as long as it has 
causal features fl and f2. If (g) is a claim of the CTR, then the CTR runs into the 
problem that the rigid designation it proposes is too rigid ((g) supports the reference 
of'phlogiston', for example). Putnam tries to side-step this problem by insisting (as I 
pointed out earlier) that NK and physical magnitude terms must denote only entities 
which exist. So statement (g) would be modified to say that if H20 exists and X is 
H20 then X necessarily has causal features fl and f2. But this merely brings us back 
to the CTR's claim that microstructural description is the description of the essence 
of a NK As Putnam puts it: 
I pointed out that difference in microstructure invariably (in the actual world) 
result in differences in lawful behavior [ ... ] Since there is a standard description 
of microstructure, and the microstructure is what determines physical behavior 
57 Putnam ( 1977b), p. 130. 
58 Shapere ( 1982), p. 8. 
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(laws ofbehavior), it seemed to me that the only natural choice for a criterion of 
substance-identity was the microstructural criterion.59 
I will return to the microstructural criterion for substance identity in a moment. 
Looking at statement (h), according to the CTR, the theoretical elements of the water 
molecule are inferred from causal relations and this order of inference is expressed 
in statement (h). However, statement (h) is not true, for to move from causal 
properties (f1 and f2) to constituent properties (H20) is not a valid inference: other 
constituent properties may have the same causal features; or other constituent 
properties may have the same causal features (f1 and f2) plus an as yet unknown 
causal feature f3. The scientific inference within a causal theory is therefore better 
expressed: 
(i) If an individual X has causal features f1 and f2 then necessarily X is H20 or 
some other thing(s). 
My understanding of Putnam's CTR is that it asserts (g) and (i). (g) gives rise to the 
problem of too rigid designation and the microstructural criterion for substance 
identity. (i) implies a very weak constraint on the reference of 'water'. If the CTR is 
to succeed in describing adequately the reference of NK terms it will need to deflect 
criticisms of the two problems associated with (g). 
Twin Earth (TE) provides the litmus test for the continuity of reference of NK terms 
by means of rigid designation. Putnam is adamant that 'water' refers to the 
substance H20 and only H20 (if water is H20), and that TE people, who call the 
substance XYZ 'water', are using the term incorrectly. For this to be the case, 
Putnam would have to assume that the term 'water' received its introducing event on 
Earth (a fact which he does not seem to state explicitly). Putnam then resets the year 
to 1750, before modern chemistry (and the periodic table) developed, and still 
maintains that 'water' referred only to that substance which we now call 'H20'; even 
in 1750, visitors from Earth toTE would have been using the term 'water' incorrectly 
(not using correct Earth English, that is). Zemach disagrees and says that in 1750, 
'water' had the extension (H20 or XYZ) on Earth and TE, and that the reference of 
'water' had changed to H20 (and only H20) by 1850 (and the arrival of modern 
chemistry). Zemach does not go into any detail about how 'water' referred to more 
than one substance; but given Devitt's approach, it seems likely that Zemach's view 
could be accommodated with a less rigid causal theory. 
59 Putnam (1990), p. 69. 
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Melior, on the other hand, takes the view that the referent of 'water' need not have 
any particular microstructure: 
There was water on both planets alike, and there still is. We simply discovered 
that not all water has the same microstructure; why should it? Because its 
microstructure is an essential property of water? Well, that's what's in 
question.60 
Melior is not saying that physical entities are without microstructural properties 
(and hence, causal relations); rather, he doubts that those properties are essential 
kind-constitutive properties. 
Shapere agrees that Putnam's very notion of a NK is problematic: "Nothing 
satisfactory is said about how we are to decide what it is to count as an essential 
property."61 If the causal features follow necessarily from the essential kind-
constitutive properties (as in statement (g)), then a NK is the subject of a closed 
definition, such that: 
we discover, from an examination of things of that kind in our spatiotemporal 
region, what the essence is, and from then on refuse to consider anything to be 
that kind unless it has that property.62 
As an illustration of why the above closed view of kind-constitutive properties is 
wrong, Shapere describes an alternative region to TE, where a field melds the 
particles of the nucleus of gold atoms, but the stuff regains the normal nuclear 
characteristics of gold when removed from the region. Within the region described 
we would still refer to the stuff as 'gold', he says, even though it would not have gold 
kind-constitutive properties. Shapere then concludes that no common 
microstructural essence, underwritten by common causal properties, is necessary for 
a given entity to be called 'the same stuff as' another given entity. If I were to travel 
to Shapere's region, the only evidence that the ring on my finger is gold would be 
that the same ring was gold before I arrived there. The different natural laws of 
Shapere's region would make my ring unrecognisable as gold as far as the CTR is 
concerned, for there would be no trans-regional causal properties with which to 
form the relation 'samex as' at the microconstituent level. 
60 Melior (1996), p. 72. 
61 Shapere (1982), p. 4. 
62 ibid., p. 5. 
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Putnam now appears to accept much of the force of Shapere's example: 
I do not think that a criterion of substance-identity that handles Twin Earth 
cases will extend handily to 'possible worlds'. In particular, what if a 
hypothetical 'world' obeys different laws? [ ... ] It is clear that we would call a 
(hypothetical) substance with quite different behavior water in these 
circumstances. I now think that the question, 'What is the necessary and 
sufficient condition for being water in all possible worlds?' makes no sense at 
all. And this means that I now reject 'metaphysical necessity' .63 
Shapere's example shows that the notion of possible worlds does not fit well with the 
CTR; but Shapere does not show that the essentialist views of the CTR are untenable 
in the actual world - the universe with the physical laws it actually has. 
It seems to me that, removing possible worlds from the picture, the CTR withstands 
Shapere's criticism; but the CTR's microstructural criterion of substance identity 
still begs the question in the way Mellor has pointed out. Furthermore, the 
microstructural criterion for substance identity of Putnam's CTR has the 
undesirable consequence of making reference too fixed (as was seen from statement 
(g)); however Michael Devitt's CTR will address this problem of rigid designation (in 
the next part). 
I conclude, then, that Putnam's views on the rigid designation of NK (and physical 
magnitude) terms have gone awry. On the one hand, the criterion of substance 
identity makes reference too fixed (statement (g)); on the other hand, the CTR, in 
claiming statement (i) (that identity of causal features does not entail that water has 
certain constituents, it only makes it possible that they do), makes too weak a claim 
about NK essences to ensure the reidentification ofNKs. Consequently, the reference 
of NK terms is not adequately fixed. 
To claim that the essence of a NK is a particular microstructure meets with the 
objection that "an essential property need not be a fundamental one".64 So gold 
could be defined in deeper quantum-mechanical terms than its atomic number, 
suggests Shapere. Shapere's point is not so much which is the right microstructural 
description, but which is the essential one: how deep must we dig to find the essence 
of a NK? Shapere also criticises Putnam for thinking that "there are well-
63 Putnam (1990), pp. 69-70. 
64 Shapere (1982), pp. 4-5. 
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circumscribed boundaries between substances or kinds, and well-defined sets of 
essential properties for them."65 Stathis Psillos agrees that "there are borderline 
cases, or untypical cases[ ... ] especially when it comes to biological kinds".66 But he 
continues: 
But the very possibility of untypical, or borderline, cases requires that there are 
typical and clear-cut cases of belonging to the extension of a kind.67 
However, it will be recalled that Putnam's argument from abnormal members was 
precisely one of his criticisms of the Description Theory of reference. Now it would 
seem that what is sauce for the Description Theory goose is not sauce for the CTR 
gander! Stathis Psillos appeals to the relation of nomological necessity (as has 
already been quoted) to defend NKs when he states: 
Had the laws of nature been different, water would have different properties. 
But those laws being what they are, water has the kind-constitutive properties it 
does.68 
Since such uses of the word 'water' create in us a natural predisposition towards NI<s 
(the very issue in question), let us talk about some individual sample of water. This 
individual sample is indeed the stuff it is, and if that is all Psillos is saying, then that 
is not an argument for the existence of the NK water. The nomological necessity is 
that the individual sample of water is H20 or other components with identical 
causal features, and this is not a very interesting constraint on the reference of NK 
terms. 
Distinguishing NKs from nominal kinds is also a problem for Putnam. Schwartz is 
surely right to point out that there are important differences between gold, water 
and tigers on the one hand, and bachelors, lawyers and boats on the other. Putnam, 
however, wishes to claim indexicality and rigid designation for artifact terms in 
addition to NK terms: 
It follows that 'pencil' is not synonymous with any description - not even 
loosely synonymous with a loose description. When we use the word 'pencil', we 
intend to refer to whatever has the same nature as the normal examples of the 
local pencils in the actual world.69 
Schwartz makes the interesting remark that NK terms are well served by the CTR 
but that nominal kind terms are better suited to a Description Theory of reference. 
65 ibid., p.IS. 
66 Psillos (1999), p. 288. 
67 ibid., pp. 288-9. 
68 ibid., p. 288. 
69 Putnam, 'The Meaning of Meaning', in Pessin, Andrew & Sandford Goldberg (eds.) (1996), p. 26. 
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Schwartz's views have more prima facie appeal than the procrustean bed which 
Putnam recommends. 
One final problem for the CTR is the qua problem. Ostension and causal contact are 
not enough to fix reference: by listing causes and effects associated with a 
magnitude, and even by pointing, it is not clear if I am referring to a particular 
object, a group of objects, or a representative sample of objects. The need for a 
categorial term is addressed in the rest of the theories of reference in this chapter. 
With regard to the Description Theory Of Reference we started with six problems. 
The first was that there is no definite description of a NK (or physical magnitude) 
which is necessary and sufficient to refer. Putnam instead suggested that NK terms 
were rigid designators, a move which will need to be modified and which we will 
examine in the next section; Putnam's own solution to the first problem has not been 
completely adequate, but merits development. 
The CTR has met with more success in the second problem of explaining how terms 
refer even when their associated descriptions are unknown or inaccurate. 
The CTR avoids the linkage of meaning with a theory or conceptual scheme (the 
third problem) and instead uses indexicality to fix reference; but this method does so 
at the cost of there not being practically any theory at the introduction of a term, 
merely "the assumption of a something-I-know-not-what".7° Subsequent extensions 
of a term depend on a 'samex as' relation which is theory-based. All use and 
extensions of the term after the introducing event are therefore subject to the 
influence of theories/conceptual schemes. Putnam has offered strong reasons for 
why meaning, that is reference, is not a question of beliefs, by keeping conceptual 
elements outside the reference fixing event; yet the communication of that reference 
does require certain beliefs. 
70 Shapere(l982), p.21. 
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The CTR deals with the Description Theory's problem that identity statements 
involving non-synonymous eo-referring expressions are merely contingent (the fifth 
problem) by saying that they are epistemically contingent but metaphysically 
necessary; but to do this, the CTR has used a very different type of necessity to the 
one used in the Description Theory. Putnam has offered us a certainty based on 
natural causes rather than linguistic ones, surely a more assured base on which to 
start. That the eo-referents of certain non-synonymous terms necessarily enter into 
identical causal relations is a more satisfying statement than saying that they 
'happen to have' identical descriptions. Using the same notion of necessity, the CTR 
also shows how apparently synonymous terms may not eo-refer (the sixth problem). 
Part 5: Devitt Does Designation 
While Putnam's CTR has addressed issues of reference which the Description Theory 
found problematic, the CTR has also created some problems of its own. The qua 
problem arose because, even in the initial act of pointing and naming, a role for 
description became apparent. The microstructural criterion of substance identity 
proved problematic because the argument from causal properties to essences was 
not convincing. For Putnam, the introducing event of a NK term ostensively defines 
not merely an individual, but a class. The reidentification of members of the class 
depends on the 'samex as' relation which is theoretical and microstructural in 
import. Putnam admits as much, but he downplays it by asserting that whatever 
your theory is, the 'samex as' relation will always reidentify that stuff. The 
problematic consequence of such na1ve causalism is: 
any abandoned term will refer, no matter how mistaken and misguided are the 
descriptions associated with it, given that some thing or other was present in the 
grounding of the term.71 
Yet not everything that is named, even for causal reasons, exists. Causal constituents 
have to be inferred for the purposes of science and these constituents will be 
described by a theory. If the theory is discredited then the identity, and even the 
existence, of the causal constituents come into question. This issue will be brought 
out more fully when phlogiston theory is considered in Parts 7 and 8. Up to now, I 
have argued that Putnam's aim "to get away from the picture of the meaning of a 
word as something like a list of concepts"72 leads him to underplay the role of 
theoretical content in referring. I have also argued that Putnam's distinction 
71 Psillos (1997), p. 270. 
72 Putnam, 'Is Semantics Possible?', in Schwartz ( 1977), p. Ill. 
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between, on the one hand, the introducing event as a reference fixing event 
independent of mental content, and on the other hand, subsequent uses of the term 
which assume linguistic competence and mental content, is too tidy. 
In what follows, I will look at how Michael Devitt tries to remedy Putnam's 
problems. The apparatus of Devitt's theory is fust given mostly with regard to proper 
names. I conclude that Devitt's CTR inadequately accounts for the reference of 
proper names; and as an account of the reference of NK terms, Devitt's CTR has all 
the problems it had with proper names, plus some more. My criticism of Devitt is 
that there are flaws in the particulars of what he proposes: the Devitt is in the detail, 
as it were. 
Devitt regards Putnam's conception of causal chains emanating from a single 
introducing event as "an idealized picture"73. Rather then one introducing event 
there can be many groundings of a term in more than one object, or many times in 
the same object. A grounding occurs under certain conditions. First, a person 
perceives an object, "preferably face-to-face''74. Second, the person's belief that the 
object belongs to a very general category is true. Third, the person acquires a new 
ability to use a term or has on old ability reinforced. 
The fust condition, requiring a physical encounter, is implicit in Putnam's theory, 
where ostensive definition is stipulated at an introducing event. Devitt agrees with 
Putnam that theoretical entities "cannot be grounded by perception"7s directly and 
so he advocates the description of causal properties. Devitt takes the notion of 
'quasi-perception' perhaps slightly further than Putnam would like when he claims 
that "certain sorts of representations of the object''76 can be used to ground a term. 
Here, Devitt is thinking of non-llil.guistic representation, so that "a film or painting 
of an object can serve as well to ground a name in the object as perceiving the 
object."77 
73 Devitt (1981 ), p. 27. 
74 Devitt(l981), p. 133. 
75 Devitt (1981 ), p. 199. 
76 Devitt (1981 ), p. 59. 
77 Devitt (1981 ), p. 59. 
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It is the second condition for grounding which appears most at odds with the CTR, 
for the belief condition is one which is associated with the Description Theory. 
However, it will be recalled that Putnam thought it necessary to have "some beliefs 
about the bearer of the name which are true or approximately true"78• I regarded 
Putnam as saying that such beliefs were only necessary for linguistic competence 
and not for reference-fixing.79 But for Devitt, belief has a role both in reference-
fixing and linguistic competence. Devitt wants to incorporate mental representations 
into a CTR and does so by pointing out that to take part in a grounding (and thereby 
acquire the ability to designate an object), we must have some belief which is cause~ 
by that object. He explains this addition to the CTR: 
The central idea of a causal theory was that present uses of a name are causally 
linked to first uses. I claim now that first uses are causally linked to the object. so 
Devitt's point is that "To perceive something is to be causally affected by it."81 It is 
not possible to perceive an object without having a mental representation (or 
thought) which is of that object and caused by that object - such is the nature of 
perception. It may look as if Devitt is claiming merely that a grounding involves 
simple intentionality, and that there is no belief about the grounding object which is 
necessary for a successful grounding to occur; and this claim is surely no significant 
addition to Putnam. But I will shortly argue that Devitt assigns a much greater role 
to mental content in reference grounding. 
Peter Sellers' sketch is again called upon, this time to illustrate the role of beliefs in 
groundings. From Devitt's perspective, the problem situation can have arisen out of 
two groundings of the description 'your dog' (and its corresponding 'my dog'). 
Person A referred to (Devitt would say 'designated') the dog physically present: he 
perceived the dog, he had a mental representation of that dog, and that mental 
representation involved the belief that the dog present belonged to the man present. 
This belief was therefore caused by the dog. This is not to say that the dog is 
responsible for the truth or falsity of the man's belief; it is merely to say that the 
belief concerns the dog and that without that dog there would be no such belief 
which could be true or false. Person A then has the new ability to designate the dog 
present with the words 'your dog', and this meets the third condition of a grounding: 
78 Putnam, 'Explanation and Reference', in Putnam (1975), p. 203. 
79 Though Putnam is not entirely clear on this matter, as the filet that there are different interpretations of him suggests, e.g. 
Devitt (1981 ), p. 197. 
80 Devitt (1981), p. 28. 
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a new ability to use a term (or terms). As far as groundings are concerned, the 
problem highlighted by the sketch is that Person B's use of the corresponding 
definite description ('my dog') has a different grounding to Person A's 'your dog'. 
Person B's use of'my dog' is grounded in a different dog, a dog which Oet us assume) 
he has perceived and of which he is thinking when he uses the description 'my dog'; 
so Person B's ability to refer to the dog which actually belongs to him started at a 
different grounding. Each person's bringing his respective object to mind in tandem 
with the respective definite description ('your/my dog') constitutes each person's 
ability to refer to each dog. Devitt sums up his whole approach thus: 
My strategy is to tie an ability to an object and a term in virtue of their role in 
bringing about the relative mental representations.B2 
A question which will arise again and again about Devitt's strategy is 'What are 
relevant mental representations?' 
For a grounding to take place there must be a significant connexion between my 
mental representation and the object I am designating. If I conceptualise the dog 
lying on the floor in my kitchen as an electric kettle, then I have simply l}Ot 
adequately perceived the dog. I can call the dog ' the electric kettle' or any 
appellation I wish, and successfully refer to it if I have that dog in mind; but if I 
think of the dog as something that I can fill with water, and as something which 
heats water (but only to dog's body temperature, of course), then I have not 
perceived the dog sufficiently to have 'grounding thoughts' in it. According to Devitt, 
a "successful grounding will be in an object that fits a category determined by the 
mental states of some person"83. I will call this condition the sortal predicate 
requireJ:llent for a grounding. At a grounding, an object gives rise to its term and a 
belief or beliefs about the object. This then begs the question of what beliefs are 
necessary for a grounding to happen. 
In considering what beliefs are necessary for a grounding to occur, the two sides of 
the matter are, on the one hand, that the belief contain an accurate sortal predicate, 
such that "the cause must be an object of the sort [ ... the grounder] has in mind"B4; 
and on the other hand, the rejection of any belief requirement, instead stipulating 
81 Devitt (1981 ), p. 27. 
82 Devitt (I 981 ), p. 130. 
83 Devitt (I 981 ), p. 63. 
84 Devitt (1981 ), p. 62. 
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"that there be something external to the mind immediately responsible for the 
experiences in question."85 The problems associated with the former side are some 
of those associated with the Description Theory of reference; and the problems with 
the latter are some of those associated with Putnam's CTR. Devitt wants to find a 
middle way with his CTR, for "we have to draw a line somewhere saying that some 
sort of error invalidates reference. Reference failure is possible"86. Considering such 
reference failure may help clarify what beliefs are necessary for a grounding to occur. 
A name introduced for an entity which is thought to exist but does not is called a 
'failed name'. When the term 'Vulcan' was introduced to refer to the planet between 
Mercury and the Sun, the intended naming event failed because "the singular term 
used to pick out the object for naming, for example, 'that planet', is empty."87 Devitt 
is of the opinion that a grounding fails to take place "if there is nothing there of the 
appropriate category to be named." However, there are examples which run counter 
to Devitt's. Sir William Herschel observed through his telescope what he thought 
was a comet and he named it 'Georgium Sidus'. What he actually saw was the planet 
Uranus; but, in spite of Herschel's possessing the wrong sortal predicate, and in 
spite of it being Lexell88 who suggested that Georgium Sidus was probably a planet, 
Herschel's grounding of 'Georgium Sidus' is regarded as successful, for he is lauded 
as the discoverer of Uranus. 'Georgium Sidus' is not a failed name. 
Devitt believes that "What object the network is grounded in depends, in part, on the 
mental processes of the person involved in the grounding"89, and he has strong 
reasons for believing so. For example, the qua problem which confronted Putnam 
strongly suggests "that the only difference between naming a cat and a time slice of a 
cat is in the intentions"90. Yet Devitt's sortal predicate requirement seems too vague 
a requirement to be of use in overcoming the qua problem. Devitt tries to wriggle out 
of the difficulties posed here by insisting "only that the object be in the same very 
general category as it is taken to be."91 Even then, he weakly admits that "[t]here is 
85 Devitt ( 1981 ), p. 62. 
86 Devitt(1981), p. 62. I have removed the italics. 
87 Devitt (1981 ), p. 176. 
88 According to Kuhn ( 1996), p. 115. 
89 Devitt (1981 ), p. 62. 
90 Devitt(1981),p. 61. 
91 Devitt (1981 ), p. 63. 
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an element of arbitrariness in our determination of these categories."92 I have 
expressed concern about the vagueness of the belief condition on a grounding, but I 
will now press on with further details, and two further criticisms, of Devitt's CTR. 
Groundings are only the first link in what Devitt calls d-chains. The name 'd-chain' 
is short for 'designating chain' and Devitt wants to make a clear distinction between 
his use of 'designation' and 'denotation' (while 'reference' remains the general term). 
The distinction exactly parallels Donnellan's referential and attributive kinds of 
reference (see Part 2). After generating at a grounding the ability to designate an 
individual by a term, that ability is passed on to others who have not been present at 
the grounding. Reference borrowing is acquiring the ability to designate that which 
was designated at a grounding. A d-chain may be summed up as a grounding, an 
ability, and reference borrowing(s). Devitt's views on designation (and therefore on 
d-chains) will be the focus of attention, but his views on denotation will be used to 
fill out his picture of reference. 
Using his cat, Nana, as an example, Devitt shows how d-chains operate. When the 
Devitts first got their cat, Mrs Devitt said, "Let's call her Nana." Here, a grounding 
had taken place and those present (the Devitt couple) had grounding thoughts and 
the ability to designate that cat with that name. The ability to designate Nana can be 
passed on, even in the absence of Nana. For example, at his place of work, Devitt 
might say to a colleague who has never met Nana, "Our cat is called 'Nana'." Then 
the colleague has borrowed the ability to designate Nana and can say things like, 
"How long have you had Nana?". Such comments on reference borrowing contain no 
surprises so far, but later I will present what I think is a glitch in Devitt's account of 
d-chains. 
One benefit of Devitt's notion of d-chains is how they account for identity statements 
and non-synonymous eo-referring expressions. Devitt and other causal theorists are 
keen to explain- or rather explain away- Frege's notion of 'sense'. In the identity 
statements 'Muhammed Ali is Muhammed Ali' and 'Muhammed Ali is Cassius Clay', 
Devitt agrees with Frege that they are 'the same but different'. Expressing these 
statements in general terms as 'a= a' and 'a= b', Devitt comments: 
92 Devitt ( 1981 ), p. 63. 
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Frege rightly saw that the solution to the difficulty lay in the different 'mode of 
presentation' of the object associated with 'a' from that associated with 'b'. 
Frege's mistake was to embody these modes within 'senses'. For me the modes 
are types of d-chain exemplified in the networks.93 
When a person says, 'Muhammed All is Muhammed Ali' he is using the same ability 
twice: each designation comes from the same d-chain.94 Of even more interest is how 
Devitt's d-chain approach can be used to adjudicate on the reference of contentious 
eo-referring non-synonymous expressions such as 'dephlogisticated air' and 
'oxygen'; but I will leave this until I come to look at Kitcher and Psillos in Part 7. For 
now, Devitt's relevant proposal is that "the way a name is treated conceptually 
appears in the account of d-chains in a theory of reference"95• 
Donnellan's distinctions (between the referential and attributive uses of a term) and 
Devitt's corresponding terms ('designation' and 'denotation') are useful for 
describing what happens when error enters into the act of referring. Continuing with 
Devitt's cat examples: I think that Nana, whom I see regularly, is the neighbour's cat 
when in fact she is my lodger's cat. The neighbour does have a cat, called 'Jemima', 
so there are two cats, but I have only ever seen and designated Nana. One day I say, 
"Our neighbour's cat has disappeared." From this simple situation, a number of 
semantic questions arise. 
The first question is, when I make the statement, 'Our neighbour's cat has 
disappeared', am I referring to Nana or Jemima? The Devitt view is that "my 
description is linked to both cats, though the links are of a different kind."96 I 
designated Nana- the cat I had in mind. I denoted Jemima- the one who satisfied 
the description. A tracing of the d-chain would show when it happened that I falsely 
grounded the defmite description 'the neighbour's cat' in Nana97; and so a d-chain 
would explain why I had Nana in mind when I used that definite description. 
93 Devitt ( 1981 ), p. 153. 
94 When 'Muhammed Ali' has groundings in two different objects (i.e. people), then a person with the two corresponding 
abilities to refer might say something like, "Oh, you mean that Muhammed Ali!" 
95 Devitt (1981), p. 156. 
96 Devitt (1981 ), p. 49. 
97 Perhaps I never knew that the lodger had a cat, but I did know that the neighbour had one and then I grounded the definite 
description in Nana; or perhaps the lodger lied to me by purposely creating a situation where I borrowed the wrong reference. 
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A second question is whether my statement 'Our neighbour's cat has disappeared' is 
true. Devitt's answer is that the truth value of a statement depends on what it means 
- on whether we consider its referring expression as designating or denoting: 
The object that bears on the truth value of a statement containing a 
designational token is the object it designates. On the other hand, the object that 
bears on the truth value of a statement containing an attributive token is the 
object it denotes.98 
Definite descriptions can be ambiguous because "the truth conditions of statements 
containing them vary according as the description is referential or attributive."99 The 
statement 'Our neighbour's cat has disappeared' (in the aforementioned example) is 
one of referential ambiguity: I clearly and determinately designate Nana with the 
description token 'the neighbour's cat'; and I clearly and determinately denote 
Jemima with that same definite description. 
The same type of ambiguity can also apply to proper names such as the names of 
authors, Devitt claims. 'Shakespeare' can designate the playwright and poet from 
Stratford who was perceived at groundings by a number of people who were the first 
links of d-chains leading up to my use of his name now. 'Shakespeare' can also 
denote (in Devitt's terminology) whoever it was who wrote Hamlet (possibly Francis 
Bacon? Ben Jonson?). Devitt concludes that "the truth value of many statements 
containing 'Shakespeare' will depend on whether the name is designational or 
attributive. "100 
Another type of ambiguity which proper names have is the purely designational 
ambiguity which arises from the fact that more than one person is called 'John'. 
Similarly, there is more than one bearer of the name 'Nana' (the bespectacled Greek 
singer Nana Maskouri, for one). Devitt acknowledges the situation: "I am likely to 
[be able to] designate several objects with the sound type 'Nana'."101 He then gives 
how the sound type is disambiguated: "It is only the thoughts that are about our cat 
that are relevant to the ability in question."102 It is not simply what the speaker has 
98 Devitt (1981), p. 53. 99 Devitt & Sterelny (1987), p. 82. 
100 Devitt (1981 ), p. 158. Devitt admits that in the name examples he gives, including the Shakespeare one, "we have not 
clearly introduced an attributive use but rather have started to run the attributive and designational". ibid. 
101 Devitt (1981), p. 130. 
102 Devitt ( 1981 ), p. 130. 
108 
in mind which determines the designatum; more precisely, "it is the ability 
exercised"103, an ability which forms part of ad-chain: 
The reference of a speaker's token of [ .. .'Nana'], who he 'has in mind', is 
determined by his psychological states together with the way those states are 
causally embedded in the environment. For the token refers to the object which 
grounds the ability exercised in producing the token.1o4 
If Devitt's causalism had a motto, it would surely be: 'Designating thoughts don't 
come from nowhere'; they are caused by the designatum (in the case of reference 
borrowing, the borrower uses a term which can be traced back to designating 
thoughts). A term token refers to (designates) what caused it, that is, to that which 
gave rise to the ability to use the term token to refer. 
In addition to the designational and denotational ambiguities of definite 
descriptions and proper names, Devitt also discusses their referential 
indeterminacy. He remarks that "there may be nothing in reality to determine 
whether some name tokens are attributive or designational"105: 
In such a case we must say that the token partially designates the object to 
which it is linked by a d-chain and partially denotes the object picked out by the 
identifying expression.1o6 
Further details of this interplay will be considered in the notion of a false grounding. 
A name is falsely grounded when the wrong name or a false definite description is 
attached to an individual under grounding conditions. 
Designational indeterminacy may be found in statements which use terms (and their 
corresponding abilities) where the grounding has gone wrong. Devitt gives the 
following example: I say to you, 'This is Nana' (the name of my cat) while indicating 
Jemima (the neighbour's cat). You accept the grounding because you have not seen 
either cat before, though you have designated Nana before through reference 
borrowing. Jemima is black, Nana is not, and neither cat is Persian. Now consider 
the following statements you might make (in the presence of Jemima) after this false 
grounding: 
(5) That cat is Nana. 
(6) Nana is a cat. 
(7) Nana is a Persian. 
103 Devitt & Sterelny (1987), p. 59. 
104 Devitt & Sterelny (1987), p. 60. 
105 Devitt(l981),p. 160. 
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(8) That cat is black. 
(9) Nana is black.107 
Devitt claims that statement (5) is false and statement (8) is true for the reason that 
the demonstrative 'that cat' is deictic, Jemima is the cat being pointed out (there are 
no others present), and, perhaps most importantly, no token of 'Nana' is employed 
in (8)108• I see no problem in Devitt's claim that (8) is true, but will argue in the next 
paragraph that Devitt's views on grounding are insufficient to explain why (5) is 
false. Devitt points out that in (6), (7) and (9), 'Nana' takes on an indeterminate hue 
because you have two abilities to designate with 'Nana': one grounded in Nana 
(which you had previously borrowed from me) and one falsely grounded in Jemima 
(as described above); so each 'Nana' token is partially based on both abilities. The 
upshot, claims Devitt, is that (6) is true109 (for both Nana and Jemima are in fact 
cats); (7) is false110 (for neither Nana nor Jemima is a Persian); and (9)'s truth value 
is partially true (for Jemima is black and Nana is not). Each of (6), (7) and (9) 
employ partial reference, for their 'Nana' tokens refer indeterminately and in a 
limited way to both cats; for it is not clear which designational ability is being 
exercised. (The details of the notion of partial reference will be addressed in Part 6. 
Here, I address the details of Devitt's notion of d-chains). 
What I do not understand is why, in the above account, 'Nana' in (5) is not 
designationally indeterminate ; for the speaker has two abilities to designate with 
'Nana' (one ability borrowed previously and one more recently obtained in the false 
grounding). So why is (5) not just partially true/false? Devitt's reason for denying 
the indeterminate truth value of (5) is that it is "an identity belief of the sort that 
passes on the benefit of a grounding"111, so that "any thought associated with 'Nana' 
resulting from this identification will contain a token grounded in the object 
designated by 'that cat"'112• I can accept that 'that cat' is univocal, but the speaker's 
use of 'Nana' is surely indeterminate for the reasons stated earlier113. I also accept 
that the grounding passed on by (5) is univocal, but what has happened to the 
106 Devin (1981), p. 160 
107 Devitt (1981 ), p. 143. 
108 Strangely, Devitt does not propose the third reason. 
109 For how a statement can, according to some, be determinately true yet contain a partially referring term, see Hartry Field's 
Y?tsition in Part 6. 
10 For how a statement can, according to some, be determinately false yet contain a partially referring term, see Hartry Field's 
\'?sition in Part 6. 
11 Devitt (1981), p. 143. My italics. 
112 Devitt(1981),p.I43. 
113 Namely, that the speaker had two abilities to refer using 'Nana', one borrowed and one obtained in the fulse grounding, and 
there seems to be no fuct of the matter which ability is being used. 
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borrowed ability and why is it completely discounted? I agree with Devitt that our 
intuitions about (5) are that it is simply false, but it seems to me that the machinery 
of his theory does not adequately explain why it is false. 
There seems to be a further inconsistency which anses m Devitt's theory of 
reference. To alter the previous example slightly, I say 'Nana is our cat' (instead of 
'This is Nana') when Nana is absent but Jemima is present. You take 'our cat' to refer 
to the cat present (Jemima). Let it also be the case that Jemima is Siamese and Nana 
is not. You then say: 
(10) 'Nana is Siamese'. 
Devitt again states (just as he did of (5)) that your statement is simply false, this time 
because: 
We must disallow that the groundings of one term can be transmitted to another 
in this way. Although an identity belief involving a nondemonstrative 
representation can be used to introduce the designational use of a term, it 
cannot reinforce that use,II4 
So 'Nana is our cat' can (in the above circumstances) be a grounding sentence, but 
the false grounding of 'Nana' in Jemima, coupled with a previously borrowed 
reference (of'Nana') which was rightly grounded (in Nana), does not give rise to any 
referential indeterminacy in (10), according to Devitt. This claim strikes me as 
inconsistent with Devitt's earlier point about partial reference: in example (9), Devitt 
asserts that it is partially true that 'Nana is black' (when she is actually not black); 
but in example (10) Devitt maintains that is simply false that 'Nana is Siamese' 
(when she is actually not Siamese). 
I have pointed out what I take to be three problems with Devitt's proposals. First, 
the sortal predicate requirement is too imprecise. Second, in certain circumstances, 
an ability to designate disappears, apparently without adequate explanation. Third, 
the general point Devitt is making in examples (10) (and (5) and (8)) is: 
[I]f a person says [ ... ] 'a is F' because b is F and he has come mistakenly to 
believe that a= b, he has said something simply true or simply false.ns 
Yet Devitt appears to break his own rule in claiming that (9) is partially true, where 
'Nana' partially designates Nana and partially Jemima. In the next Part, I explain in 
114 Devitt(I981), p. 149. 
115 Devitt(l981),p. 149. 
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more detail the notion of partial reference, a notion which Devitt makes frequent use 
of in his account of how multiple groundings (and their d-chains) fix reference. 
Devitt's notion of 'groundings' has differed from Putnam's notion of 'baptisms' in 
that groundings may recur, but it is not clear that Putnam's baptisms do so; 
grounding the same term in different entities may occur, but Putnam's Twin Earth 
example suggests that 'double-baptisms' are a form of semantic error; and a 
grounding can be false, but the first Putnamian baptism of a term probably cannot 
be. Devitt's CTR has not presented any adequate solutions to most of the problems 
highlighted in Putnam's CTR, but he has tried to describe how the reference relation 
between term and object changes, something which Putnam avoided. In a way not 
apparent in Putnam's CTR, Devitt's CTR explicitly allows for referential variance 
between the terms of successive scientific theories; yet allowing such meaning 
change does not stop Devitt opposing the semantic incomparability of successive 
theories. To secure comparability of the statements of successive theories, Devitt 
makes much use of the notion of partial reference: 
The theories we want to compare are ones 'in the same domain'. What sense can 
we make of being in the same domain? I suggest that we can make sense of it 
only in terms of shared partial referents.JI6 
However, in Part 6, I argue that partial reference is not shown to be up to the task 
which Devitt sets it . 
Michael Devitt allows the notion of partial reference a substantial role in his CTR 
He admits that "reference may often be an idealization of partial reference"ll7 and 
couches reference as a special case of partial reference: "for a term to have a full 
referent is for it to have only one partial referent."118 Devitt takes the notion of 
partial reference from Hartry Field, and I will first briefly consider what Field has to 
say about partial reference. Then I will question if Devitt is wise to employ partial 
reference in his CTR; and I will cast doubt on the ability of Devitt's CTR to quash the 
semantic incomparability claim (claim (b)) of the IT. 
116 Devitt (1979), p. 45. 
117 Devitt(I981),p. 123. 
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Field illustrates his idea of partial reference with Newtonian examples. Newton 
made experimental claims like: 
(H) "The mass of Object A is between 1.21 and 1.22 kilograms [said after putting 
Object A onto a pan balance and accurately weighing it]"119 
If we take it that Newton was referring to proper mass or relativistic mass, statement 
(11) is true (under the conditions given) in either case. The same may be said of 
theoretical claims like: 
(12) "To accelerate a body uniformly between any pair of different velocities, more 
force is required if the mass of the body is greater."120 
Statements (11) and (12) were as true on Newton's lips as on Einstein's, but, claims 
Field, Newton was not simply referring to proper mass or relativistic mass. What 
Field wants to argue is: 
[T]here are sentences with perfectly determinate truth values which contain 
referentially indeterminate names and predicates, so that it makes perfectly 
good sense to ask whether the sentence is true or false even though it doesn't 
make sense to ask what the name really denotes or what the real extension of 
the predicate is.l21 
I will side with David Papineau in presenting one reason 122 why Field does not 
succeed. 
As used nowadays, the term 'mass' is ambiguous and refers to proper mass and 
relativistic mass. Which, then, was Newton referring to? The answer Field gives is 
that there is no way to decide; for Newton's 'mass' did not completely refer either to 
proper mass or to relativistic mass. Nor did Newton's 'mass' refer ambiguously to 
both in the manner of our modern term 'mass'. For example, when Newton states 
that 
(13) 'Momentum= (mass)v', 
we are tempted to think that he is referring to relativistic mass. However, Newton 
would have maintained that the mass r~ferred to in equation (13) is invariant. So 
Newton combined (13), an equation associated with relativistic mass, with a notion 
associated with proper mass. Likewise, when Newton states that 
(14) mass is invariant, 
118 Devitt (1979), p. 43. 
119 Field ( 1973 ), p. 468. 
12
° Field (1973), p. 470. 
121 Field (1973), p. 463. 
122 There are other reasons. In a short but detailed response to Field, John Earman and Arthur Fine ( 1977) argue that Newton 
referred to proper mass. They also challenge Field's claim that the term 'mass' is ambiguous in modern physics, maintaining 
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it might seem that he is referring to proper mass; but he combines (14) with the 
notion that the product of mass and velocity gives momentum (i.e. (13)), and this 
latter is a notion of relativistic mass. As causal theorists everywhere propound: that 
Newton had some false beliefs about relativistic mass and proper mass does not 
preclude him from referring to either of them. Field goes along with this view to 
some extent, but then gives it a little twist by claiming that "there is no basis for 
choosing between"123 whether Newton meant proper mass or relativistic mass in any 
of his utterances. Why Field asserts this is as follows. The conjunction of statements 
(13) and (14) "was objectively false"124, but the conjunction is false in the case that 
'mass' refers to relativistic mass or in the case that it refers to proper mass. And 
"there are many of Newton's utterances containing the word 'mass' that we want to 
regard as true"125, such as (11) and (12), but they are true in the case that 'mass' 
refers to relativistic mass or in the case that it refers to proper mass. So Field 
concludes that, for any of Newton's utterances containing 'mass' there is a limited 
referential indeterminacy - "there is no fact of the matter as to which of these 
quantities he was referring to."126 
Field expresses such limited referential indeterminacy using the phrases 'partial 
reference' and 'partial denotation'127 in relation to term tokens: 
I want to say that Newton's word 'mass' partially denoted proper mass and 
partially denoted relativistic mass; since it partially denoted each of them, it 
didn't folly (or determinately) denote either.12s 
To appreciate what Field means by the partial denotation of Newtonian 'mass' it is 
worth contrasting referential indeterminacy with ambiguity. A term is ambiguous if 
different tokens of it .fully denote one of two different referents. So modern users of 
the term type 'mass' denote proper mass or relativistic mass, for modern tokens of 
'mass' will refer to one of these two magnitudes. In this sense, the modern term type 
'mass' is ambiguous: it partially denotes one of two determinate referents. As Field 
observes, ambiguity "does not demonstrate the existence of indeterminacy"129. 
Indeterminacy arises when "each token of 'mass' partially denote[s] two different 
instead that, 'mass' refers only to proper mass. Earman and Fine did not go as fur as to dismiss the "conceptual possibility'' 
~Earman & Fine (1977), p. 536.) of partial reference, only that it did not apply to New1on's term 'mass'. 
23 Field (1973), p. 467. I have removed the italics. 
124 Field (1973), p. 468. 
125 Field (1973), p. 473. 
126 Field (1973), p. 467. I have added the italics to "which". 
127 Field does not use 'denotation' with Devitt's special nuance. 
128 Field(l973), p. 474. 
129 Field (1973), p. 475, n. 12. 
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quantities."l3° Newtonian tokens of 'mass' referred partially to both relativistic mass 
and proper mass, but not completely to one or the other (or both). Statements 
containing an ambiguous term are determinately true or false, depending on which 
meaning is taken; but statements like (13) or (14)) will be only partially true or 
partially false because of a term's referential indeterminacy. 
Field's principle point about partial reference is not in the first instance an 
epistemological one. It is accepted that we use our best current scientific theory to 
judge what, if anything, Newton's 'mass' referred to. But the semantic and 
ontological point of partial reference addresses "not what scientists theory-
dependently take to be the references of scientific terms [ ... ], but what those 
references are."131 Field's main point with partial reference is to describe in what 
manner scientific terms refer to those entities or magnitudes which are in fact there 
(from an external perspective). 
Field's claim that 
G) statements (11) and (12) are determinately true, even as uttered by Newton, and 
even though Newtonian 'mass' only partially refers 
appears to contradict other claims he makes about the development of scientific 
terms. That is, he maintains: 
(k) "many of our current scientific terms are referentially indeterminate"l32 
and that science often progresses by a process of extensional refinement: 
the set of things that [ ... a scientific term] partially denoted after [a major 
change of theory] is a proper subset of the set of things it partially denoted 
before.I33 
So Field takes it that (11) and (12) are true in the case that 'mass' refers to proper or 
relativistic mass134• Yet it is precisely the references of our current scientific terms of 
'proper' and 'relativistic mass' which are used by Field to assert the determinate 
truth of Newtonian statements such as (11) and (12), even though Field also 
maintains that current scientific terms are themselves likely referentially 
indeterminate. This ongoing shift in reference suggests to David Papineau that Field 
13
° Field (1973), p. 475, n. 12. 
131 Pappineau (1979), p. 151. 
132 Field ( 1973), p. 480. My italics. 
133 Field (1973), p. 479. 
134 Field calls this an example of'double refmement', since modern Physics has given two subsets ofNewtonian 'mass'. 
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asserts, largely without grounds, that some of Newton's utterances containing 'mass' 
come out determinately true or false: 
[E]ven if we allow the idea of partial references, there is no reason to suppose 
that any statements will have anything other than indeterminate truth values, 
that is, be true according to some partial references and false according to 
others.l35 
The thrust of Papineau's criticism is not epistemological: Papineau is not criticising 
Field for saying that we judge the truth of Newton's statements according to the 
tenets of our own theory. Rather, Papineau criticises two of Field's semantic claims, 
namely (j) and (k); for if (k) alludes to the current scientific terms 'proper mass' and 
'relativistic mass' (which it almost certainly does) then (j) and (k) are mutually 
inconsistent (under Field's own conditions). 
I will make two criticisms of Devitt's use of partial reference. First, Devitt holds that 
many current scientific terms will undergo more refinement, so there are many 
previously and currently held scientific terms which only partially refer136• Devitt's 
holding these views then opens him up to the same criticism meted out to Field; for, 
like Field, Devitt also believes that there are scientific statements which are 
determinately or completely true, even when their terms only partially refer. Indeed, 
this claim is intended to support Devitt's argument against the semantic 
incomparability of theories: 
Given our present theory of reality we can (in principle) explain and justify [ ... ] 
our intuitive judgement of the truth value of any past or present statement 
irrespective of any difference in meaning or reference between it and the 
statements of our present theory.l37 
Once again, then, Field's problem arises, that there is a dearth of current 
determinately referring terms with which to support the determinate truth of 
scientific statements like (11) and (12) , which we intuitively regard as determinately 
or true. 
My second criticism is that the role Devitt affords to partial reference in his CTR is 
so great that a large number of scientific statements would have indeterminate truth 
values. Consequently, his CTR would not form a convincing argument against the 
IT's claim138 that some, or even many, statements of successive theories are 
135 Pappineau (1979), p. 153. 
136 
"It seems to me plausible that the terms of a scientific theory typically do partially refer." Devitt (1979), p. 44. 
137 Devitt (1979}, p. 45. 
138 Against which I have already argued in Chapter I. There, my simple argument does not draw on any theory of reference. 
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semantically incomparable. The nature of multiple groundings and cl-chains, as 
Devitt relates them, is such that there is likely to be a preponderance of referential 
indeterminacy. He tells us that "a term partially refers to two different objects (sorts 
of objects) if the network underlying it is causally grounded in both."139 In Devitt's 
theory, such mixed cl-chains happen very easily. 
Devitt's use of partial reference is not adequate for demolishing the semantic 
incomparability claim of the IT. He admits that "we lack a worked out theory of 
partial reference"14°, but I have not denied that reference can be partial. What Devitt 
lacks, it seems to me, is a theory of partial reference consistent with his other beliefs 
about the semantic relations between the terms and sentences of past and current 
successive scientific theories. A consequence of his account of partial reference and 
cl-chains, (an account which he admits with disarming candour is not satisfactorily 
'worked out') is that it does the opposite of what Devitt says it does: it lends support 
to the semantic incomparability claims of the IT (in that partial reference/referential 
indeterminacy of the terms of past and current theories entails that the statements 
of successive theories will be semantically incomparable). 
Part i: Cause and Description 
While causal constraints are necessary, they are clearly not sufficient for an adequate 
CTR. A description associated with a NK term has a role in determining the 
reference of the term. Those CTRs which take Putnam's dictum that 'meanings just 
ain't in the head' and recast it as 'meanings ain't just in the head' are sometimes 
called 'causal-descriptive theories of reference' (CDTRs). What such theories try to 
do is explain how descriptions associated with a term help determine its reference. 
Here, I present an early version of Philip Kitcher's CDTR and consider some 
criticisms offered by Stathis Psillos. I conclude that not all of Psillos' criticisms of 
Kitcher are valid, but that one his criticisms of Kitcher's use of the principle of 
humanity at least raises concerns about Kitcher's CDTR. In the rest of Part 7, I 
address the brand of CDTR towards which Stathis Psillos is sympathetic and 
conclude that still no adequate theory of the reference of (theoretical) NK terms has 
been forthcoming. 
139 
Devit1 ( 1979), p. 44. 
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Like Putnam and Devitt, Philip Kitcher has it that a baptismal event, or set of 
dubbing events, is associated with a term type. When I utter a token of a term type, 
my utterance is "normally initiated by an event"141 which is associated with the 
pertinent term type. This set of dubbing events helps make up what Kitcher calls the 
'reference potential' of an expression type. Addressing some of the previously-stated 
objections to Putnam's CTR, Kitcher grabs the bull by the horns when he tells us that 
"terms whose reference potential contains two or more different initiating events 
[ ... ] may reasonably be called theory-laden."142 He explains that the use of a term 
with such a reference potential 
depends upon hypotheses to the effect that the same entity is involved in the 
appropriate way in the different events which belong to the same reference 
potential,143 
If one of these hypotheses begins to look doubtful, then "the use of the term which 
depends on it would have to be revised"144• So a reference potential with two or more 
initiating events will have two modes of reference, one designating (to retain Devitt's 
terminology) the causal agent which was present when named, and the other 
describing (or denoting, in Devitt's terminology) that causal agent. 
Unlike Putnam, Kitcher would explicitly allow that on some occasions travellers to 
Twin Earth successfully refer to the water-like substance by using the term 'water', 
and on other occasions they refer to water by using 'water'. In allowing that 'water' 
can be a referentially ambiguous NK term, Kitcher's view is similar to that of Devitt's 
multiple groundings; so, in the case of Twin Earth, 'water' can be grounded in and 
designate H20 or XYZ. Both Kitcher and Devitt also allow for referential and 
attributive modes of reference; but where they differ is in how they handle false 
groundings and false definite descriptions. That is, Devitt disallows that such 
descriptions as 'the H20 in our glasses' can, in general use, refer to the water-like 
stuff on Twin Earth. t45 It was shown that Devittt46 tries to legislate that denotation 
(attributive reference) is a mode of reference which, when the description is false, 
may not legitimately be passed on: at a face-to-face grounding, a false definite 
140 Devitt ( 1979), p. 44. 
141 Kitcher (1978), p. 540. 
142 Kitcher (1978), p. 540. 
143 Kitcher (1978), p. 540. 
144 Kitcher (1978), p. 540. 
145 As I have understood and presented him (in Part 5), Devitt allows the multiple grounding of the NK term 'water' (its 
designating H20 and XYZ), but denies that false descriptions ofNKs, no matter what their causal nexus with an entity, confer 
an ability to refer which can be passed along causal-historical chains in the language community. 
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description may designate the object present, but others who come to use the false 
description will fail to refer (in either sense of 'refer') to the object. I have argued 
that this move ofDevitt's has an ad hoc quality. 
Kitcher, on the other hand, recommends that we discern the causal-historical chains 
which link a token utterance and its description or content, to an initial baptism 
event. We replace, where necessary, the content of another's utterance token with 
our own content in accordance with the principle of humanity (see shortly). Having 
decided, say, that the term token does denote (refer attributively) to something (as 
opposed to nothing), we must then decide, from the context of utterance, what 
'thing' caused (along causal-historical chains) the token utterance; that is, we must 
determine what the token designates (c.f. its referential use). On Twin Earth, as far 
as Kitcher is concerned, false definite descriptions can be passed on such that they 
still designate what they have failed to denote. Kitcher wants to say that there may 
be occasions (many more than Devitt allows) when not just 'water' but definite 
descriptions containing 'H20', though false, do refer to XYZ; for the principle of 
humanity is such that we may understand 'the H20 in my glass' as meaning 'the XYZ 
in my glass'. 
To determine the reference of any expression token, Kitcher considers the context in 
which the token is used and employs the principle of humanity. The principle of 
humanity is a hermeneutic device whereby we 
impute to the speaker whom we are trying to translate a "pattern of relations 
among beliefs, desires and the world ... as similar to ours as possible. "I47 
To see how Kitcher's ideas work we will look at two of his examples; the first is a 
fictional narrative about a millionairess and the second is concerned with the 
reference of NK terms in phlogiston theory. 
Eustacia Evergreen is a well known millionairess who wants to withdraw from the 
glare of public attention, so she employs an impersonator. The impersonator moves 
into a neighbourhood posing as Eustacia Evergreen while the millionairess Eustacia 
Evergreen leads a quiet life. Over time, neighbours get to know impersonator 
146 See Devitt (1981), pp. 148-9. 
147 Kitcher (1978), p. 534, quoting Richard Grandy ( 1973), 'Reference, Meaning and Belief, Journal of Philosophy, 70, pp. 
439-452. 
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Eustacia and are led to believe that she is millionairess Eustacia. A neighbour 
promises his friend that he will take him to meet Eustacia Evergreen; but in so 
doing, is the neighbour referring to the impostor or the millionairess? For he intends 
to introduce his friend to a millionairess and yet the person he intends to introduce 
his friend to is not a millionairess. Kitcher's approach to this problem is to 
specify a set of entities (the pair set of the milionairess and the impostor) such 
that each token of 'Eustacia Evergreen' refers to one member of the set, even if, 
in the case of some referents, we are unable to decide which member is the 
referent.J4B 
Kitcher concludes that the neighbour's dominant intention is to introduce his friend 
to a particular celebrity millionairess, not to an employee of that millionairess; so 
the neighbour was referring to the millionairess in the above use of the token149• 
However, the neighbour may use other tokens of 'Eustacia Evergreen' which refer 
instead to the impostor. So a neighbour might say, 'Yesterday, our rich and famous 
neighbour, Eustacia Evergreen, invited us to her next cocktail party.' Here, the 
neighbour's dominant intention is to refer to the woman who is actually the 
impostor. In each case, Kitcher advises me to use the principle of humanity to 
determine who I would have referred to were I the neighbour of Eustacia 
Evergreen's impostor. 
In the Eustacia Evergreen story, there were two referents of 'Eustacia Evergreen' 
which actually existed, namely the millionairess and the impostor. The case of 
phlogiston theory differs from the previous example because there are not, in fact, 
two NKs of 'dephlogisticated air': at most there is only one,15° and some tokens of 
'dephlogisticated air' may lack a referent altogether. Kitcher therefore remarks that 
'dephlogisticated air' cannot always be translated as 'oxygen' "because of a false 
presupposition, the idea that something is emitted in combustion, infects most of 
the terminology."151 Since we cannot translate 'dephlogisticated air', Kitcher suggests 
that we instead 'disentangle' it. By this he means simply that we should sometimes 
translate 'dephlogisticated air' as 'oxygen', and sometimes not, depending on 
context. 
148 Kitcher ( 1978), p. 527. In spite of this passing allusion to partial reference, none of Kitcher's examples is said to 
demonstrate limited referential indeterminacy. He writes: "I have been unable to find a convincing example from the history of 
science which would demand the use of Field's apparatus of partial reference." Kitcher (1978), p. 546, n. 33. However Stanford 
and Kitcher (2000), p. 119, do come up with just such an example. 
149 Kitcher (1978), p. 527-8. 
150 In fuct, 'dephlogisticated air' may on occasions have had referred to NKs other than oxygen; but my point is that, in 
Kitcher's view, at least one ofthe tokens of'dephlogisticated air' fuils to refer, and in this respect the example of 
'dephlogisticated air' differs from the Eustacia Evergreen example. 
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Georg Stahl had first named as 'phlogiston' the substance which is given off into the 
air during combustion. For example, when wood burns in a sealed container, the 
common air in the container becomes 'phlogisticated air'. Common air therefore has 
the capacity to take up or absorb a certain amount of phlogiston during the process 
of combustion. The process of smelting, turning some metal oxides to metals by 
heating them, was explained by Stahl as the emission of phlogiston from the 
charcoal to the ore. Ore was said to lack phlogiston, and when the ore's dearth of 
phlogiston is remedied by the hot charcoal, the ore becomes a metal. When Joseph 
Priestly, mirroring the smelting process, heated mercuric oxide with a lens, he 
obtained a pure metal, mercury, and a different gas (or 'air'). Priestly concluded that, 
in its conversion to mercury, the warmed mercury calx, being phlogistonless, had 
absorbed phlogiston from the air, leaving the air dephlogisticated. Priestly found 
confirmation that such air was dephlogisticated because objects burned more 
fiercely (more readily discharged phlogiston) when placed in it. The air (or gas) 
obtained in Priestley's experiment, the air described as 'dephlogisticated', was in fact 
oxygen. This ability to use 'dephlogisticated air' to refer to the gas obtained by 
heating the red calx of mercury was passed on throughout the community of 
phlogistonists and beyond. But tokens of 'dephlogisticated air' do not always refer to 
oxygen, Kitcher asserts, because: 
His [i.e. Priestley's] later utterances could be initiated either by the event in 
which Stahl fixed the referent of 'phlogiston' or by events of quite a different 
sort, to wit, encounters with oxygen.152 
So the reference potential of the term type 'dephlogisticated air' consisted of a set of 
at least two ordered pairs: the Stahlian { dephlogisticated air1, the air which has 
phlogiston removed from it}, and Priestley's introduction {dephlogisticated air2, the 
air obtained.by heating mercuric oxide}. To determine the reference of any given 
token of'dephlogisticated air', Kitcher recommends the employment of the principle 
of humanity. 
For Kitcher, the principle of humanity is an essential presupposition underlying 
successful attempts at cross-theory communication. When a term type is common to 
two different theories, there will likely be a difference between the respective 
reference potentials. In the effort to understand each other, persons from each 
theoretical viewpoint "will endeavor to formulate hypotheses about the referents of 
151 Kitcher ( 1978), p. 531. 
152 Kitcher (1978), p. 537. 
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their rivals' tokens which will explain their rivals' linguistic behavior."153 Doing this, 
claims Kitcher, it becomes quite clear when Priestley is referring to oxygen, and 
when 'dephlogisticated air' fails to refer at all. 
Stathis Psillos objects to Kitcher's use of the principle of humanity because it splits 
Priestley's intentions from his beliefs. Priestley believed that dephlogisticated air1 = 
dephlogisticated air2 and his intention was to refer to the object which satisfied this 
identity. The principle of humanity distorts Priestley's situation: 
The principle of humanity establishes an incoherence between the subject's 
beliefs and intentions (that is, an incoherence in the subject's own perception of 
the situation he was in) in order to maximise coherence in our judgements of 
what our subject was doing in light of our knowledge of the situation he was 
in.J54 
The principle of humanity wants to make Priestley's beliefs and assertions as like a 
modern chemist's as possible. For the modern chemist employing Kitcher's theory of 
reference, 'dephlogisticated air' is an ambiguous expression type referring either to 
oxygen or the empty set. But as far as Priestley was concerned, 'dephlogisticated air' 
was not an ambiguous term! Priestley would have been happy to assert: 
(].5) 'Dephlogisticated air exists and oxygen does not'. 
But under some token interpretations, the Kitcherian modern chemist will take a 
token of 'dephlogisticated air' to mean oxygen, and this would be to interpret 
Priestley's happy assertion (15) as inconsistent. The problem, then, is that under 
Priestley's interpretation, (15) is not inconsistent. Inconsistency is not one of the 
major flaws of phlogiston theory; so to say that Priestley's phlogiston theory implies 
inconsistent statements such as (15) is to misrepresent Priestley's phlogiston theory. 
An undesirable general consequence of Kitcher's combining the principle of 
humanity with that of reference potential is that, according to Psillos: 
the principle of humanity makes referential continuity too easily available: 
arguably all past abandoned expression-types end up having referential tokens 
[ ... so that] no abandoned concept has failed to characterise some natural kind 
we now posit.I55 
However, it seems to me that the problem here is not the principle of humanity but 
the problem common to so many CTRs, namely, that reference comes cheap when it 
comes causally. What the principle of humanity provides is content, but it is the 
153 ibid., p. 541. 
154 Psillos (1997), p. 265. 
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causal nature of Kitcher's CTR which will allow the reference a NK term token to be 
traced back to some causal agent; the principle of humanity, on the other hand, will 
provide the current view about what that causal agent could reasonably be described 
as being. Applying Kitcher's theory of reference to Stahl's phlogiston theory, we 
might say that Stahl was one of the first to describe systematically the reversible 
relationship between some metals and their calces (or oxides). The principle of 
humanity, combined with a CTR, warrants the inference that whatever would cause 
Stahl to say, 'Heat mercury in air and it gives off phlogiston, thereby becoming a 
calx' is what would cause a modern chemist to say, 'Heat mercury in air and the 
mercury oxidises'. Ergo, for certain metals 'to give off phlogiston' means (or entails) 
that they will absorb oxygen. What must be removed from iron to obtain iron oxide? 
Stahl's answer: phlogiston; but the Modern chemist's answer: nothing. As far as I 
can see, then, Kitcher's use of the principle of humanity is a narrower constraint 
than the purely causal one, and leads to the conclusion that some, if not many, of 
Stahl's (and, for that matter, Priestley's) tokens of 'phlogiston' failed to refer.156 So I 
do not think that this particular criticism which Psillos levels at Kitcher's theory is 
convincing. 
Stathis Psillos is prepared to accept that the expression type 'dephlogisticated air' 
can refer to oxygen, yet he maintains that virtually none of Priestley's tokens of 
'dephlogisticated air' did so. Priestley did refer to oxygen, maintains Psillos, but only 
by using demonstrative pronouns and deictics, "saying the likes of 'This air (or this 
stuff) makes me feel so light."'157 For Psillos, "[t]he shift from 'this air' or 'this stuff 
to 'dephlogisticated air' is crucial. The fact that the former may refer does not entail 
that the latter refers too. "158 Here, Psillos is placing restrictions on multiple or false 
groundings which are even narrower than Michael Devitt's. When Priestley made 
utterances like: 
(16) I call the stuff which makes me feel so light 'dephlogisticated air' 
(17) I call the stuff which makes me feel so light 'air with phlogiston removed' 
Devitt would probably159 say that in utterances like (16) and (17), Priestley, having 
already grounded in the air obtained by heating mercury oxide the expressions 
'dephlogisticated air' and 'air with phlogiston removed', may use those expressions 
155 Psillos (1997), p. 269. 
156 Matters are different for tokens of'dephlogisticated air' because of the diffurent reference potentials. 
157 Psillos (1997), p. 268. 
158 Psillos (1997), p. 268. 
159 Priestly does seem to have met the three conditions which Devitt lays down for a grounding to occur (see Part 5). 
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in sentences such as (16) and (17) to refer to oxygen. Devitt would also hold that the 
referential ability first made in the grounding of the expression 'dephlogisticated air' 
in oxygen can be passed on, but that it can only passed on to those who would not 
assent to (17) at the same time as (16). (Since Priestley himself would have assented 
to (16) and (17), Devitt would describe Priestley's grounding of 'dephlogisticated air' 
in oxygen as a false grounding.) Psillos maintains that Priestley probably never 
grounds 'dephlogisticated air' in oxygen (and so never passed on the reference 
ability). So Psillos is stricter than Devitt when it comes to giving adequacy conditions 
for a grounding to take place, though Psillos and Devitt have similar views about the 
passing on of the benefits of such a grounding. Kitcher is the least strict of the three, 
concerning groundings and the passing-on of abilities to designate. The positions of 
Psillos, Devitt and Kitcher concerning Priestley's utterance tokens containing 
'dephlogisticated air' are: 
(f) None of Priestley's tokens of 'dephlogisticated air' referred to oxygen. (Psillos) 
(g) Some of Priestley's tokens of 'dephlogisticated air' referred to oxygen, but 
Priestley's occasional ability to refer to oxygen using tokens of 'dephlogisticated air' 
could not be passed on to other phlogistonists in d-chains. (Devitt) 
(h) Some of Priestley's tokens of 'dephlogisticated air' referred to oxygen, and 
Priestley's grounding of 'dephlogisticated air' in oxygen was the grounding back to 
which can be traced some other phlogistonists' ability to refer to the air obtained by 
heating mercury oxide (oxygen) using tokens of'dephlogisticated air'. (Kitcher) 
What motivates Stathis Psillos' position (f) is the view that merely being in causal 
contact with a member of a NK is not sufficient to be able to refer to it (other than 
deictically); one must also, as an effect of such causal contact, be able to give a core 
causal description of the (putative) entity referred to (or be causally-historically 
related to one who can). The core causal description associated with NK term will 
include a description of the NK's kind-constitutive properties and a description of 
the causal roles of the kind-constitutive properties. If the core causal description is 
false (if there is nothing which satisfies it) then its associated term fails to refer. So 
Psillos' causal-descriptivist view of the term 'phlogiston' used by phlogistonists is 
that: 
[N]one of the properties of oxygen were the causal origin of the information 
they [the phlogistonists] had associated with phlogiston. And nothing in nature 
could possibly be the causal origin of such information. What it is correct to say 
is that 'phlogiston' refers to nothing.l6o 
160 Psillos(l999), p. 291. 
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And Psillos concludes that since 'phlogiston' refers to nothing, then 'dephlogisticated 
air', inasmuch as it refers to common air with phlogiston removed, also refers to 
nothing. I will next offer three criticisms of these views. 
The first is that Psillos' view is surely too strict and entails a counter-intuitive view of 
the relation between the statements of phlogiston and oxygen theories. Psillos 
maintains: 
We can still understand and explain Priestley's assertions that dephlogisticated 
air supports combustion better than ordinary air and that dephlogisticated air is 
phlogiston-free, even if we admit that both of them are false (as I think we 
should).t6t 
However, it seems remarkable to me that all Priestley's statements containing 
'dephlogisticated air' were false. If the expression type 'dephlogisticated air' includes 
oxygen in its reference potential, as Psillos maintains, then it must have been 
grounded in oxygen at some stage - a fact also acknowledged by Psillos. If we go 
along with Stathis Psillos' general argument, then we will conclude that the person 
who first had the ability to refer to oxygen using the term token 'dephlogisticated air' 
could not have been a phlogistonist; for only such a person has the possibility of 
being free of the erroneous identity belief that dephlogisticated air1 = 
dephlogisticated air2 (or of holding (16) and (17)). Psillos' position seems to be that 
oxygenists can refer to oxygen using 'dephlogisticated air' as much as they like: 
phlogistonists can't at all. 162 But does it not seem odd - and counter to our intuitions 
about the relation between the languages of scientific theories - that a phlogistonist 
can give what is, to a modern chemist, a recognisable (and systematic though, 
admittedly, false) account of the relation between a metal and its oxide without ever 
referring to oxygen? 
A second criticism concerns the appeal to kind-constitutive properties in the core 
causal description. "The appeal to kind-constitutive properties is essential" Psillos 
tells us, ''because it is these properties which, ultimately, fix the reference of the 
term."163 These properties pertain to the 'internal structure' of members of the NK: 
[P]ositing a natural kind with a certain internal structure should be tied to a 
description of its properties - a description, that is, of what this internal 
161 Psillos (1997), p. 267. 
162 Psillos concedes that phlogistonists may on occasions have referred to oxygen using tokens of'dephlogisticated air', but 
that they would have done so "only accidentally" (Psillos ( 1997), p. 268). 
163 Psillos ( 1999), p. 295. 
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structure is - in such a way that if there is no kind which has these properties, 
then we may have to just admit that a word which was taken to refer to this kind 
does not, after all, refer.I64 
In Part 4, criticism was made of the microstructural criterion of substance identity, 
and it seems to me that Psillos' view of NKs, and of the eo-reference of NK terms, is 
open to the same criticism.16S 
Finally, the third criticism- or set of criticisms- is directed at the claim that the core 
causal description determines the reference of NK terms. Advocates of the CDTR 
have replies to these criticisms, but I go on to say why I do not find the replies 
completely convincing. 
At first glance, it may seem that the CDTR may be criticised on the same grounds as 
the Description Theory of reference, i.e. that one cannot give a description of 
properties which are necessary and sufficient for an entity to be member of NK, and 
that without such a core causal description, the reference of the associated term 
cannot be determined. The CDTR side-steps this criticism by denying that the core 
causal description is or need be a description of the properties necessary and 
sufficient to be a member of a NK. The details are as follows. In the early stages of 
scientific enquiry, a detailed description of a postulated entity's constituents and 
causal role is neither available nor necessary for the enquiry to proceed. In due 
course, descriptions may be added to the core causal description, but if the core 
causal description is falsified, then the associated term will fail to refer. (Some parts 
of the general (theoretical) description associated with a term may be dropped 
altogether without change of reference, but the core causal description can only be 
added to.) The scientific enquiry is committed to holding the core causal description 
as true for as long as it is found to be so; so the term associated with the core causal 
description is held to refer for as long as the line of enquiry continues. The longer the 
enquiry, the more evidence there is that the term associated with the core causal 
description does in fact refer. If or when a description of the properties necessary 
and sufficient to be a member of a NK does become available, it will have been found 
164 Psillos (1999), p. 287. 
165 Psillos believes that such criticism can be satisfactorily dealt with (as Psillos (1999), p. 313, n. 4 makes plain), but he 
doesn't have sufficient space for the details. 
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that the core causal description was satisfied by the referent, and was about the 
referent, all along. I66 
To the objection that, particularly in the early stages of enquiry, the core causal 
description may be satisfied by a number of different entities not all of which are 
directly relevant to the enquiry, it can be replied that only the entity or entities which 
are the causal source of the core causal description and which satisfy it are referred 
to. Further investigation will refine the core causal description by adding quantifiers 
so that eventually the core causal description will refer to only one entity.167 
It is certainly possible to criticise the CDTR's above responses. For example, no clear 
criteria are given for distinguishing what would be part of the core causal description 
and what would be part of the full theoretical description. This means that if part of 
what was thought to be the core causal description were falsified, the falsified part 
could be relegated to the full description and the rest of the core causal description 
could be retained. It would then be very unclear when to regard a theoretical term as 
having a referent. 
Furthermore, there is a problem with Psillos' claims about reference when he says 
that, in the process of enquiry, scientists "do refer to the (putative) entity which 
satisfies the core causal description."168 The problem is that one can only refer to 
putative entities which actually do exist; that a putative entity satisfies a given 
description is not sufficient for it to exist (unicorns being a case in point). So I think 
that Psillos would be better to say that, in the process of enquiry, scientists 'talk 
about'169 the putative entity which satisfies the core causal description. But then he 
will not have a theory of reference, only a theory of 'talking about' things. In Part 8, 
this kind of criticism is enlarged and applied to all the CTRs and CDTRs considered 
in this chapter. 
166 Psillos admits that "the whole idea of the specification of a core description involves an element of rational reconstruction 
of the actual problem situation in which an entity was originally posited." (Psillos ( 1999), p. 297.) 
167 
"[l]t is perfectly possible that a theoretical term begins its life as part of some abstract speculations about the causes of a set 
of phenomena, and subsequently becomes part of a rather firm theory which associates with it a core causal description." 
(Psillos (1999), p. 299. 
168 Psillos (1999), p. 295. 
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The conclusion of Part 7, indeed of Parts 1 to 7, is that the various causal theories of 
reference here considered do not satisfactorily account for the reference of NK and 
physical magnitude terms. Since none of the causal or causal-descriptive theories of 
reference here is judged sufficient to sustain externalist semantic claims, 
Feyerabend's thesis I, stated as: 
(a) thesis I: "the interpretation of an observation language is determined by the 
theories which we use to explain what we observe, and it changes as soon as the 
theories change." 17o 
has little to fear from those quarters. (In fact, the causal-descriptivist trend, with its 
talk of 'reference-determining core causal descriptions' and "overdetermination of 
reference by theory"171 might be construed as something of a move in Feyerabend's 
direction). And since thesis I is what motivates the claim that when theory changes, 
the references of terms may change, the meaning variance thesis is not convincingly 
challenged by these causal t}leories of reference; in particular, the claim: 
(b) statements ofT1 and T2 may be logically independent in the common domain 
is not refuted by these causal theories of reference because they are not adequate 
theories of reference. 
Should the conclusion - that the CTRs (including CDTRs) in this chapter are 
inadequate - be regarded as insufficiently supported (particularly by the criticism 
directed at Kitcher and Psillos here in Part 7), all is not lost. In Part 8 I present an 
argument for why substantive accounts of reference, such as all those considered 
here in Chapter 3, constitute an unacceptable argument against claim (b). Part 8 will 
also discuss briefly what relevance the rejection of substantive theories of reference 
has to the IT. 
Part 8: The Flight To Reference and the IT 
Here I present Michael Bishop's and Stephen Stich's argument against the strategy 
of using substantive theories of reference for resolving philosophical issues which 
are not merely about reference. Bishop and Stich label this strategy 'the flight to 
reference'. A substantive theory of reference is one "that takes reference to be some 
sort of complex relationship between referring terms and entities or classes of 
169 The distinction between 'referring to' something and 'talking about' something is discussed by Rorty ( 1980), pp. 289-91. 
17
° Feyerabend (1958), in PP I, p. 31.1talics removed. 
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entities in the world."172 So Bishop and Stich have in their sights all the CTRs and 
CDTRs considered in this chapter, as well as many description theories of reference. 
The flight to reference is used by Putnamm, Devitt,174 Kitcher17s and Psillos176 to 
argue that the logical independence claim of the meaning variance thesis, claim (b), 
is false. Their argument assumes something like the following form. First, they use a 
general account of reference to determine whether or not a scientific term refers, 
and if so, to what. In the latter case, continuity of reference between the terms of 
successive theories (in their common domain) wiU be asserted; in the former case 
there will be discontinuity of reference. Any past scientific statement is false which 
predicates a term which has been deemed refert;ntially discontinuous with the terms 
of our current theory in the appropriate domain; and all the other past scientific 
statements (i.e. those whose terms do refer) will be either (approximately) true or 
else false. With the truth values of the statements of all scientific theories thus 
determined (under the interpretation of our current scientific theories) none of the 
statements of successive scientific theories is logically (or semantically) independent 
in the common domain: claim (b) is then false. 
What is wrong with the flight to referen~e is that it begins by proposing a theory of 
reference specifying "an empirical relation [or relations] that must obtain for terms 
of a certain kind to refer to things in the 'fOrld"177; then it applies this theory to some 
NK or physical magnitude or theoretical term; but its conclusion "is explicitly about 
truth or ontology or some matter."178 In this kind of argument there is a "fatal gap"179 
between premises (about reference) and conclusion (about other things). 
The case of 'phlogiston' provides an illustration. Let us say that on a particular 
occasion, 'o', Priestley uses the term token 'dephlogisticated air' with the intention of 
171 Kroon(l985),p. 148. 
172 Bishop, Michael A. & Stich, Stephen P. (1998), p. 34. Deflationary accounts of reference arc therefore not targeted. 
173 See Putnam (1975). 'How not to talk about meaning' & 'Explanation and Reference'. 
174 See Devitt ( 1979). 
175 See Kitcher ( 1982 ). 
176 See Psillos ( 1999), pp. 280-1. 
177 Bishop & Stich (1998), p. 38. 
178 Bishop & Stich (1998), pp. 34-5. 
179 Bishop & Stich (1998), p. 35. 
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referring to a substance he has produced in a certain experiment. Kitcher's argument 
begins with the following premises: Iso 
(18) On occasion o, Priestly uttered, "Dephlogisticated air supports combustion 
better than ordinary air." 
(19) On occasion o, 'dephlogisticated air' refers to oxygen. 
(20) Oxygen supports combustion better than ordinary air. 
And ends with the conclusion: 
(21) On occasion o, Priestley's utterance, 'Dephlogisticated air supports combustion 
better than ordinary air' is true. 
For (21) to follow from the above premiSes, a further premiSe connecting the 
reference and truth of utterances is required, such as: 
(22) An utterance of the form 'Fa' is true iff (Ex) (this token of 'a' refers to x and x 
satisfies this token of 'F _'). 
There is historical support for (18), current chemistry supports (20), and Kitcher's 
theory of reference supports (19). But what support does Kitcher offer (22)? The 
common response would be to say that (22) must be true, for "No account of the 
reference relation that failed to make [22] true could possibly be correct."181 And 
Bishop and Stich would agree. So the assumption is that Kitcher's account of the 
reference relation makes (22) come out true. 
But this assumption is problematic because other accounts of reference which are 
inconsistent with Kitcher's, also want to assume that the reference relations they 
specifY make (22) come out true. Psillos, for example, makes the supported claims: 
(23) On occasion o, Priestly uttered, "Dephlogisticated air supports combustion 
better than ordinary air." 
(24) On occasion o, 'dephlogisticated air' fails to refer. 
And concludes: 
(25) On occasion o, Priestley's utterance, 'Dephlogisticated air supports combustion 
better than ordinary air' is false. 
So Psillos also must assume (22) and that his theory of reference makes (22) come 
out true. But Kitcher and Psillos can't both be right182! Unless one of them 
demonstrates that his own account of reference supports the truth of (22), neither 
180 Statements ( 17), ( 18), ( 19), (20) and (21) are quoted from the example in Bishop and Stich ( 1998), p. 44. 
181 Bishop & Stich (1998), p. 45. 
182 And, of course, this does not show that both Kitcher and Psillos are v.Tong. The (alleged) problem common to both is stated 
at the end of this paragraph. 
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Psillos nor Kitcher has "grounds for claiming that the complex substantive relation 
he describes really is reference."183 Each of them gives a theory describing the 
relation between tokens of 'dephlogisticated air' and oxygen; but neither is entitled 
to claim that the relation described is reference, where (22) is constitutive of 
reference, unless it is shown that the theory describing the relation makes (22) come 
out true. 
None of those who attempt the flight to reference as a line of attack against MVT 
claim (b)- neither Putnam, Devitt, Kitcher, nor ,Psillos- shows that the relation he 
describes in his 'theory of reference' is constituted by (22). Since each fails in this 
way to demonstrate that he is presenting a theory of reference, each fails to offer 
arguments against meaning variance claim (b). 
At the end of the day, the theories of reference considered in this chapter seem to me 
to be inappropriate to the problems posed by Feyerabend's semantic IT. The 
externalism of these CTRs brooks little understanding of the internalist strain in the 
IT. As John Preston puts it: 
Attempts to compare incommensurable theories on the basis of the concept of 
reference ... ignore the fact that reliance on conceptually unmediated 
word/world relations (such as reference) is not in keeping with Feyerabend's 
philosophy .184 
The second problem with these CTRs (in the context of the IT) is that they 
presuppose a strict realism, whereas what the semantic IT seems to imply is a less 
strict - or what John Dupre calls 'promiscuous' - realism: "the claim that there are 
many equally legitimate ways of dividing the world into kinds"18s. Feyerabend, in his 
later writings, articulates this position- which he calls 'cosmological' or 'ontological 
relativism' as follows: 
Scientists [ ... ] are sculptors of reality. That sounds like the strong programme of 
the sociology of science except that sculptors are restricted by the properties of 
the material they use [ ... ] What we find when living, experimenting doing 
research is therefore not a single scenario called 'the world' or 'being' or 'reality' 
but a variety of responses, each of them constitutil}g a special (and not always 
well-defined) reality for those who have called it forth. This is relativism because 
the type of reality encountered depends on the approach taken. However, it 
differs from the philosophical doctrine by admitting failure.t86 
183 Bishop & Stich (1998), p. 46, n. 8. 
184 Preston ( 1997), p. 217 n. 14. Oberheim & Hoynengen-Huene ( 1997) make even stronger remarks to this effect. 
185 Dupre ( 1993), p. 6. 
186 Feyerabend (1993), pp. 269-70. 
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So it seems to me that two kinds of semantic theory would offer better analyses or 
criticism of the semantic IT. The first kind would be one that does not build upon an 
externalist view of reference. This approach is taken by Donald Davidson, whose 
views will be considered in the next chapter. The other kind of semantic theory 
would be one which offers a plausible explication of the notions of 'truth' and 
'reference' consistent with the ontological pluralism which lies behind the IT. 
Part 9: A Knn.dl off IIDlcommennsuurabilnty 
As Martin Carrier observes, "it is the incompatibility of theoretical premises that 
generates incommensurability in the first place"187• Theoretical premises motivate 
the classifying of entities into natural kinds by being part of theories which help us 
explain the observed common properties and dispositions of entities. A realist view 
is that, for the classification to be true, the classification sorts the kinds by their 
essences. Taxonomic realism is the claim: 
there is one unambiguously correct taxonomic theory. At each taxonomic level 
there will be clear-cut and universally applicable criteria - essential properties, 
let us say - that generate an exhaustive partition of individuals into taxa.JBB 
Given the difficulties which such a view engenders (earlier parts of this chapter have 
shown some of the difficulties taxonomic realism created for the CTR) one begins to 
wonder if natural kinds have such essential properties. The meanings of NK terms 
may not then be constrained by completely nonepistemic essences. However, it will 
not be my goal in this brief Part 9 to develop or argue for this proposal. Instead, I 
will limit discussion to incommensurability as a phenomenon which may arise when 
different theories classify NKs differently. Such a situation describes epistemic 
rather than semantic incommensurability, but I think that the epistemic model 
points out the direction for those more brave and more able. 
Taxonomic incommensurability is a notion associated with the writings of Thomas 
Kuhn, but some of Feyerabend's comments from the mid 'sixties make strikingly 
similar proposals. Feyerabend tells us that incommensurability occurs when "rules 
according to which objects or events are collected into classes"189 undergo changes 
187 Carrier, in Hoyningen-Huene & Sankey ( eds.) (200 I), pp. 78-9. Carrier's view here is in line with my exposition of the IT 
in Chapter 1. 
188 Dupre (1993 ), p. 27. 
189 Feyerabend (1965b), p. 268. 
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such that "a new theory entails that all the concepts of the preceding theory have 
extension zero"19°, or that the new theory: 
introduces rules which cannot be interpreted as attributing specific properties 
to objects within already existing classes, but which change the system of classes 
itself.I91 
By way of comparison with Feyerabend, Thomas Kuhn describes what he calls 'the 
principle of no overlap' as the condition that, in the transition from T1 and T2 "no 
two kind-terms [ ... ]may overlap in their referents unless they are related as species 
to genus."192 When the principle of no overlap is not adhered to, when "the kind in 
the old science cannot be a kind in the new science"t93, then T1 and T2 are 
incommensurable theories. 
Taxonomic incommensurability comes close to meeting the four main elements of 
the MVT. First, thesis I: taxonomic incommensurability considers classification not 
reference, and this gives taxonomic incommensurability a semantic internalist 
flavour. Second, inconsistency: one theory's system of classification precludes the 
other's. Thirdly, meaning variance: the intension, and possibly extension, of one or 
more NK terms will have changed. 
The fourth element of the MVT is the logical independence claim. Clearly if T2's 
taxonomy is inconsistent with Tt's, the truth of Tt is not independent of that of T2. 
One way round this is to drop the inconsistency claim and therefore the case that the 
theories are competitors. This is what John Dupre seems to do when he remarks: 
one reason that scientific narratives constructed for different purposes will be 
incommensurable is that they need to be told in terms of noncoincident kinds.I94 
The incommensurability which Dupre describes is something like the taxonomic 
incommensurability described above. What gives rise to such different, indeed 
incommensurable (though not inconsistent and not competing), systems of 
classification, suggests Dupre, is the science which forms and uses the theory, for "a 
system of classification is typically an inextricable part of the science to which it 
19
° Feyerabend (1965b), p. 268. 
191 Feyerabend (1965b), p. 268. 
192 Kuhn, quoted by Carrier in Hoyningen-Huene & Sankey (eds.) (2001), p. 70. 
193 Hacking(l993),p.295. 
194 Dupre (1993), p. 112. 
133 
applies."19s However, Dupre's view does not fit our paradigm case of 
incommensurable theories one of which succeeds the other. 
To retain the inconsistency element of the MVT, an alternative to logical 
independence will need to be found. Ian Hacking suggests a kind of pragmatic 
independence. In this case, one who holds T2 will "no longer speculate, conjecture, 
predict, explain, and most importantly, work on the world using the old 
classifications."196 The classification of the prede,::essor theory T1 can be understood, 
but it no longer suits the purposes of, or makes connexions considered pertinent to, 
those who have accepted and use the successor. Hacking gives the example of 
reading a text by Paracelsus. Those competent in Latin or four-hundred-year-old 
German will be able to translate Paracelsus' words, but his whole style of reasoning 
and the connexions he makes, are alien to the modern reader; even a Paracelsus 
expert. 
The ideas presented here in Part 9 are tentative and do not even constitute a 
semantic construal of the IT. The aim has been to sketch a direction to go in to arrive 
at a satisfactory understanding of the semantic incommensurability. 
195 Dupre(l993), p. 103. 
196 Hacking (1993), p. 295. 
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Chapter 4 
Conceptual Schemes, 
Translation, and The 
Meaning Variance Thesis 
The world, our world, is depleted, impoverished enough. Away with all duplicates of it, until 
we again experience more immediately what we have. 
Susan Sontag, 'Against Interpretation', p. 6. 
To see language in the same way as we see beliefs - not as a 'conceptual framework' but as 
the causal interaction with the environment described by the field linguist, makes it 
impossible to think of language as something which may or may not (how could we ever 
tell?) 'fit the world'. So once we give up tertia, we give up (or trivialize) the notions of 
representation and correspondence, and thereby give up the possibility of formulating 
epistemological skepticism. 
Richard Rorty, 'Pragmatism, Davidson and Truth', in Lepore (ed.) (1986), p. 345. 
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I begin with an overview of Donald Davidson's 'On the Very Idea of a Conceptual 
Scheme', where he offers arguments against conceptual schemes, arguments which 
he regards as refuting the IT. In Part 2, I look in more detail at Davidson's views on 
truth and interpretation which inform the arguments in Part 1. In Parts 3 to 7, I 
consider objections to Davidson's arguments, but conclude that none of those 
presented convincingly tackles head on what Davidson proposes. In Part 8, I 
conclude that Davidson's argument against untranslatability is successful, and that 
the principle of charity (POC) convincingly opposes and undermines the logical 
independence claim of the MVf. I also conclude, however, that while Davidson's 
argument against the possibility that there are untranslatable natural languages 
holds, his claim to have shown that the very idea of a conceptual scheme is 
problematic does not succeed. I conclude the chapter with a Davidsonian account of 
something like semantic incommensurability drawn from Bj0rn T. Ramberg. 
Part 1 ~ Overview 
Donald Davidson has nothing against groups of propositional attitudes, such as 
beliefs. Nor would he object to the claim that a sentence can describe a state of 
affairs. What Davidson does not like about conceptual schemes is that they adopt a 
staging role: they present states of affairs in a certain light, from one angle or 
another; and they take what we are presented with - the world - and re-present it. 
Davidson's trivial point is that a true sentence describes a state of affairs and a false 
one does not. There is no need to dramatise a state of affairs as something other 
than what it is. Instead, Davidson recommends that we "re-establish unmediated 
touch with[ ... ] familiar objects"1• Davidson makes clear what he is attacking in his 
essay 'On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme': 
My target was the idea that on the one hand we have our world picture, 
consisting of the totality of our beliefs, and on the other hand we have an 
unconceptualized empirical input which provides the evidence for and content 
of our empirical beliefs.2 
Davidson's first step in his attack on the very idea of a conceptual scheme is to lay 
out the common view of conceptual schemes as being the tertium quid of languages. 
If two people speak the same language, then they share the same conceptual scheme. 
1 Davidson (1984 ), p. 198. 
2 Davidson ( 1999), p. I 05. 
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If two people speak different languages then either they share the same conceptual 
scheme or not. Their sharing the same conceptual scheme entails that they 'divide 
up' or 'organise' the world and its contents the same; their having different 
conceptual schemes entails that one of them does these things differently to the 
other. Davidson's second step is to argue that these common views about dividing up 
or organising the world are spurious. So he concludes that the idea of conceptual 
scheme is a bogus one; and this leaves us with language and the world. Giving the 
details of these three steps takes up practically all of this chapter. 
Davidson further maps out the purported relations between conceptual schemes and 
languages, claiming that, when two different language speakers share the same 
conceptual scheme, translation between the two languages is possible; when they 
share different conceptual schemes, it is not. It is the case of untranslatability which 
Davidson is most interested in: 
(1) "two people have different conceptual schemes if they speak languages that fail 
of intertranslatability". 3 
If Davidson can refute the claim that there are different conceptual schemes then, 
according to his map of the territory, he also refutes mutual untranslatability. And 
mutual untranslatability is equivalent to incommensurability, for, by Davidson's 
reckoning: 
(2) "'Incommensurable' is, of course, Kuhn and Feyerabend's word for 'not 
intertranslatable'."4 
However, Davidson's argument against mutual untranslatability (and 
incommensurability) is not quite the modus tollens form given above. Statement (1) 
claims that two different conceptual schemes are necessary for the mutual 
untranslatability of two languages. Yet Davidson also holds the converse true: 
(3) "[t]he failure of intertranslatability is a necessary condition for difference of 
conceptual schemes. "s 
It seems fair to adduce that Davidson has in mind an equivalence relation between 
different conceptual schemes and languages which fail of intertranslatability. 
3 Davidson ( 1984 ), p. 185. 
4 Davidson ( 1984 ), p. 190. 
5 Davidson ( 1984 ), p. 190. 
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Davidson then argues that the roles of organising and arranging attributed to two 
different conceptual schemes preclude their mutual untranslatability and support 
their mutual intertranslatability. Additionally, Davidson advances what he regards 
as a refutation of mutually untranslatable natural languages, thereby seeking to 
rubbish the notions of different conceptual schemes and of incommensurable 
languages/ schemes. 
The organising (or classifying) role of a conceptual scheme is embodied in "the 
referential apparatus of language - predicates, quantifiers, variables, and singular 
terms"6. Two different conceptual schemes would classify differently the actual 
objects in the world such that each conceptual scheme language (L1 and L2) would 
have predicates with no common extensions. Davidson finds such a claim 
unconvincing because a "language that organizes such entities must be a language 
very like our own."7 Support for this rebuttal comes in Davidson's use of the 
principle of charity (POC) to be explained later. 
Actually, it is Davidson's comments about thefitting role which support most of his 
argument against total untranslatability. This is because the fitting role of 
conceptual schemes is concerned with sentences, whereas the organising role is 
concerned with sentence parts; and Davidson cautions us 
not to suggest that individual words must have meanings at all, in any sense that 
transcends the fact that they have a systematic effect on the meanings of 
sentences in which they occur.s 
Given Davidson's 'top-down' view of the compositionality of meaning, the argument 
about the referential apparatus of language (and the organising role) defers to that 
of the truth of sentences (and the fitting role). 
When two different conceptual schemes (mostly) fit the facts then (most of) the 
scheme sentences of L1 and L2 are true. Davidson sees no need for the fitting role 
because he sees no need for this view of truth: 
The trouble is that the notion of fitting the totality of experience, like the notion 
of fitting the facts, or of being true to the facts, adds nothing intelligible to the 
simple concept of being true.9 
6 Davidson (1984), p. 193. 
7 Davidson (1984), p. 192. 
8 Davidson ( 1984 ), p. 18. 
9 Davidson ( 1984 ), pp., 193-4. 
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Instead, Davidson proposes: 
( 4) "The sentence 'My skin is warm' is true if and only if my skin is warm. Here 
there is no reference to a fact, a world, an experience, or a piece of evidence."10 
As will become apparent, the establishment and use of this premise (4) will be 
central in Davidson's arguments against conceptual schemes. 
If different schemes (pretty much) fit the world, then (most of) the scheme sentences 
of L1 and Lz are true, in which case "the criterion of a conceptual scheme different 
from our own now becomes: largely true but not translatable."11 The reason why this 
idea of a conceptual scheme is unacceptable is because: 
(5) We do not "understand the notion of truth, as applied to language, independent 
of the notion of translation."12 
As Part 2 will show, Davidson argues that, from the Tarski-style use of the truth 
predicate shown in (4), and additional premises, (5) follows. The gist of the 
argument is that, if you give the necessary and conditions under which a sentence, s, 
of an unknown language is true, then you give p, the meaning of s, in your own 
language. The evidence used in going about such a task would be the utterances of 
an interpretee. If there were complete failure of translation between two languages, 
then such radical interpretation would not be possible at all. Davidson argues that if 
the evidence gathered by his radical interpreter were such that successful 
interpretation could not occur, then the interpretee could not be speaking a natural 
language. To support the claim that "no significant range of sentences could be 
translated into the other"13, it would need to be shown that Davidsonian radical 
interpretation would not work under conditions where an interpretee is speaking a 
natural language. Showing this, and thereby vindicating the total untranslatability 
claim, has in my opinion proved unsuccessful, as later parts will try to show. 
If partial translation failure were possible, then at least one of the interpretee's 
beliefs would not be expressible in the language of the interpreter. But Davidson 
maintains that, from his views of the methodology of interpretation, it is not at all 
clear how there could be such an outcome: 
10 Davidson (1984 ), p. 194. 
11 Davidson (1984), P- 194. 
12 Davidson ( 1984), p. 194. 
13 Davidson (1984), p. 185. 
139 
( 6) "Given the underlying methodology of interpretation, we could not be in a 
position to judge that others had concepts or beliefs radically different [i.e. 
'incommensurable' in the Davidsonian sense] from our own."14 
In the case of radical interpretation, what we have is: 
(a) The meaning of s 
(b) What the alien believes 
From the alien's utterance of s, or assent to s, the radical interpreter knows: 
(c) The alien holds that s is true 
As Davidson puts it, (c) is "the vector of two forces"15, (a) and (b): "A speaker holds a 
sentence to be true because of what the sentence (in his language) means and 
because of what he believes."16 The prima facie problem is that the radical 
interpreter knows neither (a) nor (b), but Davidson maintains that the interpreter 
has in principle full access to (a) and (b) in the way described in the next paragraph. 
Since the interpretee speaks a natural language, he has intentional states, such that 
"causal links [ ... ] run between states of the environing world and intentional states of 
the [interpretee]."17 If the radical interpreter can determine those causal links, he 
will have epistemic access to the physical conditions under which the alien holds s 
true. As Davidson puts it: 
I ask myself what sentence of mine I am stimulated to assent to whenever you 
assent to a particular sentence of yours, and I use my sentence to give the truth 
conditions of yours.JB 
The truth conditions are expressed in the form of aT-sentence given in (4), thereby 
matching s with a sentence, p, of the radical interpreter's language. Such truth 
conditions are based on two main premises. First, that from an interpretee's holding 
s to be true under certain conditions, the interpreter is justified in holding p true 
under the same conditions. Second, that the observable features of a particular 
occasion of alien utterance offer evidence that the alien sentence uttered is true.19 
Both of these premises will be returned to, especially the first of which expresses the 
principle of charity (POC). Further constraints of a formal nature relating the 
structure of sentences to their truth conditions and values will be such that T-
14 Davidson (1984), p. 197. 
15 Davidson (1984 ), p. 196. 
16 Davidson (1984), p. 134. 
17 Ramberg ( 1989), p. 69. 
18 Davidson (1993), p. 39. 
19 
"the T -sentence does fix the truth value relative to certain conditions, but it does not say that the object language sentence is 
true because the conditions hold." Davidson ( 1984), p. 138. 
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sentences "giving correct interpretations"20 will result. So Davidson has found a way 
to get at (a) and (b) and that way involves the POC. 
The general argument against partial translation failure proceeds with (6), a 
statement which begins with Davidson's methodology of interpretation and draws a 
conclusion about beliefs. A summary of that methodology is: having only evidence 
for (c), an interpreter must make general assumptions (POC) about (b); applying the 
POC under specific circumstances, the interpreter may look for specific knowledge 
of (b); knowing (c) and (b), the interpreter may adduce (a). In the case of s being 
false, the POC is not applicable, so the interpreter may not combine (c) and (b) to 
get (a). This looks like it may offer the possibility of partial failure of translation. 
Now, the evidence available to the radical interpreter is the circumstances of other 
token utterances of s, and confirmed T -sentences for sentences with structural 
similarities to s. Given evidence particularly of the latter kind (where the POC is 
applied), the radical interpreter could determine (a). Combining (a) and (c), the 
interpreter can adduce (b). 21 
Satisfactorily formulating the POC has been problematic for Davidson. He has tried 
"minimize disagreement" and "maximize agreement", but as he admits, "The aim of 
interpretation is not agreement but understanding."22 He continues: 
My point has always been that understanding can be secured only by 
interpreting in a way that makes for the right sort of agreement. The 'right sort', 
however, is no easier to specify than to say what constitutes a good reason for 
holding a particular belief.23 
I will loosely formulate the POC as: 
(7) What the interpretee holds as true and asserts, the interpreter also holds as true 
and asserts under the same conditions. 
Bj0rn T. Ramberg points out that "It is this very notion of truths-for-languages as 
somehow the same that drives interpretation."24 He explains: 
In a true T-sentence, s and p are appropriate to the occasions of empirical 
observation in exactly the same manner. It is by assuming this sameness of 
truth, which is the intuitive foundation of Davidson's model of interpretation, 
that the interpreter is able to understand [the interpretee).2s 
20 Davidson (1984), p. 152. 
21 So evidence for disagreement over specifics is to be had against a background of common understanding and agreement. 
22 Davidson (1984), p. xvii. 
23 Davidson (1984), p. xvii. 
24 Ramberg ( 1989), p. 76. 
25 Ramberg (1989), p. 76. 
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For Ramberg, this implies that "[t]he concept of truth that underlies a theory of 
interpretation is a concept of absolute truth."26 The POC is the claim that, for each 
"systematic correlation of sentences held true with sentences held true"27, what it is 
fors to be true is the same as what it is for the interpreter's correlated sentence to be 
true. I have characterised the POC in (7) in terms of common assertability or holding 
as true, but (7) is used in conjunction with an adequacy condition for use of the truth 
predicate (4) in order to account for interpretation, as Ramberg's explanation shows. 
This slippage between holding as true, or assertability and being true will be 
addressed in Part 4, and again in Part 5. At this point, though, the aim is to clarify 
that the POC claims that what is true for the alien is true for the interpreter under 
the same conditions; so the POC a statement about beliefs, for it refers to (the 
sentences which an alien would utter to express) the beliefs he would have. In 
particular, the POC (7) is a claim about "general agreement ofbeliefs"28• 
Assumption (7) is not always applicable, nor does Davidson intend it to be. It 
expresses a "general policy, to be modified in a host of obvious ways."29 There may 
be occasions when the alien lies; he and the interpreter may each have defeasible 
beliefs or different beliefs. Despite this, the radical interpreter cannot do without 
presuming the POC (7): it is initially indispensable, yet open to suspension for the 
nonce in the light of evidence. Why this is so is as follows. If the alien utters a false 
sentence, either deliberately or erroneously, then it is of no immediate use to the 
radical interpreter, for "the negative truth-value of a sentence severs the connection 
between sentence and observable circumstance"3°. The alien sentences which the 
interpreter depends upon are the true ones about the observable circumstances of 
utterance. Only after a preponderance of such sentences are recorded in T -sentences 
will the interpreter be able to know sufficiently members of the extension of the 
truth predicate (of his own language) 'true-in-alien-language' to recognise false alien 
sentences as sentences. Ramberg puts this point more clearly: 
The only possible incentive the field linguist could have for attributing error or 
deceit is that a speaker's utterance[ ... ] conflicts with[ ... ] inductively acquired T-
sentences. And these [ ... he] could only have formulated by treating as true the 
native speakers' previous utterances of [ ... s] or other expressions in which 
structural elements of [ ... s] occurred.3I 
26 Ramberg ( 1989), p. 76. 
27 Davidson (1984), p. 197. 
28 Davidson ( 1984 ), p. 196. 
29 Davidson (1984), p. 152. 
30 Ramberg ( 1989), p. 72. 
31 Ramberg(1989), p. 70. 
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It is not that 'exceptions prove the rule of the POC', but rather 'without the POC we 
never get to discover the exceptions to or exemplifications of it'. Without assuming 
the POC, the interpreter would never have evidence that the interpretee is an utterer 
of truth-bearing sentences. 
While the interpretee may have some beliefs which are different to those of the 
radical interpreter (in which cases is false by the interpreter's lights), the "totality of 
possible sensory evidence, past, present and future"32 along with the appropriate 
structural constraints are such that the radical interpreter will be able to interpret 
the sentence expressing that different belief: 
Attributions of belief are publicly verifiable as interpretations, being. based on 
the same evidence: if we can understand what a person says, we can know what 
he believes.33 
Using this approach, Davidson has offered two arguments34 for the 
intertranslatability of natural languages. Since there are no non.,.translatable.natural 
languages, there are no incommensurable natural languages. 35 If there were 
different conceptual schemes, then they would not be translatable36; but Davidson 
has ruled out non-translatability; so there are no different conceptual schemes (nor, 
therefore, are there incommensurable ones). 
Part 2: Meaning: Truth and Interpretation 
An acceptable theory should [ ... ] account for the meanings (or conditions of 
truth) of every sentence by analysing it as composed , in truth-relevant ways, of 
elements drawn from a finite stock.37 
Part 2 begins by presenting Davidson's three adequacy conditions for any theory of 
meaning and then goes on to consider Davidson's own theory of meaning38• Since 
Davidson seeks to extract a theory of meaning from a theory of truth, I spend most 
of this part presenting the Tarski/Davidson "empirical theory of truth"39, showing 
32 Davidson (1984 ), p. 193. 
33 Davidson (1984), p. 153. 
34 One against complete translation fuilure, and one against partial translation fuilure. Each was briefly presented earlier. 
35 In (2) Davidson equates 'not translatable' with 'incommensurable'. 
36 In (I) Davidson equates different conceptual schemes with nonintertranslatahle langtJBges. 
37 Davidson ( 1984 ), p. 56. 
38 
'Theory of meaning' in Davidson's "mildly perverse sense". Davidson (I 984), p. 24. 
39 Davidson ( 1984 ), p. 139. 
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the reasoning behind (4). The POC (7) is warranted by the claim that this theory of 
truth is also a sufficient description of any theory of interpretation. 
Knowledge of any adequate theory of meaning would enable one to understand and 
use (all the sentences of) the language (Davidson has in mind a natural language) 
mentioned by the theory. This is the condition of interpretation. Davidson's first 
condition on a theory of meaning does not require that the theory of meaning be one 
that we actually do use in interpreting others. Rather, the interpretation condition 
directs us towards any theory which would enable us to interpret the words of 
others. Given the first adequacy condition, Davidson's theory of meaning is 
necessarily a theory of interpretation. 
If a theory of meaning for a natural language is to meet the condition of 
interpretation, then it must enable one to understand an infinite number of 
sentences and sentences which have not been previously encountered. Such a theory 
would need to provide a finite number of axioms which can generate an infinite 
number of sentences thereby accounting for the learnability of a natural language. 
This is the second adequacy condition on a theory of meaning: compositionality. 
A theory for meaning for a natural language must sufficiently describe all the 
semantic properties of that language. Although natural languages employ extensions 
and intensions, Davidson requires that a theory of meaning describe the language 
using only extensional resources. The third adequacy condition, then, on any theory 
of meaning is that it be extensional. Davidson claims a practical justification for this 
third condition: 
My objection to meanings in the theory of meaning is not that they are abstract 
or that their identity conditions are obscure, but that they have no 
demonstrated use.40 
If an extensional theory of meaning can sufficiently describe a natural language, 
then it will indeed have shown that intensions have no demonstrated use in that 
theory of meaning. As no such theory has yet been presented here, it may be 
tempting to regard the e:xtensional condition itself as premature and of no yet 
demonstrated use. However, there are other reasons for requiring that a theory of 
meaning be couched extensionally. One of these reasons is that "[t]he extensions of 
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complex expressions are functions of the extensions of their parts"4I, whereas the 
intensions of complex expressions do not display such compositionality. Accepting 
the compositionality condition inclines us towards the extensional condition. 
An illustration of why an adequate (and so compositional) theory of meaning ought 
not to employ intensions :is found in Davidson's criticism of Frege. Consider the 
sentences: 
(A) Galileo said that the earth moves. 
(B) Galileo said that the third planet from the sun moves. 
Frege claimed that in mtensional contexts such as (A), the referent of 'the earth' is 
not the earth but the normal sense of the expression 'the earth'. Since the normal 
sense of 'the earth' is different to that of 'the third planet from the sun', Frege has 
explained why 'the earth' and 'the third planet from the sun' are not 
intersubstitutable salve veritate in (A) and (B). The upshot of Frege's view is that 
"'the earth' has two referents, depending on its context: the earth itself, and the 
sense of the expression 'the earth' [ ... ] as it features in 'the earth moves"'.42 Indeed, 
in 
(C) Davidson said that Galileo said that the earth moves. 
'the earth' refers to the sense of 'the earth' as it features in 'Galileo said that the earth 
moves'. For Frege, each new intensional context produces a new sense and a new 
referent; consequently, any referring expression, such as 'the earth', 
has an infinite nlllllber {)f entities it may refer to, depending on context, and 
there is no rule that gives the reference in more complex contexts on the basis of 
the reference in simpler ones.43 
Davidson's claim that "the one thing meanings do not seem to do is oil the wheels of 
a theory of meaning"44, .and .the concomitant extensional cD.Ildition· on an adequate 
theory of meaning, follows from the compositionality condition, which in turn is 
supported by the interpretation condition. 
One way in which Davidson argues from the three adequacy conditions for his own 
theory of meaning is as follows. The interpretation condition states that an adequate 
theory of meaning will pair every well-formed unknown sentence, s, with a sentence 
40 Davidson ( 1984 ), p. 21. 
41 Evnine(l991), p. 77. 
42 Evnine (I 991 ), p. 91. 
43 Davidson (1984), p. 99. 
44 Davidson ( 1984 ), p. 20. 
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I understand, p. The nature of this pairing will be such that s means that p. The 
problem for the theory of meaning is that it cannot describe the pairing in terms of 
'means that', for the theory must use only extensional resources. An extensional 
pairing could employ the material biconditional: s if and only if p. This is a 
metalinguistic statement in the language of the sentence p about the object language 
(OL) sentence named by s. Since s is a name and not a sentence, we must make the 
left hand side of the biconditional a metalanguage (ML) sentence in order to make 
the whole well-formed. This is achieved by attaching the name, s, to a ML predicate. 
Davidson suggests the dummy predicate 'is T', giving: sisT iff p. Now Alfred Tarski 
famously showed that to attach a ML truth predicate to (the OL sentence) s is to 
form a sentence which is materially equivalent to the ML sentence p, that is: 
(T) s is true iff p 
where p is the sentence named by s, or is a translation of s. The latter case suits 
Davidson's purpose oLusing p to interpret the.senttmce·which s names. To use the 
truth predicate in place of the dummy predicate could therefore be sufficient to yield 
an interpretation, p, for each unknown OL sentence named by s. In addition to the 
interpretation and extensional conditions being addressed, the compositionality 
condition is met because 
the importance of the theorems does not lie in the theorems themselves, but in 
their derivation. The power of a Tarskian theory lies in its showing how we can 
get, from a finite stock of building blocks and logical (recursive) axioms, all and 
only the true T -sentences for a language.45 
An adequate theory of meaning .will .:therefore be one which yields sentences of the 
form (T) as theorems. 
Tarski utilised sentences of the form (T) in his proposal, Convention T: 
We wish to use the term "true" in such a way that all equivalences of the form 
(T) can be asserted, and we shall call a definition of truth "adequate" if all these 
equivalences follow from it.46 
As has been said, Tarski has shown that, by assuming that the sentence named by s 
is the same as, or a translation of, p, it follows that Convention T states when we can 
rightly say's is true'. Davidson turns this around and wants to claim that, assuming 
the sentence named by s is true, then Convention T sets conditions under which p is 
a translation into a known tongue (that is, an interpretation) of s (when the sentence 
45 Ramberg (1989), p. 58. 
46 Tarski ( 1985), 
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named by s is not in the language of p). His strategy is therefore to "take truth as 
basic [ ... in order to] extract an account of translation or interpretation."47 
Given the Davidsonian inversion, Convention T alone does not, however, set 
adequate conditions under which p is an interpretation of s when the sentences are 
those of natural languages. For example, 
(81) 'La neige est blanche' is true-in-French iff grass is green 
is formally correct, but p does not interpret s. I will come back to this; for prior to 
this problem of adequately constraining interpretation there is the problem of how a 
radical interpreter would know that 'La neige est blanche' is true-in-French, and 
there is the question of what is the property 'truth' which true sentences have. So 
before discussing adequate constraints on meaning ascription we must determine 
adequate constraints on truth ascription, as well as ask what criterion or criteria 
characterise truth. In so doing, we are addressing the left hand side of the 
biconditional of a Davidsonian T sentence. Here, we are distinguishing between: 
(d) What evidence there is that s is true-in-OL? 
(e) What is it fors to be true-in-OL? 
Davidson's answer to (d) is: the evidence that s is true-in-OL is that a speaker of OL, 
holding s to be true, assents to, or utters s. Here, we are assuming that the speaker of 
OL is expressing a belief generally shared by other speakers of OL, that he is a 
competent speaker and that is not deluded or lying. Davidson's answer to (e) is 
partly minatocy in character: 
Confusion threatens when this question· is- ref~mnulated as, what makes a 
sentence true? The real trouble comes when this in turn is taken to suggest that 
truth must be explained in terms of a relation between a sentence as a whole 
and some entity, perhaps a fact or state of affairs. Convention T shows us how to 
ask the original question without inviting these subsequent formulations.48 
Convention T answers (e) using the notion of satisfaction. If an open sentence 
satisfies some condition, then a function maps the variable(s) of the open sentence 
to an entity or entities. Here, two domains are in correspondence: the free 
variable(s) and ordered sequence(s). The open sentence 'xis green' is satisfied by 
{grass, the sky, ice cream, ... } and by {my car, ice cream, the sky, ... } but not by {the 
sky, grass, ... }.While the open sentence 'xis green' is satisfied by some sequences 
and not by others, the closed sentence 'Grass is green' corresponds only to 
47 Davidson (1984), p. 34. 
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sequences which satisfy it. Likewise, 'The sky is green' corresponds with, or is 
satisfied by no sequence. Hence Davidson's comment: 
If the sentence has no free variables - if it is a closed, or genuine, sentence -
then it must be satisfied by every function or by none. [ ... ] those closed 
sentences which are satisfied by all functions are true; those which are satisfied 
by none are false.49 
Just as closed sentences are a special case of open sentences, so true (or false) 
sentences are (each) a special case of satisfaction - satisfied by all sequences or 
none. For this reason, Ramberg points out: "Satisfaction is what Tarski actually 
showed us how to define."so The recursive or compositional nature of Tarski's 
approach proposes the use of a finite number of two types of axiom: one kind to 
show how a complex sentence (open or closed) is satisfied by a sequence in terms of 
how simpler sentences are satisfied; the other kind of axiom to give the satisfaction 
conditions for the simplest open sentences. 51 Two observations worth noting on this 
approach to proving T -sentences are as follows. First, while the truth predicate 
applies only to closed sentences, we require the broader domain of closed and open 
sentences "to axiomatize the systematic effect of our semantic building blocks on the 
truth-value of the expressions in which they occur."52 Second, we cannot say what 
makes sentences true; for each true sentence is satisfied by all sequences; as 
Davidson puts it: "All true sentences end up in the same place"53. What we can do is 
"show how they got there[ ... ] by running through the steps of the recursive account 
of satisfaction appropriate to the sentence."54 That 'story' is "the canonical proof of a 
T -sentence"ss. 
While "[t]ruth is defined for closed sentences in terms of the notion of 
satisfaction"56, we may wonder if this appeal to satisfaction breaks Davidson's own 
prohibition, mentioned in the previous paragraph, on explaining the property of 
truth in terms of correspondence. Davidson even admits that "[t]he semantic 
conception of truth as developed by Tarski deserves to be called a correspondence 
theory because of the part played by the concept of satisfaction."57 The traditional 
48 Davidson (1984 ), p. 70. 
49 Davidson (19114), pp. 47-411 
50 Ramberg ( 1989), p. 40. 
51 Sec Davidson ( 1984 ), p. 131. 
52 Ramberg (1989), p. 43. 
53 Davidson (1984), p. 49. 
54 Davidson (1984), p. 49. 
55 Davidson (1984 ), p. 1311. 
56 Davidson ( 1984 ), p. 131. 
57 Davidson (1984), p. 48. 
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view of a correspondence theory of truth, however, adopts what Davidson describes 
as 'the strategy of facts'. This approach expresses 
the desire to include in the entity to which a true sentence corresponds not only 
the objects the sentence is 'about' [ ... ] but also whatever it is the sentence says 
about them.58 
Davidson's and Tarski's way is to say that 'Dolores loves Dagmar' is satisfied by 
{Dolores, Dagmar} in case that Dolores loves Dagmar. {Dolores, Dagmar} are not 
facts as such, but they are the entities which (may or may not) satisfy 'Dolores loves 
Dagmar'. The strategy of facts, on the other hand wants "somehow [to] include the 
loving"59 as part of the fact which makes 'Dolores loves Dagmar' true. Davidson, 
though, makes a clear demarcation between the semantic and the epistemological 
issues: determining the truth value of 'Dolores loves Dagmar' is the concern of 
epistemology; to say what is the property of truth-in-English in the sentence 
'Dolores loves Dagmar' is a semantic problem, constrained by a Davidsonian theory 
of theories of truth-in-:-natural-languages. The Tarski/ Davidson account oftruth-in-
a-language 
is less ambitious about what it packs into the entities to which sentences 
correspond: in such a theory, these entities are no more than arbitrary pairings 
of the objects over which the variables of the language range with those 
variables.6o 
The entities involved in the correspondence relation of satisfaction are clearly not 
facts in the common sense of the word. This has led Evnine to venture: 
The fact that what is supposed to 'correspond' to the sentences does not include 
the relations that apply to the objects makes this sense of correspondence too 
tenuous to justify the idea that we have an explanation of truth in terms of 
correspondence. 61 
Evnine feels particularly justified in saying so because of a later comment of 
Davidson's that "Correspondence theories have always been conceived as providing 
an explanation or analysis of truth, and this a Tarski-style theory of truth certainly 
does not do."62 But perhaps Davidson's later words are not a recantation of 
correspondence claims; instead, they may simply confirm that the Davidsonian view 
of correspondence and truth is different to the norm. This stance will be adopted as I 
draw this presentation of Davidson's answer to (e) to a close with .a summing up. 
Conveniently, this will carry us to where we need to go, for what we will find is that 
Davidsonian views on truth will lead us from talk of the left hand side to talk of the 
right hand side ofT-sentences. 
58 Davidson (1984), p. 49. 
59 Davidson (1984 ), p. 48. 
60 Davidson (1984), p. 49. 
61 Evnine(1991), p. 137. 
62 Davidson, quoted in Evnine ( 1991 ), p. 137. 
149 
Davidson wants to give us "correspondence without confrontation"63• The main 
point to this slogan is that "there is no way to somehow confront sentences with 
something non-linguistic in order to see whether they are true."64 So correspondence 
is of no use in determining truth values - for that a different theory, one of 
verification, is required (and is given in Davidson's holism and empiricism, later). 
The strength of the Tarski/Davidson approach to correspondence is two-fold. First, 
the elements of the theory -i.e., the truth bearer (the sentence) and real entities 
(sequences of objects) and their relation (satisfaction)- are all clearly defined: 
Propositions, statements, facts, states of affairs, and other assorted relations 
figure not at all. [ ... ] Most traditional discussion of correspondence theories has 
centred upon the adequacy of the definition of the relation or the adequacy of 
the requisite identity and individuation conditions of the relata. We avoid most 
of these worries. 65 
Secondly, where correspondence is of particular use to Davidson is in the 
determination of truth conditions. We have seen that if 'Dolores loves Dagmar' is 
satisfied by {Dolores, Dagmar}, it is so on condition that Dolores loves Dagmar. 
Truth conditions are important to Davidson's task of interpretation because "to give 
truth conditions is a way of giving the meaning of a sentence."66 Now I come to the 
right hand side of sentences of the form (T). 
If s is true if and only if p, then p is a condition on the truth of s. The conditions 
under which the English sentence 'I gave him the book' is true will depend upon who 
uttered the sentence, who got the book, and which book that was. Since the specific 
answers to these questions are not merely rule-determined, but arejnstead aJD.atter 
of circumstances, the proof of a Davidsonian T-sentence will be partly empirical and 
not just syntactical (as Tarski's theorems for formal languages were). So Davidson 
tells us to "relate language with the occasions of truth in a way that invites the 
construction of a thoozy."67 Such 'occasions of truth' are taken to be the 
circumstances under which s is uttered: 
We have agreed that the evidential base for the theory will consist in facts about 
the circumstances under which speakers hold sentences of their language to be 
true.6s 
63 Davidson, quoted in Ramberg (1989), p. 47. 
64 Ramberg(1989), p. 44. 
6' ~ P1atts (1979), p. 35. 
66 Davidson ( 1984 ), p. 24. 
67 Davidson (1984), p. 44. 
68 Davidson (1984), p. 152. 
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These 'facts' given by p will be the truth conditions of s: strictly speaking they are 
evidence for the truth of s, for no finite amount of empirical evidence can add up to 
the semantic statement that s is true. This point was mentioned earlier, and 
Davidson reminds us of it when explaining truth conditions: 
The T -sentence does fix the truth value relative to certain conditions, but it does 
not say the object language sentence is true because the conditions hold.69 
Davidson can say this because he is talking about one or some T-sentences. Were we 
to have all the T-sentences for a natural language, that is, "[i]f we knew that aT-
sentence satisfied Tarski's Convention T, we would know it was true"70• Since a 
natural language would be capable of producing an infinite number ofT-sentences, 
such knowledge is not forthcoming: 
A true statement for Davidson is simply one we would assert when all the 
evidence is in. No statement is ever indefeasible, but that is [ ... ] for the 
epistemic reason that we never possess all the evidence there might be - and 
not because of a discrepancy between all possible knowledge and the way things 
really are.7I 
Truth conditions are epistemic, but in Davidson's use of Convention T they tend 
towards a limit which is semantic: it is this calculus which enables Davidson to 
propose an empirical coherence theory of truth and holistic approach to meaning. 
Davidson's coherentist approach to truth is displayed in his taking consistency in the 
use of words as evidence that a sentence is held true. If I believe that snow is white 
and that snowmen are made of snow then this is evidence that I would hold that 
snowmen are white. He tells us: 
I called my view a coherence theory because I held (I still do) that there is a 
presumption that a belief that coheres with the rest of our beliefs is true. But 
obviously this doesn't make every such belief true.n 
It is this expectation of consistency between utterances which solves the problem 
presented earlier in: 
(St) 'La neige est blanche' is true-in-French iff grass is green. 
If a radical interpreter were to set about forming a large number of sentences of the 
form (T), a pattern would begin to emerge. It would be observed that a 
preponderance of utterances containing 'neige' would occur around snow and those 
containing 'blanche' around things which are white. The circumstances in which 
these many sentences are held true, and the consistent assent and dissent to 
69 Davidson (1984), p. 138. 
70 Davidson (1984), p. 138. 
71 Ramberg(l989), p. 46. 
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different utterances and sentences containing 'neige', would rule out the truth 
condition given in (St). We see that 
The work of the theory is in relating the known truth conditions of each 
sentence to those aspects ('words') of the sentence that recur in other sentences, 
and can be assigned identical roles in other sentences.73 
When we require that "the totality of T-sentences should [ ... ] optimally fit the 
evidence about sentences held true by native speakers"74, then we find that the right 
hand side of the biconditional in (T) will be an interpretation of the sentence 
mentioned on the left hand side. We have made the transition from a theory of truth 
to a 'theory of meaning'. 
Davidson's use of Convention T for the interpretation of natural languages, wherein 
the interpreter must, on condition that p, attach the ML truth predicate 'true-in-OL' 
to s in order to interpret s, proceeds on the assumption of the POC (7). This principle 
of interpretation has many facets. I have already mentioned some of these in. relation 
to (d), where it is assumed that a competent speaker of OL is acting in good faith. 
Here, the very notion of a competent speaker who acts in good faith is one who 
speaks and acts rationally. The POC therefore makes the cognitive claim that "if a 
creature has propositional attitudes.then that creature is approximately rational"75• 
More will be said in later parts about the charitable "conceptual link between truth 
and rationality on the one hand and intentional description on the other"76• 
In Part 1 it was said that the POC is a claim about the use of the truth predicate of 
any interpreter's language. When Tarskian claims .about the truth _predicate are 
applied to natural languages in the context of radical interpretation, it is found that 
to be able to make claims that there are necessary and sufficient conditions under 
which the ML truth predicate applies to names of OL sentences, it is necessary to 
proceed on the basis of thePOC. In this way, the names of OL sentences satisfy the 
ML truth predicate, and the necessary and sufficient conditions under which they do 
so are the ML interpretations of the OL sentences. This way of arriving at an 
interpretation makes it clear that the POC is a general semantic claim. For individual 
sentences of the OL, it will be found !hat this general semantic claim does not hold; 
72 Davidson, in Stoeker (ed.) (1993), p. 37. 
73 Davidson (1984), p. 25. 
74 Davidson (1984), 'Radical Interpretation', p. 139. 
75 Davidson, quoted in Evnine ( 1991 ), p. 112. 
76 Stich (1991 ), p. 44. 
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yet the general semantic claim is indispensable for, without it, the exceptions (where 
pis not an interpretation of s) would never be discovered. For this reason, the POC 
is more than a heuristic: it is not merely an instrument which yields interpretations, 
but part of the vecy notion of 'truth-in-a-naturallanguage', and so of interpreting a 
natural language. For this reason Ramberg describes the POC as "a condition of the 
possibility of interpretation"77. 
Davidson's argument against complete translation failure is summed up as: 
nothing [ ... ] could count as evidence that some form of activity could not be 
interpreted in our language that was not at the same time evidence that that 
form of activity was not speech behaviour.7B 
The language is slightly contorted, but what Davidson seems to be saying is: that 
which counts as evidence that some behaviour, say the utterance of s, is speech 
behaviour will also count as evidence for the interpretation of s; and enough of such 
evidence would, under Davidson's description of radical interpretation, lead to the 
translation of s. The only condition under which the methodology of radical 
interpretation would not yield translation into a familiar tongue is when the 
behavioural evidence is not an utterance from a language. So Davidson describes his 
argument against complete translation failure as "transcendental"79• 
Davidson's opposition to partial translation failure concerned those utterances 
where the POC did not hold. On these occasions, the interpreter and interpretee 
would have different beliefs under the same conditions. But were it such that the 
total behaviour of the interpretee was not evidence that both interpreter and 
interpretee had mostly the same beliefs under the same conditions, then radical 
interpretation would not be possible; in which case (see argument against complete 
failure), the interpretee is not speaking a language80• As long as the interpreter and 
interpretee have different beliefs under the same _conditions on a minority of 
occasions, translation will go ahead for every utterance. 
77 Ramberg ( 1989), p. 74. 
78 Davidson (1984), p. 185. 
79 Davidson (1984), p. 72. 
80 
"If we cannot find a way to interpret the utterances and other behaviour of a creature as revealing a set of beliefs largely 
consistent and true hy our own standards, we have no reason to count that creature as rational, as having heliefs, or as saying 
anything at all." Davidson (1984), p. 137. 
153 
The implications of all this for the semantic IT are that statements of T1 and T2 will 
always be semantically comparable; and ruling out the possibility of failure of 
translation in turn rules out (according to Davidson) incommensurable theories or 
conceptual schemes. The claim that all the meanings of terms have changed, such 
that all the truth values of statements of T1 are independent of the truth of 
statements of T2, will be false, for it .entails,· for Davidson,. the claim of .complete 
untranslatability. Likewise, the weaker claim that, due to meaning change, some 
statements of T1 are logically independent of those ofT 2 will also be false because it 
entails the false partiallllltranslatability claim. 
However, it is Davidson's justification of the POC which is more directly relevant to 
my presentation ofFeyerabend's IT. So Ramberg remarks: 
The principle of charity serves in one form or another as the foundation for 
Davidson's much cited arguments against incommensurability and the 
possibility of our being fundamentally mistaken about .how things are.B1 
The argument against complete untranslatability justifies the claims of the POC, 
namely, that when two people speaking different languages each make an utterance 
about their common physical circumstances, then, as long as they tend to (be 
disposed to) express agreem.en~ .the utterance of one will .be evidence which the 
other can use to interpret what his interlocutor is saying. And the argument against 
partial untranslatability showed that when on occasion they do not express 
agreement, the POC, must still be applicable most of the time, if the interpreter and 
interpretee are language speakers. This charitable agreement under common causal 
interaction with the environment limits the degree to which the claims of two 
theories will differ in a common domain; it also ensures that in a common domain, 
the truth claims of one speaker are not semantically independent of what another 
speaker would be disposed to assert. So the POC rules out the MVT's logical 
independence claim. 
To save the strong or weak form of the logical independence claim of the MVT, a 
successful argument against the POC would do the job. This is not so easy to do 
because of the POC's transcendental justification: 
(t) If Davidson's theory of interpretation were to work for all natural languages, it 
must employ the POC 
(g) Davidson's theory of interpretation would work for all natural languages 
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(h) Therefore we are justified in employing the POC 
Given the careful nature of Davidson's argu~nt, few would challenge (f). 
Undermining the conclusion (h) will involve explaining why Davidson's theory of 
interpretation would not work, or else showing that (h) does not follow from (f) and 
(g). Both of these approaches have weaknesses, but other, more indirect arguments 
have also been used to nndermine (h). So, for example, . Michael Devitt accepts the 
validity of the above transcendental arguments, but rejects them on the grounds that 
they are instrumentalist in nature (as the verificationist character of the arguments 
may suggest). Another, very different, indirect attack on the POC is mounted by 
Stephen Stich who accepts. (h), but claims that the POC is not as philosophically 
potent, or interesting, as Davidson thinks. These indirect rebuttals of the POC will be 
considered in Parts 5 and 6. 
Part 3: Common Objections 
Here, I consider briefly a couple of common objections to Davidson's theory of 
interpretation and say why they are not sufficient (at least in the form presented) to 
derail Davidson's position. In subsequent Parts, I go on to look at other arguments 
(many of which seek to. undermine the POC) against Davidson's theory of 
interpretation. 
A common criticism of Davidson's meta-theory of interpretation is that the 
extensional adequacy condition is unacceptable. Such criticism generally amounts to 
the claim that natural languages use intensional constructions which cannot, for the 
purpose of interpretation, be sufficiently described purely extensionally. 82 Davidson, 
however, has had some success in dealing with specific types of intensional 
construction, such as indirectly reported speech. Davidson's defence is that critics of 
the extensional adequacy condition have not offered a detailed argument to support 
their objection; and an objection of a merely general nature does not offer a 
convincing challenge in the face of Davidson's specific successes. In addition, 
Davidson can appeal that his project is a research programme, and claim that the 
difficult intensional parts of language will succumb later. There are other aspects of 
natural language, such as.irony _and paradox, which .would also pose. problems for 
81 Ramberg(l989),p. 70. 
82 See for example: Black bum (1984), p. 288; Taylor (1998), pp. 148-9; Grayling (1997), p. 251. 
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Davidson since his use of Convention T requires formal, first-order logic83• Davidson 
acknowledges that these aspects are of concern: 
I have always been aware that it is a big question whether, or to what extent, 
such theories can be made adequate to natural languages; what is clear that [sic] 
they are adequate to powerful parts of naturallanguages.B4 
Concerns, however, are not arguments. Davidson maintains that very general doubts 
about the suitability of Convention T to natural languages are not enough to show 
that his theory of interpretation is unsuccessful: 
To show this, or even that it is unlikely to work, they [critics] would either have 
to produce a priori reasons why you can't get there from here, or come to grips 
with the arguments which aim to show in some detail how it could be done.ss 
A further, final example of an ineffectual attack is the claim that Davidson's theory of 
interpretation is irrelevant, for it does not describe how we actually go about the 
business of interpretation. To support the irrelevancy claim it is sometimes added 
that Davidson offers no explanation for how a first language is acquired. However, 
the irrelevancy claim is itself irrelevant! As was pointed out earlier, Davidson is only 
saying what would work as a theory of interpretation, not what is done by 
interpreters: 
I am outlining what l claim could succeed, not what does. [ ... ] I have never 
claimed to know how children learn their first language. (In fact, it is a mystery 
to me how we can correctly describe the contents of a partly formed mind [ ... ] I 
have never claimed to give an account of how field linguists anive at their 
theories.s6 
The next four protests address Davidson's position by attempting toshow either that 
his arguments are not logically valid, or that one or more of his premises is false a 
priori. 
Part 4: The Presumption of Truth 
Simon Evnine maintains that Davidson cannot presume, without supplementing his 
argument for the method of radical interpretation, that all, or most, of the sentences 
which the interpretee, or indeed, of the interpreter, are disposed to utter are true. 
What Evnine has in mind is that Davidson's argument as presented so far is not 
83 Notwithstanding Davidson's admission that he was "hasty" to rule out use of modal logics, possible world semantics and 
substitutional quantification as able to meet the demands of Convention T, "[t]he well-known virtues of first-order 
quantification theory still provide plenty of motivation, however, to see how much we can do with it." see Davidson (19114), pp. 
xv-xvi. 
84 Davidson, in Stoeker (ed.)(l993), p. 83. 
85 Davidson, in Stock er (ed.)(~ 99J), fl· 84. 
86 Davidson, in Stoeker(ed.) (1993), pp. 80-1. 
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sufficient to fend off the sceptic. The pessimistic induction that one globally false 
theory succeeds another opens up a space where one group of people hold a globally 
false theory and another group hold another globally false theory. Under these 
circumstances there is general agreement among the members of each group, but 
the method of radical interpretation would fail to secure intergroup translation. 
Then the POC would not bejustified..and itis possible that each group holds logically 
independent general theories in a common domain. 
I have taken the POC (7) to express the claim that an interpreter and alien have 
mostly the same beliefs, but it may be recallediromJ>.art 2 that-Davidson makes the 
further claim that those beliefs are mostly true. Davidson must therefore warrant his 
claim that "What makes interpretation possible[ ... ] is the fact that we can dismiss a 
priori the chance of massive error."87 As far as Evnine is concerned: 
The method of radical interpretation takes us as far as ensuring that [ ... ] the 
interpreter must take the interpretee to be largely a believer of truths. But it 
does not appear to guarantee the truth of the beliefs of either.ss 
For such a guarantee, claims Evnine, Davidson requires89 his omniscient interpreter 
argument, which goe.s ~s follows: 
there is nothing absurd in the idea of an omniscient interpreter; he attributes 
beliefs to others, and interprets their speech on the basis of his own beliefs, just 
as the rest of us do. Since he does this as the rest of us do, he perforce finds as 
much agreement as is needed to make sense of his attributions and 
interpretations; and in this case, of course, what is agreed is by hypothesis 
true.9o 
In this case, when the interpretee is in massive error, then very little he says will be 
true or (therefore) agreed. Then (nearly) all of the interpretee's utterances about the 
common physical situation of utterance will be false. The evidence thus tainted, the 
omniscient interpreter will pair interpretee utterances with the wrong truth 
conditions, and p will not give the meaning of s. Davidson concludes that "massive 
error about the world is simply unintelligible"91 (of natural language speakers) 
because even the most knowledgeable radical interpreter could not interpret one 
who is in massive error. Since Davidson's constraints on radical interpretation are 
adequate for the interpretation of all natural languages, global error can only be 
attributed to one who does not speak a natural language. From all this, two 
questions arise. First, what are we to make of Davidson's omniscient interpreter 
87 Davidson (1984), pp. 168-9. 
88 Evnine ( 1991 ), p. 141. 
89 Evnine ( 1991 ), p. 142. 
90 Davidson ( 1984 ), p. 20 I. 
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argument? And second, is Evnine right to maintain that Davidson needs the 
omniscient interpreter argument to demonstrate that the interpretee is largely a 
believer of truths? 
To answer the second question first, Davidson's answer is that the omniscient 
interpreter argument is an adjunct to the main argument upholding the charitable 
claims that the beliefs of all natural language speakers are mostly common and 
mostly correct. This is what Davids011 says before introducing the omniscient 
interpreter: 
It may seem that the argument so far shows only that good interpretation 
breeds concurrence, while leaving quite open the question whether what is 
agreed upon is true. And certainly agreement, no matter how widespread, does 
not guarantee truth. This observation misses the point of the argument, 
however.92 
To see why Davidson thinks this, I will turn to the first question. 
Davidson tells us that "all interpretation, whether radical or not, must be 
constrained in certain ways, and therefore [ ... ] all natural languages must have 
certain properties."93 One of those properties is "correspondence between observed 
utteral\ces and specifiable features of the environment"94. Part of that 
correspondence is a causal relation between a speaker and his environment; another 
is the intentional relation. But Davidson's mention of "correspondence" does not 
indicate that he is offering a correspondence view of truth (in the traditional sense). 
He is merely saying that the environment - or world - is involved in the translation, 
and so the very notion, of a natural language. The possibility of global error, while 
rejected by Davidson, is not directly refuted. Davidson just points out that, in cases 
where either the interpretee or the interpreter has mostly false beliefs, then 
interpretation is not possible; and if interpretation is not possible, then one - or 
both - of the parties is not a speaker of a language. So "Davidson does not provide 
metaphysical assurance of our connection with reality, he simply makes the _point 
that if we give up the world, we must also give up language."95 The omniscient 
interpreter argument is striking because it makes this very point, but makes it to the 
91 Davidson ( 1984 ), p. 20 I. 
92 Davidson ( 191!4 ), p. 200. 
93 Davidson, in Stoeker (ed.)(1993), p. 78. 
94 Ramberg (1989), p. 47. 
95 Ramberg ( 191!9), p. 4 7. Such a light metaphysical touch should not come as much of a surprise when it is recalled that the 
David~onffarski semantic conception of truth is a view with a minimum of metaphysical hallast. 
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nth degree: epistemological scepticism does not make semantic sense. I will consider 
Davidson's position a little further. 
Davidson does not deny that "a sentence may be false in spite of the indications of all 
available evidence"96 ; what he rejects is "that a sentence might be false in spite of 
the indications of all possible evidence"97. Davidson does not attempt to give criteria 
for individual sentences by which we can judge whether an individual sentence is 
true, or its terms refer. Instead, he shows why it is wrong to claim that the majority 
of all possible sentences of a natural language could be false98. It is in this way that 
Davidson rejects scepticism, and I believe that, contra Evnine, he does not need the 
omniscient interpreter argument to do so. 
By way of assessing Davidson's argument against the possibility of natural language 
users having mostly false beliefs I consider briefly the case of the brain in -the vat. 
Colin McGinn points out that it is consistent with the POC that: 
my brain and the brain in the simulation machine or in the vat could be 
physically indiscernible and yet we would, on the Davidsonian view, experience 
and believe totally different things [ ... ] I believe that there is a brown rabbit 
running by and I have a visual experience as of a brown, rabbit-like creature 
running by; they believe (say) that an electrode is sending n volts into their 
occipital lobe and they have an experience with just this content. But there is no 
difference in what is going on in our brains.99 
In the case where every belief of the vat brain could be false, Davidson's view may be 
that radical interpretation would be impossible because the radical interpreter 
would never be able to differentiate truth conditions for vat brain utterances 
(assuming the vat brain had an articulation device); or, if the radical interpreter 
were the scientist with good access to the physical conditions of the vat brain, then 
he would be able to give truth conditions of vat brain utterances in terms of degrees 
of electrical stimulation to specific locations. Either case would rule out any notion 
of content other than that which could be publicly verifiable. In the first case it 
would not be possible to know that the vat brain was in global error and able to 
96 Ramberg ( 1989), p. 47. My italics. 
97 Ramberg ( 1989), p. 47. My italics. 
98 Richard Rorty's comments (Rorty (1980). p. 3J I) seem to su1:gest, rather misleadingly I think, thal Davidson doe&n't really 
have much of an argument: "Ifyou ask[ ... ] Davidson why he thinks that we ever talk about what really exists or say anything 
true about it, [he is] likely to ask you what makes you have doubts on the subject. If you reply that the burden is on [him], and 
that [he] is forbidden to argue from the filet that we would never know it if the sceptic were right to the impossibility of his 
being right, [ ... Davidson] might[ ... ] reply that [he] will not argue in that way. [He] need not invoke verificationist arguments; 
he need simply ask why [he] should worry about the sceptical alternative until [he] is given some concrete ground of doubt." 
But surely Davidson does have an ar_gument- a sewantil: argument- a1111inst the scertic. 
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speak a natural language. In the second case, where translation can go ahead, the vat 
brain would not be in global error, for it would be talking about electrical impulses 
and such like. 
According to Davidson, understanding an utterer in global error would not be 
possible. But what if the interpreter were in the same global error as the 
interpretee? The 'soft' Davidsonian defence here is to say that the rest of us would 
never know because our radical interpretation of them would fail. But I don't think 
that this is Davidson's main defence. Rather, I think that Davidson's point is that, 
even for the two in shared global error, it is not clear how two people in shared 
global error could interpret each other: how could two such language users 
systematically map all their own or each other's sentences (i.e.false sentences) to 
common causes? Consequently, the extreme sceptical charge that all natural 
language speakers are in one great shared global error is not rebuffed directly by 
Davidson - but it is rebuffed, and the rebuttal is Davidson's general point that 
radical interpretation must deal mostly with true sentences for they are the ones 
which can be systematically mapped to the environment. For this reason I disagree 
with Simon Evnine that Davidson needs the omniscient interpreter argument. 
Part 5: Devitt's Discontent 
Michael Devitt rejects the interpretation adequacy condition which Davidson places 
on any theory of meaning. Davidson's approach to semantics, instead of asking the 
question 'What is meaning?', has pursued another question which he thought would 
be less intractable, namely "What would it suffice an interpreter to know in order to 
understand the speaker of an alien language, and how could he come to know it?"100 
Davidson has redirected the task of semantics from that of giving "an explanatory 
correspondence notion of truth [ ... ] explained in terms of genuine, objective 
reference relations"101 to that of describing "how to construct theories of 
interpretation"102 where meaning is rendered but not explained. Devitt's line of 
attack is to attempt to show that, because of problems caused by this 'interpretative 
99 McGinn (1986), p. 361. The problem, for McGinn, is that, as a result ofDavidson's approach, "there is a rather extreme 
failure of the supervenience of the mental on the cerebral". McGinn (1986), p. 361. Davidson does not regard such 
s::gervenience as a problem. 
1 Davidson, in Stoeker(ed.) (1993), p. 83. 
101 Devitt(1991), p. 180. 
102 Devitt(I991),p. 187. 
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perspective', Davidson is forced to adopt the POC; yet the POC is, for a number of 
reasons, objectionable. 
Devitt's 'take' on Davidson is presented in the next few paragraphs. Then come 
Devitt's objections to Davidson's enterprise. The thrust of these objections is that 
Davidsonian semantics in general, and the POC in particular, are tainted with 
instrumentalism. If the instrumentalist charge can be upheld, then the POC need be 
considered little more than a heuristic device, in which case the arguments 
supported by the POC (including those against the IT) are seriously undermined; for 
rather than Davidson having shown that language users are mostly in agreement 
and mostly speakers of the truth, he will then just have shown that these are good 
assumptions to make when placed in the position of a radical interpreter. 
Devitt charges Davidson with 'semanticalism', the view that 
Our theory of the world has need of explanatory semantic notions which are 
basic and inexplicable in non-semantic terms - for example, in physical terms.1°3 
Davidson admits that "the truth predicate is not defined, but must be considered a 
primitive expression"104: 
Not that the concept of truth that is used in T-sentences can be explicitly 
defined in non-semantic concepts, or reduced to more behaviouristic concepts. 
Reduction and definition are [ ... ]too much to expect.tos 
As regards other semantic concepts like satisfaction and reference, "we know all 
there is to know about them when we know how they operate to characterize 
truth."106 
For Devitt, the problem with such semanticalism is that its account of meaning lacks 
a clear description of how language hooks on to the physical world. This issue of 
reference or correspondence truth will turn out to be the issue between Devitt and 
Davidson. According to Devitt, Davidson gets around the anti-physicalist import of 
semanticalism by two epistemic means. The first of these is to proceed on the basis 
that "meaning is determined entirely by observable behaviour, even readily 
103 Devitt(1991),p. 182. 
104 Davidson (1984). p. 216. 
105 Davidson (1984), p. 223. 
106 Davidson (1984), p. 223. 
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observable behaviour."107 However, this approach merely creates another problem, 
namely: 
readily observable behaviour is far too thin a basis to do all this work: to 
determine interpretations, to determine attitudes, and, let us not forget, to 
explain truth.wB 
Thus Davidson is forced to resort to a further constraint on the evidence - the POC. 
With charity to hand, Davidson can finally proceed with the interpretative 
perspective, a perspective which "is an attempt to have irreducible semantic facts 
while retaining physicalistic respectability."109 This is what Devitt sees when he looks 
at Davidson. Next come his critical arguments. 
First I consider Devitt's attack on charity. To employ the POC in order to interpret is, 
says Devitt, to "seek understanding by imposing an interpretation."110 Devitt regards 
the POC as asserting what "is constitutive of a person's having beliefs and expressing 
meaningful utterances"111: the interpretee's utterances express beliefs which would 
mostly agree with the interpreter's and which are themselves largely consistent. 
Such an imposition of meaning is unacceptable to Devitt because the imposition of 
an interpretation does not guarantee the correct interpretation, and "What is the 
point of attaching a meaning to a person's words if they don't really have that 
meaning?"112 
As regards this first cluster of objections, Devitt's charge that the POC is constitutive 
of, or imposes, meaning, seems to me to lack teeth for two reasons. First, Devitt does 
not spell out in what sense 'constitutive of meaning' or 'imposing meaning' is true of 
the POC. What I think is clear is that the POC does not apply in every case, so it does 
not impose meaning in every case: the POC constrains the overall interpretation, 
but it is suspended locally. If the POC imposes meaning, then it does so not 'across 
the board' but indirectly in a significant number of instances. So I feel that the 
accusation that the POC imposes meanings needs to be more accurate or refined for 
the discu..<>sion to come further. 
107 Devitt{1991), p. 190, quoting Davidson. 
108 Devitt (1991 ), p. 190. 
109 Devitt ( 1991 ), p. 191. 
'110 Devitt ( 1991 ), p. 192. 
111 Devitt (1991 ). p. 192. 
112 Devitt(l991).p. 198. 
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The second reason why this first attack on the POC seems to lack teeth is that Devitt 
does not make clear what is wrong with the constraint which the POC does 
constitute (as I have described it above). Just as the POC is not a hard and fast rule, 
it is surely also not, as Ian Hacking thinks113, a rule of thumb. The POC is how an 
interpreter must begin. Why it is so that the POC is a necessary opening gambit was 
explained in Part 1; yet Devitt does not appear to address this explanation or the 
nature of this 'imposition'. To re-phrase (with a slightly different emphasis) my 
second reason why Devitt's imposition of meaning charge lacks teeth: Devitt does 
not show that the assumption that the POC is correct in a majority of cases would 
ever result in the wrong meaning being ultimately 'imposed'. 
Devitt's second cluster of objections hang around the notion that Davidson is 
instrumentalist in his approach to semantics. Devitt substantiates this objection in 
three ways. The first is that the POC is merely an instrument for yielding 
interpretations: "It seems as if the Davidsonian adopts [it] simply because without 
[it] no interpretation would be possible."114 If a theory of meaning need not provide 
interpretations (as Devitt maintains), then the POC would lack any justification. 
A similar objection is also raised by Jerry Fodor and Ernest Lepore115, to which 
Davidson responded: 
I do not believe I have presented any argument that makes the need for charity 
depend on radical interpretation; the argument goes the other way round.I16 
The POC is not justified by the task of radical interpretation; it is employed even by 
speakers of the same language117• So it is not the case that the POC is an instrument 
only in the exotic cases; rather "all understanding of the speech of another involves 
radical interpretation"118 in the sense that all linguistic understanding involves the 
use of the POC. If we dispense with charity, we dispense with people talking with 
each other; that the former is a requirement of the latter is surely all there is to the 
instrumental nature of the POC. While the POC is instrumental to linguistic 
communication, I don't see that this makes it instrumentalistic (i.e. merely a useful 
113 Hacking {1975), p. 147. 
114 Devitt(l991), p. 198. 
115 In Stoeker ( 1993) 
116 Davidson, in Stoeker (1993), p. 78. 
117 As Davidson shows in his example of the ketch and the yawl in Davidson (191!4), p. 1911. 
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fiction for explaining linguistic behaviour). It is true that the POC is part of a 
strategy to render meanings rather than to say what meaning is, and that the only 
argument for accepting the POC is that it is instrumental in this way. But Devitt has 
not undermined the POC's a priori status and shown that charity is merely a 
pragmatic or instrumentalist notion. 
The second charge in the instrumentalist cluster of three concerns reference: 
Davidson's "[t]alk of reference in that theory is a mere instrument for yielding the T-
sentences"119.To Devitt's dismay, Davidson does not explain the truth of a sentence 
in terms of the reference of its parts; nor does he explain the meaning of a term as its 
referent. I will take this second charge together with the third. The third charge in 
the instrumentalist bunch is related to the issue of reference. Devitt maintains that, 
for Davidsonian, 'truth' is merely warranted beliefl-2°. The truth of a sentence, for 
Davidson, is a matter of "facts about the structural properties of utterances, 
behavioural facts, and environmental facts"121; but Devitt insists "these are not the 
physical facts but the physical evidence"122: so Davidson's entire interpretative 
project amounts to positing (and assimilating) lots of empirical hypotheses in the 
form ofT-sentences; but "[t]o suppose that the only facts a theory must make 
contact with are the evidential ones is instrumentalistic."123 A more proper (i.e., 
noninstrumental) realism about semantic facts (such as the contents ascribed to 
utterances) "will suppose, by contrast, that there is a factual realm underlying the 
evidential one with which he is trying to make contact."124 
By way of a reply to Devitt's criticisms of Davidson's views on reference and truth, I 
note that Davidson himself distinguishes two complaints related to his theory's 
notions of truth and reference: 
1. his "theory of truth does not throw light on the semantic features of the basic 
vocabulary of predicates and names"125 
and 
118 Davidson ( 1984 ), p. 125. Here, Davidson appears to shift from presenting a theory of interpretation that would work to one 
which actually is employed. 
119 Devitt (1991 ), p. I 91. 
120 Quine also senses some confusion of truth and warranted belief on Davidson's part: Quine (1981 ), p. 39. 
121 Devitt(l99l),p.185. 
122 Devitt (1991 ). p. I 85. 
123 Devitt ( 1991), p. 185. 
124 Devitt (1991 ), p. 185. 
125 Davidson ( 1984), p. 217. 
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2. his "theory of truth gives no insight into the concept of truth."126 
As regards complaint number 2, Davidson admits that he uses truth as a primitive 
notion. However, that is not to say that Davidson's theory tells us nothing about 
truth. For example, his theory "reveals how the truth of every sentence of a 
particular L depends on its structure and constituents."127 It also gives an 
extensional characterisation of the truth predicate for any natural language. That his 
theory of interpretation does not present a general conceptual analysis of truth 
would be of no hindrance as regards the purpose of interpretation to which 
Davidson puts the theory. Hence his response to complaint 2: "The point may be 
granted without impugning the interest of the theory."128 However, Davidson's 
semantic theory of truth does claim "to give a complete account of the truth of 
sentences"129, and to do so a notion of reference would be required, for "[t]ruth [ ... ] 
clearly depends on the semantic features of the elements; and where the elements 
are names or predicates, what features can be relevant but reference?"130 This brings 
me to complaint 1. 
Davidson does not deny the reference relation in language: "[i]f the name 
'Kilimanjaro' refers to Kilimanjaro, then no doubt there is some relation between 
English (or Swahili) speakers, the word, and the mountain."131 A truth conditional 
account of meaning, such as Davidson offers, assumes the notion of reference (and, 
as Part 2 has shown, of satisfaction): 
Explaining the truth conditions of a sentence like 'Socrates flies' must amount to 
saying it is true if and only if the object referred to by 'Socrates' is one of the 
objects referred to by the predicate 'flies'.132 
Yet, while the bare idea of correspondence between word and object is assumed, it is 
not put to any further use, for it is Davidson's belief that the reference relation is not 
semantically interesting; that is, reference fails to explain semantic concepts (of 
correspondence, truth, and such like) in terms other than semantic ones. As regards 
reference, 
it is inconceivable that one should be able to explain this relation without first 
explaining the role of the word in sentences; and if this is so, there is no chance 
of explaining reference directly in non-linguistic terms,l33 
126 Davidson (1984), p. 217. 
127 Davidson ( 1984), p. 218. 
128 Davidson ( 1984 ), p. 218. 
129 Davidson ( 1984), p. 218. My italics. 
130 Davidson (1984), p. 21ti. 
131 Davidson ( 1984 ), p. 220. 
132 Davidson (1984), p. 216. 
133 Davidson (19R4), p. 220. My italics. 
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It is this claim, particularly its final main clause, which is in many ways the crux of 
the matter between Devitt and Davidson. 
Devitt believes that some causal-historical theory of reference will describe the 
reference relation in non-semantic terms. According to the causal-historical theory 
of reference, I could determine which person 'Socrates' refers to and what objects 
satisfy 'flies'; and then I could determine whether 'Socrates flies' is true. For obvious 
reasons, Davidson calls this approach to determining the truth value of a sentence 
'the building-block theory'. The flaw (from where Davidson is standing) in this 
account of determining the truth value of a sentence is explained by Ramberg: 
While we might be able to formulate a causal theory of reference without using 
the concept of truth [ ... ] testing such a theory presupposes knowledge of the 
truth-value of sentences, knowledge which we have come by independently of 
the theory to be tested.134 
Chapter 3 has shown how Devitt's own CTR works by stipulating references in 
grounding sentences, and from the reference groundings, the truth of sentences (at 
the object level) is determined. Truth at the object level is externally determined, 
according to the CTR. But what of the CTR itself- how can the truth of the theory, 
truth at the meta-level, be justified? It cannot be done by building up from the 
reference of terms to the truth of the theory: for that, a meta-theory of reference to 
determine the reference of the theory's own terms would be required. So Davidson's 
point is that, though Devitt might try "to give a non-linguistic characterization of 
reference,[ ... ] of this there seems no chance"135, for we just come back to where we 
started, trying to determine the truth value of sentences (but this time at the meta-
level- the sentences of a causal theory of reference). So Davidson believes that the 
building block approach is doomed to fail to account adequately for the truth of 
sentences. 
Davidson would agree with Devitt that truth conditions can be described in terms of 
the reference relation, and that the truth value of a sentence can be described as 
composed of "the referential properties of its parts."136; but Davidson does not accept 
that the truth value or conditions of a sentence are determined by the referential 
properties of its parts. For his part, Devitt accepts that "[t]he Davidsonians are of 
134 Ramberg(l989), p. 27. 
135 Davidson (1984). p. 221. 
136 Devitt (1991), p. 174. 
166 
course right to emphasize that the evidence for a semantic explanation is at the level 
of sentences"137; yet he comes to a different conclusion: 
But this does not support the view that truth, but not reference, is a place of 
'direct contact between linguistic theory and events, actions or objects described 
in nonlinguistic terms'"l3B. 
But surely Devitt is only warranted in drawing this conclusion if he can refute 
Davidson's a priori point, outlined in the previous paragraph, that to verify or 
justify any semantic theory (of truth or reference, for example) we will need to use 
the notion of truth, and truth is predicated of sentences. 
On this a priori foundation, Davidson builds an empirical theory of truth and 
interpretation. While "the only way to find out whether a particular expression refers 
to a particular object is to see how that term affects the truth-value of the sentences 
in which it occurs"139, knowing truth-values of sentences is not sufficient to 
determine reference or interpretations. We must then hypothesise in relation to 
what physical evidence a sentence could be considered true, and we do this by giving 
truth conditions. Having provisionally assigned truth values and truth conditions, 
we have a first pass at forming T-sentences. So Davidson's 'holistic method' (in 
contrast to the 'building-block method') "assigns no empirical content directly to 
relations between names or predicates and objects."140 Instead, the holistic method 
assigns empirical content at the level of sentences; and this surely implies that true 
sentences are the points of contact between the physical and the linguistic. 
When Davidson himself tells us that he assumes reference in order to implement his 
theory of interpretation14\ this perhaps sounds to Devitt as if Davidson is saying, 'It 
makes no difference whether a term refers (to a particular physical object) or not, as 
long as I can assume a correspondence relation which gives me the truth conditions 
I need to form the T -sentences which will enable me to predict utterances 
accurately.' This, then, is the charge of epistemological instrumentalism142 ; but it 
does not seem to me to be an accurate description of Davidson's position. True, 
Davidson assumes correspondence as a means of accounting for truth conditions; 
137 Devitt (1991 ), p. 186. 
138 Devitt(I991), p. 186. 
139 Ramberg ( 1989), p. 26. 
140 Davidson (1984), p. 223. 
141 Davidson (1984), p. 222. 
142 
"The suggestion that theories are true or false but that that filet plays no role in our understanding [ ... ofthe theory .. ] will be 
called epistemological instrumentalism." Newton-Smith (1981 ), p. 30. 
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but the constraints of coherence truth, applied in conjunction with empirical 
evidence of circumstances of utterance, ultimately yield an equivalence between a 
pair of sentences most of which are true, and all of which are true under the 
conditions given by the other. 
Davidson's view of reference and satisfaction does not imply that language has no 
correspondence with physical objects; all it implies is that any such correspondence 
is "beyond the reach of direct verification."143 Yet it may be recalled from Part 2 that 
Davidson has "semantical notions of satisfaction and reference [which appeal] to an 
ontology of sequences and the objects ordered by the sequences"144• This 
Davidsonian ontology appears to lack any physicalistic import. Ramberg clears up 
this issue of what kind of objects Davidsonian correspondence corresponds to: 
Davidson calls himself a realist because the only way to construct a semantic 
theory of truth, to give the truth conditions of sentences, is to postulate a 
relation between language and the world. But this relation does not serve 
justificatory purposes of any kind. He is a coherentist because the only way to 
test claims to truth, to determine the truth-value of sentences, is to see how they 
cohere with other truths.J45 
Devitt's view that Davidson has a "special sort of non-physical understanding"146 of 
objects and facts is perhaps based on the assumption that, were Davidson to have 
assumed that the referents (of, for example, scientific terms) are physical, then he 
would advocate using them "to give a rich content to each sentence directly on the 
basis of non-semantic evidence"147. But Devitt would be wrong to make this 
assumption. Davidson does not deny that scientific objects are physical, only that 
their being physical helps much in answering our semantic questions; for "we can be 
no more, or less, sure about meanings than about facts in the world."Wl It is this 
epistemological position that gives Davidsonian semantics an antirealist hue, but 
Davidson still maintains his realist credentials: 
Realism about correct interpretation does not, for me, entail that what someone 
means by his words is independent of what is understood by others, nor does it 
imply that what expressions in a natural language mean is independent of how 
speakers understand one another.I49 
143 Davidson (1984), p. 133. 
144 Davidson (1984), p. 133. 
145 Ramberg ( 1989), p. 47. 
146 Devitt(1991), p. 191-
147 Davidson (1984), p. 225. 
148 Ramberg(1989), p. 47. 
149 Davidson, in Stoeker(ed.) (1993), p. 83. 
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Davidson finds that "[d]oing without reference [as an evidential or explanatory 
notion] is not at all to embrace a policy of doing without semantics or ontology."150 
The objects to which he is overtly committed in his description of the reference 
relation are minimistically conceived; but a fuller consideration of the nature of T-
sentences has shown that true natural language sentences are correspondence true. 
Like the POC, reference is, for Davidson, an instrument to advance an 
interpretation; but that does not make it instrumentalist. This winds up the reply to 
Devitt's charge that Davidson has an instrumentalist conception of reference. 
The final and related charge of instrumentalism is that Davidson's theory of 
interpretation never gets beyond talk of warranted belief to talk of what is true: 
Davidson fails to move from consideration of evidence for the facts to description of 
the facts. I think that this accusation has been successfully dealt with already in the 
discussion of Simon Evnine's claim about the omniscient interpreter argument in 
Part 4. 
Devitt's bold (or reckless?) comment that, for Davidson, "the only 'reality' 
determined [ ... ] consists of T-sentences"151 seems not to acknowledge the theory-
independent nature of the facts, or the epistemic implications of being speakers and 
interpreters of natural languages. If speakers are not mostly talking to each other 
about the facts, how are they talking at all and what are they talking about? 
To conclude briefly, I do not think that Devitt has managed to undermine the POC 
(7) or the Davidsonian theory of interpretation (4) and its a priori claims (5) and (6). 
With his realist credentials intact, I think it fair to conclude that Davidson's 
argument against nontranslatable languages and incommensurable (in Davidson's 
sense) conceptual schemes and for the POC remains intact. 
Part 6: Charity Gets Stiched Up 
Stephen Stich does not directly challenge Davidson's arguments for the POC; 
instead, he argues that the POC is not significant or philosophically interesting. In 
150 Davidson (1984), P- 223_ 
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particular, Stich seeks to demonstrate that "the demarcation between states that are 
intentionally describable and states that are not is going to be vague, context 
sensitive, and observer relative; it will not be stable, or objective, or sharp."152 Stich's 
tactic is to enervate the POC and show that it is then not up to the job it is supposed 
to do in the argument against untranslatability. 
The charitable constraint on beliefs is that most beliefs are common to all language 
speakers. A further Davidsonian premise, discussed in Part 4, is that most beliefs are 
true. Since beliefs which are in fact true are mutually consistent, most beliefs are 
consistent. This final premise will be called the rationality constraint and if it is 
found to be unacceptable, one of the other premises, both of which are essential to 
Davidson's argument against untranslatability, will be undermined. 
To the extent that an interpretee's utterances are not subject to the rationality 
constraint, attempts at interpretation are undermined. For example, an interpreter 
may attribute to an interpretee the belief 'If p then q'. Then the interpretee asserts 
that p. From this belief, p, the interpretee then infers (without any change in 
physical circumstances) that not-q153• The intentional characterisations of the 
interpretee's beliefs are now in question. "If, moreover, our subject as we interpret 
him regularly infers in this silly way, our discontent with our scheme of 
interpretation will grow even more acute."154 So if a belief is to have any content 
ascribed, it must interact with other beliefs "in certain systematic ways"155, that is, "a 
way which more or less mirrors the laws of logic."IS6 If a person believes that If p 
then q and that p, then, if we are to understand him, he must generally infer that q. 
This is a general example of the rationality constraint on beliefs. 
The rationality constraint has been regarded as a strong constraint by some but not 
by others. The strong form, the perfect rationality constraint, insists on consistency 
of all held beliefs, and acceptance of all logical consequences of held beliefs, as a 
condition of beliefs being intentionally describable. The weak form, the minimum 
151 Devitt(l991),p.l91. 
152 Stich (1990), p. 52. 
153 Merely simultaneous acceptance ofp, ifp then q, and not-q is required for irrationality, but I follow Stich's argument. 
154 Stich (1990), p. 35. 
155 Stich(l990), p.49. 
156 Stich (1990), p. 37. 
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rationality constraint is considered in two varieties. The free minimum rationality 
constraint claims that no fixed set of valid inferences or consistent beliefs is needed 
to understand a belief, but that, for any cluster of inferences, there must be "some 
reasonably substantial subset of the inferences that would be required of a perfectly 
rational cognitive agent."157 I will return to this constraint shortly. The tapering 
minimum rationality constraint is the view that: 
intentional characterizability, like baldness, is a matter of degree. As the 
distance between perfect rationality and the rationality displayed by the system 
at hand increases, the intentional characterizability of the system decreases.I58 
However, it seems fair to conclude that Davidson does not advocate the perfect 
rationality constraint. Davidson's theory allows for some difference in beliefs, and 
such difference could be due to inconsistent beliefs on the part of interpreter or 
interpretee. So Stich suggests that "[p]erhaps the most prominent advocate of the 
minimum rationality view is Donald Davidson"159. 
Stich's argument against the minimum rationality constraint on beliefs proceeds as 
follows: 
If what we are doing in offering an intentional characterization of a person's 
cognitive state is identifying it by way of its similarity to a hypothetical state of 
our own, then we should expect that as subjects get less and less similar to us in 
salient respects, we will increasingly lose our grip on how their cognitive states 
might be intentionally characterized.J6o 
Stich illustrates this claim by asking us to imagine a row of people. The second 
person in the row has identical beliefs but one to the first person, the third person 
identical beliefs but one to the second person, and but two to the first person, and so 
on; so "each adjacent pair are very psychologically similar to one another"161• Vital to 
Stich's argument, though, is the further claim that "there are no interesting or 
significant discontinuities: there is no natural or theoretically well-motivated way to 
divide these people into two classes."162 This claim, if true, calls into question the 
status of the POC in belief content ascription; for in order to describe intentionally 
the beliefs of people in the row, "we will be forced to divide them up into two 
radically different groups. The ones relatively close to me have intentionally 
157 Stich (1990), p. 40. 
158 Stich (1990), p. 41. 
159 Stich ( 1990), p. 41. Though Stich is not entirely sure about this, for he tells us that "There are a number of passages in 
which Davidson sounds instead like an advocate of the perfect rationality view." (ibid.). Is Davidson inconsistent or is Stich not 
clear about the POC? 
160 Stich ( 1990), p. 49. 
161 Stich (1990), p. 52. 
162 Stich (1990), p. 52. 
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characterizable states; the ones very far away do not."163 This division "is without any 
psychological significance"164, claims Stich. That is, the cognitive states of the people 
in the row, along with their cognitive processes, are not constrained by charity: the 
POC offers no justifiable way of distinguishing 'real' beliefs from belief-like states 
(those cognitive states not sanctioned by the POC), or 'real' inference from 
inference-like processes (those cognitive processes not sanctioned by the POC). The 
distinctions made by the POC are "observer-relative [and] situation-relative"; they 
are dependent upon the first person in the line (taken as the interpretative norm) 
and the location of the interpretee in the line. There is, says Stich, "no natural or 
theoretically significant boundary"165 found in the line. The rationality constraint is 
therefore not of any demonstrable significance. 
It seems to me that it is by no means certain that Stich's argument addresses the 
POC as Davidson conceives it. For Davidson, interpretation may only occur if there 
is a background of shared belief. The division in the line of people, if there were such 
a division, is therefore clear: the row of people would extend as long as each member 
would be able to evidence beliefs (in the form of utterances) a majority of which are 
in agreement with the interpreter's beliefs. Davidson's point is that an alien who 
would not be able to demonstrate substantial agreement is an alien without beliefs 
altogether and without a natural language. Stich seems to think it possible to extend 
the line in terms of difference of beliefs, for he envisages a line with all-but full 
agreement to all-but no agreement. Yet, as far as I can see, such a line does not 
figure in Davidson's view of interpretation. That is, Stich's line presupposes a 
tapering minimum rationality constraint; but Davidsonian charity envisages a free 
minimum rationality constraint. Stich has presented an argument against the former 
but not the latter. 
In an example which parallels Stich's illustration of tapering minimal rationality, 
Davidson asks us to consider a row of different language speakers in which it is 
suggested that "the relation of translatability is not transitive"166: 
The idea is that some language, say Saturnian, may be translatable into English, 
and some further language, like Plutonian, may be translatable into Saturnian, 
while Plutonian is not translatable into English. Enough translatable differences 
163 Stich ( 1990), p. 53. 
164 Stich ( 1990), p. 53. 
165 Stich (1990), p. 52. 
166 Davidson ( 1984 ), p. 186. 
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may add up to an untranslatable one [ ... ] Corresponding to this distant language 
would be a system of concepts altogether alien to us [i.e., ones we could not 
understand] ,167 
The point Davidson makes is that if the differences in meanings are translatable 
between two natural languages, they will never add up to even partial 
untranslatability between any natural languages. Part 1 of this chapter pointed out 
that even partial translation failure is not possible under radical interpretation, and 
made the following distinctions: 
(a) The meaning of s 
(b) What the alien believes 
(c) The alien holds that s is true. 
The POC does not ultimately constrain any individual belief; so an interpreter may 
not combine (c) and (b) to get (a). However, the evidence still available to the radical 
interpreter is the circumstances of other token utterances of s, and of sentences with 
structural similarities to s. Given evidence particularly of the latter kind (where the 
POC is applicable in a majority of cases), the radical interpreter could determine (a). 
Combining (a) and (c), the interpreter can adduce (b). While the alien may have 
some different beliefs to those of the radical interpreter in the same circumstances, 
(in which cases is false by the interpreter's lights), the "totality of possible sensory 
evidence, past, present and future"168 along with the appropriate structural 
constraints are such that the radical interpreter will be able to interpret the sentence 
expressing that different belief: 
Attributions of belief are publicly verifiable as interpretations, being based on 
the same evidence: if we can understand what a person says, we can know what 
he believes.J69 
In Stich's example, the variable is not the language spoken but the beliefs. So the 
interpreter would already understand (a) and he would know (c); so he could always 
determine (b). Stich wants to address the claim that enough differences in belief 
would at some point add up to having no intentionally characterizable beliefs. 
Davidson, if he agreed with such a claim, would perhaps also object that it clumsily 
comes at the problem from the wrong end; for when there are too many differences 
ofbelief, there are no beliefs at all to be reckoned with. Avoiding the clumsiness, 
Davidson could say that without mostly the same beliefs, an interpreter has no 
linguistic evidence that an interpretee has beliefs at all. And if an interpreter can 
ascribe content to one alien belief, he can in principle do so to all. Stich's row seems 
167 Davidson ( 1984 ), 1'. 186. 
168 Davidson (1984), p. 193. 
169 Davidson (1984), p. 153. 
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to be a tacit denial of this point, for it suggests that there can be believers with some 
contentful beliefs, but not enough of them for content to be ascribed. 
I conclude that Stich's argument against the tapering minimum rationality 
constraint is no argument against the free minimum rationality constraint, and so is 
no argument against the Davidsonian POC or the method of radical interpretation. 
Part 7: Conclusion 
The foregoing discussions suggest to me that Davidson shows that natural languages 
are intertranslatable. This conclusion implies that there is no principled bar on 
communication between people who speak different languages. While this is no 
mean achievement, it is Davidson's success in justifying the POC which has put paid 
to the MVT's claim that in the common domain a theory and its successor may, due 
to meaning variance, have few common consequences because the terms of one are 
logically independent of the other. The POC has established that language speakers, 
when placed under common causal interactions with their environment, will, most 
of the time, be disposed to assent to sentences which have the same meanings. In the 
cases where they are not so disposed, the overall constraint of charity means that an 
interpreter will always be able to state, in the ML, the conditions under which an OL 
sentence is true. By the same token, a natural language speaker who holds a theory 
T 2 will in principle always be able to state the conditions under which utterances of a 
speaker of a theory Tt are true. Consequently, the truth claims of the latter are never 
in principle semantically independent of those of the former. 
My main disagreement with Davidson's paper 'On the Very Idea of a Conceptual 
Scheme' is not with his conception of language, but with his view of conceptual 
schemes. I see no good reason to claim, as Davidson does17°, that all different 
conceptual schemes are incommensurable, and that incommensurable conceptual 
schemes are somehow equivalent to languages which fail of intertranslatability. 
While such notions as conceptual schemes or world views may well imply forms of 
representationalism which Davidson rejects, I do not believe that Davidson's 
semantic arguments show that these notions are fundamentally incoherent. Rather, 
170 See Part 1, claims (2) and (3). 
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I am inclined to agree with Larry Laudan that "establishing relations of mutual 
translatability is a precondition for determining that they are different conceptual 
schemes."171 
Many of Feyerabend's comments suggest that the notions or taxonomy of one theory 
do not fit those of another theory, but he usually veers away from claiming explicitly 
that their languages cannot be translated. Certainly the later Feyerabend goes out of 
his way to deny that schemes or "cultures are more or less closed entities"172 which 
are not open to understanding by outsiders. In the transition from classical physics 
to quantum theory: 
every stage of the transformation was discussed. There were clear problems; 
they worried both the radicals and the conservatives. Many people suggested 
solutions. These solutions, too, were understood by the contending parties [ ... ] 
The final clash between the new philosophy and its classical predecessor found 
its most dramatic expression between the debate between Bohr and Einstein. 
Did Bohr and Einstein talk past each other? No.l73 
Of course there may have been misunderstandings between the two great men, but 
they were not doomed to misunderstanding each other forever! In the last Part, I 
trace a Davidsonian description of communication pathology in such encounters and 
regard this as a kind of incommensurability. 
Part 8: Another Kind of Incommensurability 
Bjern T. Ramberg provides "an analysis of the semantics of incommensurability"174. 
Ramberg's analysis regards the roots of incommensurability as being embedded not 
in the nontranslatability of a language but rather in its mistranslation. Ramberg 
holds that such a "semantic obstruction"175 is in principle only a temporary, or 
temporal, communication problem which can be overcome once the role of radical 
interpreter is adopted. 
Donald Davidson has pointed out that we resort to use of the principle of charity and 
do "off the cuff interpretation"176 even when understanding speakers of the same 
171 Laudan (1996), p. 13. My italics. 
172 Feyembend ( 1995), p. 151. 
173 Fcyerabend (1999), p. 267. 
174 Ramberg ( 1989), p. 115. 
175 Ramherg(1989), p. 119. 
176 Davidson ( 1984 ), p. 196. 
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natural language. However, interpretation is not always necessary: speakers of the 
same language can frequently rely on one another to use words in similar ways. It is 
when the regularities disappear that interlocutors need to begin interpreting. So 
interpretation is what needs to be resorted to when reliance on convention does not 
yield a right interpretation. 
Ramberg argues that a semantic problem occurs when one speaker relies on the 
wrong conventions to understand his interlocutor. In such a case, one is trying to 
"interpret others [by] applying linguistic conventions to which they are not a 
party."m Correct translation of the misunderstood interlocutor has not been 
achieved because "interpretation, [that is, alteration of the theory of truth] rather 
than reliance on convention, is required to a greater degree than is usual"178, but 
interpretation has not been (sufficiently) employed. The resulting 
misunderstanding, claims Ramberg, is the stuff of incommensurability179: 
Incommensurability in discourse can only begin to occur once we think we have 
begun to agree on linguistic conventions, but in actuality remain confused as to 
which language we are using.tso 
Ramberg is justified (thanks to Davidson) in discounting there being 
nontranslatable languages, and so I think that he is wise to separate the issue of 
nontranslatability from the useful one of mistranslation. The question is: 'How close 
is Ramberg's proposal to the semantic IT? 
From Chapter 1 it will be recalled that two successive theories are semantically 
incommensurable if they are inconsistent, if the terms of the former have different 
meanings in the latter, and if they are logically or semantically mutually 
independent. The passive interpreter (as opposed to the active radical interpreter 
who is carefully studying utterance dispositions), as represented by the Received 
View, assumes that the conventions governing 'impetus' are the same as those 
governing the use of 'momentum' and translates 'impetus' as 'momentum' so that 
theory reduction is supported. Were the passive interpreter to become an active 
radical interpreter, however, he will have some evidence suggesting that, while the 
impetus theory, contains explicable error, impetus is momentum; but he will also 
177 Ramberg(l989), p. 132. 
178 Ramberg ( 1989), p. 131. 
179 Ramberg's explanation implies that the interpretee's terms have meanings different to those of the interpreter, and this 
clearly covers the meaning change element ofthe MVT. 
180 Ramberg(\989), p. 132. 
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have some evidence that impetus theory is false and that impetus is not momentum. 
(The Davidsonian approach does not tell us whether specific entities exist or not, or 
what the translation of any specific sentence is.) The case where impetus is not 
momentum is a textbook example of meaning change between two successive 
theories. When this case applies, but the interpreter assumes, without bothering to 
consult the evidence, that impetus IS momentum, then Rambergian 
incommensurability is the result. 
It is clear, then, that Ramberg's semantic proposal for the incommensurability thesis 
really only addresses the meaning change element. For the rest of this short section, 
I suggest slight additions to Ramberg's proposal in order to incorporate the 
conditions of inconsistency and something like logical independence. The hope is 
that the result will be something yet closer to the semantic proposals of the IT. 
The only kind of disagreement which Ramberg's suggestion necessarily includes is 
disagreement over an interpretation. One person's utterance, s, is translated as p 
when p is not a correct translation of s. But from this disagreement it does not follow 
that sand pare inconsistent. My first little addition to Ramberg's description is that 
s and p must be mutually inconsistent. This simple requirement is that of 
Feyerabend's semantic IT. An interesting consequence of this requirement as 
regards incommensurable conflicts is that the inconsistency lies between s and its 
mistranslation, p. So correct translation is a necessary and sufficient condition for 
resolution of this kind of conflict. Of course, this is not to say that the conflict 
between the impetus theory and Newtonian mechanics magically disappears when 
we are good interpreters! Some of the beliefs of one who holds the impetus theory 
are, when correctly translated, inconsistent with one who holds Newtonian 
mechanics. At this point, then, it is probably a good idea to distinguish on the one 
hand between conflict due only to mistranslation, and on the other hand genuine 
conflict181• 
The logical independence requirement will have to be dropped for reasons given in 
Chapter 1. What Ramberg's approach cleverly hints at is that incommensurable 
181 The distinction may explain Feyerabend's remark that theories "may be incommensurable in some interpretations, not 
incommensurable in others." Feyerabend (1978), p. 68, n. 118. 
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conflicts have an air of intractability: the mistranslation can persist for a long time. 
Ramberg offers a mechanism whereby this may occur: one thinks that one's own 
linguistic conventions yield the right translation. I think that the idea of 
intractability should be enlarged on because it seems to capture something like the 
logical independence claim of the semantic IT. 
The POC and other premises of Davidson's radical translation put general 
constraints on the beliefs of speakers of natural languages. Without the agreement 
and rationality constraints, Davidson argues, interpretation would be inconceivable: 
If we cannot find a way to interpret the utterances and other behavior of a 
creature as revealing sets of beliefs largely consistent and true by our own 
standards, we have no reason to count that creature as rational, as having 
beliefs, or as saying anything at a11JB2 
The rationality or consistency constraint on beliefs is motivated by the thought that 
too much irrational inference on the part of an interpretee would undermine 
attempts at interpretation. The rationality constraint can also work the other way: 
misinterpretation can undermine understanding the reasoning of the interpretee, so 
that the interpretee's inference patterns seem wildly irrational. In a situation where 
an interpreter has misinterpreted an interpretee in the way described so far in Part 
9, and where the misascribed belief is viewed as part of a reasoning process (such as 
theoretical explanation), then the interpretee's reasoning could well appear suspect 
to the interpreter. This gives the conflict another dimension. 
The new dimension, seen in terms of an undermined rationality constraint, could 
look something like this. Let's say that an interpretee has three consistent beliefs, 
that: 
(i) If p then q 
(ii) p 
(iii) q. 
Then let's say that some utterance types expressing the third belief are 
misinterpreted (in the Ramberg way) as asserting that not-q. The interpreter, 
perceiving that the interpretee is being unreasonable, must decide if the apparent 
irrationality is explained by poor cognitive performance on the part of the 
interpretee, or poor interpretation on his own part. Since the interpreter is under the 
impression that they are 'speaking the same language' he will more likely feel 
182 Davidson (1984), p. 137. 
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inclined to try and convince the interpretee that he, the interpretee, is being 
irrational. This scenario seems to create conditions suitable for a certain kind of 
protracted conflict which I think can be usefully described as incommensurable. For, 
ironically, the more an interpretee tries to justify himself and argue using utterances 
of the type misinterpreted as expressing that not-q, the more irrational he will 
appear to the interpreter. For example, "How can you say that q and also say that 
not-q?" is not an uncommon question (or implied accusation that the other person is 
obtuse) in this kind of conflict. It is usually met with the reply: "I didn't say that". 
This response is often regarded as further evidence of the interpretee's poor 
cognitive performance. 
The apparent failure of the rationality requirement (due to misinterpretation) is my 
proposed substitute for the logical independence of the MVT. What I am proposing 
instead is perceived inconsistency within a theory from the point of view of 
Ramberg's duff interpreter. This suggestion at least has the merits of being 
consistent with the inconsistency claim of the MVT and of attempting to include a 
substitute for logical independence. It also captures what I think is the flavour of the 
problematic logical independence claim, which is that 'the other guy's theory does 
not make sense to me'1B3. 
Were the interpreter to stop relying on linguistic conventions and begin to radically 
interpret, the above conflict would be transformed. Continuing in the Davidsonian 
vein, the interpretee would be found to be largely rational and largely in agreement 
with the interpreter; and the interpreter, in understanding aright, could find out 
where their theories actually differed (if at all). Then there would be a different 
conflict - and a different kind of conflict. 
Conflict Resolution theorists speak of the need, in the case of intractable conflict, to 
transform the conflict, where "transforming an intractable conflict into a tractable 
one involves changing the understanding of that conflict. "184 On way of going about 
such a transformation is by controlled communication, an approach to conflict 
founded on the premise that: 
183 See Feyerabend (1978), p. 70. 
184 KTiesberg, Terrell, and Thnrson (eds.) (1989), p. 5. 
179 
The process of resolution of conflict is essentially the process of testing whether 
information is received as was transmitted, and whether what was transmitted 
was sent deliberately and contained accurate information.JBs 
The MVT describes incommensurable misinterpretations, misinterpretations which 
cause intractable conflicts where (at least) one side does not understand what the 
other is saying. The kind of incommensurability thesis here proposed is conceived of 
as "a diachronic relation, not a synchronic one"186 between the languages (in 
Davidson's sense) of the holders of different theories.; for "[i]n incommensurable 
discourse, participants who take themselves to be speaking the same language, 
actually are not."187 
185 Burton (1969), p. 55. 
186 Ramberg ( 1989), p. 131. 
187 Ramberg(l989), p. 130. 
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General Conclusion 
It is sometimes thought that, in his 1962 critique of the Received View of scientific 
theories, Paul Feyerabend was attacking a man of straw. The incommensurability 
thesis (IT) which ensued as part of that attack is then regarded as misguided from 
the very start. I have opposed such a view and have argued that Paul Feyerabend's 
'Explanation, Reduction and Empiricism' was a well-justified critique of the 
Received View of scientific theories. The derivability, consistency, and meaning 
invariance conditions do logically follow from Nagelian views about theory reduction 
and development. 
Admittedly, Carl Hempel did not share Nagel's view that a (well-confirmed) 
successor theory would always, in principle, reduce its predecessor; so Hempel did 
not hold that a successor theory would always, in principle, be able to explain its 
predecessor. The derivability condition is not pinnable on Hempel. However, a 
consequence of the double-language model of scientific theories is that two well-
confirmed theories in a common domain would be mutually consistent and their 
(observation) terms would be meaning-invariant.~ When such theories are mutually 
inconsistent, Hempel insists that such a state of affairs is an anomaly which will, in 
principle, be eventually resolved by observationally based crucial experiments 
falsifying one of them. In this case, though, the falsified theory is not, technically 
speaking, the same theory which was empirically adequate in the common domain, 
for new correspondence rules must apply. 2 Hempel also maintains that, when a 
hypothesis or theory is consistent with a currently well-confirmed theory, it is to that 
hypothesis's (or theory's) advantage. The Hempelian picture is therefore that 
successive theories are likely consistent and (observationally) meaning invariant; 
but establishing that a predecessor is a logical consequence of its successor requires 
empirically grounded correspondence rules rather than a priori fiat. In short, the 
derivability, consistency, and meaning invariance conditions do not sit as well on the 
Hempelian Received View as they sat on the Nagelian; but it would be an 
exaggeration to claim that the three conditions have little to do with the Hempelian 
Received View. 
1 In the foregoing pages I tJy to spell out- and distinguish - exactly what meaning invariance means for observation and 
theoretical terms. 
181 
This misfit between Hempel and the three conditions does not matter very much, for 
Feyerabend, in opposing the three conditions, addresses examples in which Hempel 
says the three conditions do apply. Feyerabend demonstrates how Hempel's (and 
Nagel's) previously accepted examples of theory reduction and explanation fail to 
meet the requirements which reduction and explanation imply (namely, derivability, 
consistency, and meaning invariance). Feyerabend's argument from example, along 
with his other two kinds of argument against the Received View, presuppose that 
inconsistencies at the theoretical level work through to the observational level; this 
contrasts with the logical empiricist view that observational terms inform the 
theoretical ones. Feyerabend's arguments against the Received View therefore rely 
on the view that there are internal and holistic constraints on the meanings of 
scientific terms. 
The semantic IT claims that there are some general successive theories such that: 
(1) the derivability, consistency and meaning invariance conditions do not hold, even 
within a common domain. 
The IT also claims that: 
(2) the three above conditions fail to hold because of meaning holism 
and that 
(3) such meaning holism allows that (parts of) successor theories may be logically 
independent of their predecessors, even in the common domain. 
Feyerabend's attacks on the Received View focus on showing how some successive, 
empirically adequate theories are inconsistent within a common domain. Since 
theoretical inconsistency is the thrust of his arguments, Feyerabend is wrong to 
claim that such inconsistent theories are logically independent. 
The theory of meaning which Feyerabend proposes in support of semantic 
internalism and holism, the Pragmatic Theory of Observation (PTO), is found 
wanting.3 But this is not sufficient cause to dismiss the IT. 
2 Since new observations, experiments, or measuring instruments will have been used. 
3 Also found wanting is Feyerabend's claim that the PTO proposes the indeterminacy of translation thesis; but a number of 
other Quinean elements are found in the PTO. 
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Since the arguments supporting (1) (and (3)) have presupposed (2), a largely 
externalist view of meaning, if convincing, would fatally undermine the IT. Causal 
theories of reference have been used with this purpose in mind. However, I judge 
that the CTRs of Putnam, Devitt, Kitcher, and Psillos fail to convince for a number of 
reasons, many of which revolve around the need for some "structural component"4 
in addition to ostension. s 
These, and other criticisms of using theories of reference to combat the IT, lead me 
to wonder whether a theory of reference based on the view that there is only one true 
way to separate individuals into kinds is the wrong way to think of reference. 
Feyerabend seems to wonder this too. An alternative would be a theory of reference 
which embraces the view that there are various - even mutually inconsistent - ways 
of correctly dividing the world into kinds. Under this approach to reference, two 
competitor theories could be true in a common domain and yet each theory could 
refer to many objects simply not referred to at all - or objects whose existence is even 
forbidden -by the other theory. This pluralist understanding of reference might then 
further explicate the semantic IT by showing how something like (3) can be 
proposed in conjunction with (1) and (2). However, I make no attempt to give any 
further details of such a theory of reference. 
An other way to attack (3) is to argue about truth rather than reference. If two 
theories share a common domain but are logically independent of each other, then 
the truth of one will imply nothing about the truth of the other theory. Donald 
Davidson argues that, were this the case, translation from one theory to the other 
would fail; and that permanent and principled failure of translation between two 
natural languages is unacceptable; so theories cannot exhibit in a common domain 
the logical independence asserted in (3). I think that Davidson's argument is 
convincing, but I argue that nontranslatability is not, or ought not to be considered, 
a part of the semantic IT. 
4 Devitt, M. & Sterelny, K. (1987), quoted in Stanford, P. Kyle & Kitcher, P. (2000), p. 100. 
5 
"Something about the mental state of the grounder must determine which putative nature of the sample is the one relevant to 
the grounding, and should it have no such nature the grounding will filii. It is very difficult to say exactly what determines the 
relevant nature." ibid., p. 101. 
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I outline a Davidsonian account6 of the IT in which (3) is replaced by temporary (but 
possibly long-term) failure to translate correctly. In this scenario, chronic 
mistranslation on the interpreter's part leads the interpreter to regard (some of) the 
interpretee's inferences as irrational; and this, in turn, perpetuates the interpreter's 
view that the interpretee is not making sense. I take it that this captures something 
of the gist of (3) (or what (3) ought to be claiming in stead oflogical independence). 
It seems to me that researching the semantic claims of the IT still has plenty of 
mileage. Element (1) of the IT is now generally accepted and plenty of work is being 
done on internalism and holism (element (2)). As for finding adequate semantic 
substitutes for (3), fewer suggestions have been forthcoming. The tendency here is to 
offer epistemological alternatives to (3). But if the semantic IT is a valid research 
programme, as I think it is, then its value and interest surely lies in finding out what 
it is about language that makes so fraught with difficulty our understanding 
another's general theory or world-view. 
6 Developing ideas ofBjem T. Ramberg. 
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